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For this research, the dynamics of how inter-organisational trust is violated and repaired is 
investigated, thus contributing to the burgeoning field of inter-organisational trust violation and 
repair literature. Four identified theoretical and empirical gaps identified from the extant literature 
are addressed: i) single point in time, ii) single dimension of trust, iii) single outcome of trust repair, 
and iv) single party focus, by drawing on longitudinal, dyadic, comparative multiple case study 
data.  
From a process perspective, this study involves collecting, analysing, and presenting the data 
with respect to the level of competence and goodwill trust across the pre-transgression, trust 
violation, trust repair, and post-repair stages. Over a two-year data collection period, 59 semi-
structured, face-to-face interviews with respondents across organisational hierarchies (e.g. GMs, 
VPs, PMs, QA teams, RD teams, and procurement managers) and from both buyers and suppliers 
in the Taiwanese electronics industry were conducted. Based on the four case studies that consist 
of rich narratives and through representative graphical illustrations, the temporal dynamics of 
competence and goodwill trust over time are explored.  
The findings reveal that the process of trust violation and repair entails multiple mini-episodic 
interactions between the buyer and the supplier that constantly shape the level of trust dynamically. 
In the trust violation stage, trust violation consists of multiple transgressions. If these transgressions 
are met with ineffective reparative attempts (i.e. recalibration practices), then this generally, first, 
violates competence trust and then, gradually spills over into goodwill trust violation. In the trust 
repair stage, goodwill trust is repaired earlier than competence trust, which appears to be opposite 
to the order of their being built. Through his study, critical factors that facilitate and hinder trust 
violation and repair stages, respectively, are identified, thereby deepening the understanding of 
how differential outcomes of trust repair are achieved.  
The findings not only address the gaps identified in the theory, for they also have significant 
managerial implications. Accordingly, a set of recommended strategies is put forward for managers 
to facilitate mitigation of the severity of trust violation and to repair the violated trust effectively. 
This could reduce significant operational and financial losses associated with trust violation and 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH 
Inter-organisational trust is a critical component within buyer-supplier relationships 
(Brinkhoff et al., 2015; Connelly et al., 2018; Johnston et al., 2004; Zaheer et al., 1998). It 
serves as an organising principle that creates desired and necessary conditions for inter-
organisational exchanges that promote high performance (McEvily et al., 2003). The extant 
literature has shown that inter-organisational trust brings about multiple benefits to inter-
organisational relationships, including improved efficiency and productivity (Gulati and 
Nickerson, 2008; Panayides and Lun, 2009), reduced transaction and search costs (Luo, 2002; 
Squire et al., 2009), higher relationship-specific investment (Hoffmann et al., 2010), and 
improved financial performance (Corsten and Feld, 2005; Fink and Kessler, 2010). 
Despite acknowledgement of these benefits, trust is sometimes violated by supplier 
induced disruptions (Lumineau et al., 2015), such as under-capacity, quality issues (e.g. 
unauthorised adjustments to the product specifications and defective products), significant 
increases in price, delays in product delivery, or inappropriate cancellation of production (SEC 
annual report, 2017). For example, Prevent Group halted product deliveries to Volkswagen in 
2015 by demanding a 1000% price increase, which caused $120 million loss to the buyer 
(Automotive Logistics, 2018). Volkswagen’s trust in Prevent Group was severely violated as 
its spokesperson noted: “at all times, [Volkswagen maintains] a reliable and trustworthy 
relationship with its suppliers […] in this specific case, we had to take the necessary steps” 
(Deutsch Welle, 2018). 
The omnipresence of supplier-induced disruptions poses a significant threat to inter-
organisational trust violations (Wang et al., 2014). Regarding which, 47% of supplier 
collaborations failed with the major reason being attributable to violated trust (Procurement 
Leaders, 2017). As a result, trust violations undermine the buyer’s positive expectations of the 
supplier’s behaviour and in turn, reduce the buyer’s willingness to rely on the supplier (e.g. 
decreased purchase volume). They can also result in a loss of financial and human resources 
as well as reputation on both sides of the dyad, even leading to relationship dissolution in the 
most severe situations (Hibbard et al., 2001; Holmlund and Hobbs, 2009).  
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Of course, violated trust can also be repaired. The nature of some constrained supply 
markets means that alternatives are not always available to buyers and therefore, termination 
is not an option or would incur significant losses, leaving repair the only viable solution 
(Caldwell and Howard, 2014; Tahtinen and Vaaland, 2006). Alternatively, one or both parties 
might wish to sustain the benefits associated with the trusting relationship and thus seek active 
repair (cf. Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan, 2009). In light of this, the importance of inter-
organisational trust violation and repair has received increasing attention from academics and 
practitioners (Kramer and Lewicki, 2010). 
Despite growing recognition that trust violation and repair between buyers is an 
important managerial challenge, there are at least four significant gaps in the extant 
scholarship. First, the majority of studies are constrained to a static, cross-sectional analysis. 
This means, that a single transgression is assumed to trigger trust violation automatically and 
immediately to a point where trust repair may be required. Similarly, reparative responses are 
assumed to affect the outcome of a repair immediately and simultaneously. Largely this is 
attributable to the primacy given to survey-based and experimental designs (e.g. Wang and 
Huff, 2007; Wang et al., 2014; Yu et al., 2017), both of which involve adopting a cross-
sectional research approach. However, trust is, rather, a dynamic state indicating “an ongoing 
process that must be initiated, maintained, sometimes restored and continuously 
authenticated” (Flores and Solomon, 1998, p. 206) that is based on constant updates of 
information and experience during inter-organisational interactions (Luo, 2004). Kramer and 
Lewicki (2010, p. 268) add that “we will learn little about real trust repair (and the 
effectiveness of various strategies and tactics) until we can more accurately calibrate trust 
violation dynamics over time”. 
Second, in prior trust violation and repair studies trust has been examined as an 
aggregated construct, leaving more granular effects from different trust dimensions – 
competence and goodwill - understudied (one notable exception is the study by Malhotra and 
Lumineau, 2011). In particular, the impact of transgressions and reparative responses on 
shaping both dimensions of trust still remain unclear (Connelly et al., 2018). It is important 
not only because competence and goodwill trust are conceptually distinctive constructs that 
may be differentially violated and repaired (Kim et al., 2004), but also, because the two trust 




Third, the extant literature has provided a limited understanding of the relative 
effectiveness of responses when compared with each other. It often overlooks the role of the 
level of prior trust (before the transgression) plays and anchors in the trust violation process. 
Specifically, the effectiveness of responses in comparison to the prior trust still remains largely 
under-researched despite scholarly contentions over potential restoration as well as the 
upward, and downward recalibration of trust (Kramer and Lewicki, 2010). It is important to 
understand the nuance of how various reparative responses adopted at different times, by 
different actors, and with different intensity, may result in different post-repair outcomes.  
Finally, past studies have also largely assumed that trust violation and repair is 
predominantly driven by the trustee’s behaviour (in this case the supplier) (Kim et al., 2009), 
which is unilaterally evaluated by the trustor (the buyer) (e.g. Wang et al., 2014). However, 
the buyer and the supplier in fact “consider others’ reactions when determining how to repair 
or respond, trust violation and repair processes are not independent, dyadic events” (Yu et 
al., 2017, p. 233). This is critical not only because it provides a more accurate understanding 
of the phenomena via evidence constructed by perceptions of both parties, but also because it 
reflects the reality that trust violation and repair are characterised as a process of dynamic 
negotiation between the trustor and the trustee (Kim et al., 2009). 
Given the gaps identified above, the overarching aim of this thesis is to explore the 
dynamics of the trust violation and repair process in inter-organisational relationships. Two 
distinct, yet interrelated, research questions are constructed to guide this process, as follows. 
 
RQ1: What are the dynamics of competence and goodwill trust in the trust violation stage? 
To address this research question, the emergence, the development, and consequences of 
a transgression(s) and how these violate competence and goodwill trust over time until the 
relationship reaches deadlock are investigated. Moreover, RQ1 requires identifying critical 
factors that facilitate or hinder the trust violation process.  
 
RQ2. What are the dynamics of competence and goodwill trust in the trust repair stage? 
In addressing this research question, the transition from trust violation to repair stages is 
examined. There is also an investigation of the effect of reparative responses enacted by the 
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buyer and the supplier on repairing competence and goodwill trust over time. Similar to RQ1, 
this research question also requires uncovering critical factors that facilitate or hinder the trust 
repair process. Importantly, the study reflects on the responses in light of the previous trust 
violation, thereby connecting the two stages of the process that are largely unconnected in the 
extant literature.  
 
1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE CONTRIBUTION  
This thesis contributes to both theory and practice. With respect to its theoretical contributions, 
first, a processual view is taken that reveals differential rates of violation and repair with 
respect to competence and goodwill trust. Moreover, it uncovers the timing and sensitivity of 
competence and goodwill trust as well as the interaction of both dimensions over the trust 
violation and repair stages (Malhotra and Lumineau, 2011). Second, this research identifies 
responses and factors that affect competence and goodwill trust in the trust violation and repair 
stages. It contributes to the limited prior understanding of the initiation, acceleration, and 
deceleration of trust violation and repair. Last, this study contributes to the extant literature by 
identifying negative and positive turning points that facilitate the understanding of transitions 
of the level of trust, whilst also revealing potential thresholds that accelerate the trust violation 
and repair (Dirks et al., 2009).  
Empirically, this study captures four temporal stages including: pre-transgression, trust 
violation, trust repair, and post-repair (Dirks et al., 2009). This facilitates an understanding of 
how the characteristics of previous stages actually shape or determine subsequent outcomes. 
This research contributes to the literature by overcoming the assumed linearity and one-sided 
focus by capturing actions and reactions enacted by both the buyer and the supplier over time 
(Stevens et al., 2015). Whilst a large number of prior studies have been grounded in either 
conceptual or survey/experimental settings, for this work the dyadic multiple case study 
method based on longitudinal data is adopted to capture the processes of trust violation and 
repair. In addition, graphical illustrations are provided to represent and compare the data across 
different cases.  
With respect to practical contributions, as inter-organisational trust is a critical source of 
firms’ competitive advantage, this study provides a set of recommended strategies to contain 
the trust violation and quickly repair the violated trust. These could help organisations to 
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reduce operational and financial resources spent in the process and to restore normal 
operations in a timely manner.    
1.3 OVERVIEW OF THE METHODOLOGY  
An under-represented longitudinal and dyadic research methodology is adopted for 
investigating trust violation and repair processes from both the buyer and supplier sides over 
time. More specifically, in-depth, multiple case studies based on a theoretical sampling of 
differential outcomes of trust repair (restoration, down- or up-ward recalibration) are utilised. 
Overall, the data collection yielded 59 in-depth semi-structured interviews across operating to 
corporate level personnel in the Taiwanese electronics industry. Different types of secondary 
data (e.g. industry reports, company reports, and technical reports) were also gathered that 
complemented the rich primary dataset. Primary and secondary datasets were collected by 
following four buyer-supplier dyads over time, thus offering a unique opportunity to 
investigate the dynamic process of trust violation and repair (Suddaby, 2006). 
The selection of the Taiwanese electronics industry is particularly pertinent for two 
reasons. First, the extant literature suggests that buyers in the high-tech industry tend to place 
higher importance on trust towards suppliers, which manifests itself in the sense of affiliation 
and identification (Ruyter et al., 2001). Second, Taiwanese electronics manufacturers maintain 
their cost competitiveness via close cooperation with upstream and downstream firms (Hwang 
and Choung, 2014). These trusting relationships between OEMs, suppliers and other partners 
in the supply chain (e.g. distributors and contract manufacturers) are critical to success in 
competitive environments.   
 
1.4 OUTLINE OF THESIS  
This thesis comprises seven chapters, the first being the present one, which has introduced the 
background to the research, provided the research questions under investigation, given an 
overview of contribution, and provided an overview of the methodology. The remainder of the 





Chapter two: literature review 
This chapter synthesises the relevant literature in order to define the focus of this study. 
Specifically, there is a review of the extant literature on inter-organisational trust, including 
its definition, emergence, and consequences, followed by a description of the trust violation 
and repair process. Then, the definition and outcomes of trust violation, as well as factors 
affecting it across interpersonal and inter-organisational trust violation studies, are covered. 
The research questions are derived from specific gaps identified in the review. 
 
Chapter three: methodology  
This chapter outlines the research philosophy and methodology that guide the study. The 
research type, strategy, and design based on their appropriateness for addressing the research 
questions are explained and justified. Following this, the research credibility (i.e. validity and 
reliability) measures are described and the data analysis steps delineated. 
 
Chapter four: within-case analysis  
This chapter presents the findings of the empirical investigation across the four cases. Each 
case begins with a brief background of the companies (the buyer and the supplier) and a 
graphical illustration of the overall dynamics of trust violation and repair. Then, this is broken 
down into six distinctive phases: pre-transgression stage, negative turning point, trust violation 
stage, positive turning point, trust repair stage, and post-repair stage. Each stage contains 
detailed narratives supported by interview quotes from both the buyer and supplier sides.  
 
Chapter five: cross-case analysis  
This chapter consolidates the findings from the within-case analysis, identifying key insights 
and factors that allow for the research questions to be addressed. These insights and factors 
are examined in greater depth and validated across the four investigated cases to ascertain their 




Chapter six: discussion  
This chapter reflects on the research findings by revisiting the research questions. In addition, 
the findings are compared and contrasted with the past literature in order to identify potential 
similarities and differences, which are reconciled with theoretical explanations.  
 
Chapter seven: conclusion  
This chapter discusses the theoretical and empirical contributions of the research as well as 
managerial implications. The limitations of this study are presented, followed by suggestions 




This chapter has provided the background to this thesis by introducing the research context, 
research aim and objectives, the research context, the initial conceptual framework and by 
[providing an outline of the thesis structure. The following chapter examines the research 





CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
INTRODUCTION TO THE CHAPTER  
This chapter reviews the background literature that supports the development of two research 
questions. Section 2.1 begins with the vulnerability of buyer-supplier relationships and 
reviews different streams of literature that examine the outcomes of and responses to supply 
chain disturbances. Section 2.2 presents the definition, dimensions, and consequences of inter-
organisational trust, whilst section 2.3 reviews the overall process of trust repair. Sections 2.4 
and 2.5 review trust violation studies at the interpersonal and inter-organisational levels, 
followed by section 2.6, a synopsis of cross-level fertilisation regarding trust violation. 
Sections 2.7 and 2.8 discuss trust repair research across the interpersonal and inter-
organisational levels. Then, section 2.9 provides a cross-level synopsis on trust repair. Finally, 
section 2.10 integrates the extant literature and provides the two research questions. 
 
2.1 THE VULNERABILITY OF BUYER-SUPPLIER RELATIONSHIPS  
To accommodate increasingly intensified competition, shortened product lifecycle, and high 
inventory and logistics costs (Das, 2011; Ruyter et al., 2001), firms have shifted from arms-
length transactional relationships to long-term collaborative ones with their strategic supply 
chain partners in order to utilise other firms’ capabilities and resources (Kannan and Tan, 2006; 
Wisner et al., 2014).  
Among various supply chain configurations (i.e. vertical, horizontal, and network 
collaboration), vertical collaboration between buyers and suppliers is the most common form 
and particularly focused upon in this thesis, because it is relatively difficult for firms to engage 
in direct collaboration outside one-tier upstream and downstream partners, providing limited 
resources and insufficient information (Autry and Golicic, 2010; Fawcett and Magnan, 2002; 
Kotabe et al., 2003). As a result, managing buyer-supplier relationships is a critical element to 
firms’ supply chain management (Harland, 1996). Successful buyer-supplier relationship 
management leads to positive firm performance (e.g. cost and lead time reduction, as well as 
the access to product and process technology), which creates a competitive market advantage 
(Mentzer et al., 2000, Tan et al., 1999).  
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2.1.1. Supply chain disturbances 
As a buyer-supplier relationship becomes more collaborative and long-term oriented, it is 
characterised by continuous information exchange, a mutual sharing of risks and rewards, 
significant interconnectedness, and mutual interdependence (Hendrick, 1995). Intensive 
resources are essential to maintain a high level of inter-organisational coordination for various 
activities (e.g. R&D, manufacturing, and distribution) (Dwyer et al., 1987). Given the highly 
integrated and complex nature of relationships, contractual governance alone is not adequate, 
because there are too many unforeseeable contingencies (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). In 
addition, contractual governance may not always be desirable for firms, because the presence 
of a certain level of flexibility is essential to maximise mutually beneficial outcomes (Harris 
et al., 1998). Hence, relational governance, trust in its various forms and relational norms, play 
important roles in regulating risks and uncertainties pertaining to buyer-supplier relationships 
and also allow for collaborative firms to benefit from them (Poppo et al., 2008). Without 
sufficient trust in place, firms tend to pursue their goals solely based on their self-interest and 
demonstrate a reluctance to depend on their collaborating partners (Sabath and Fontanella, 
2002).  
 Firms have developed various supply chain management practices embedded in trust, 
such as just-in-time, single-sourcing, and early involvement of suppliers in the new product 
design phase (Lummus and Vokurka, 1999). These practices heighten the inherent 
interconnectedness and interdependences between buyers and suppliers. However, this also 
makes organisations more vulnerable to supply chain disturbances (Craighead et al., 2007). 
These can come from multiple sources that generally involve buyer and/or supplier induced 
transgressions (e.g. production delays and defective quality); natural disasters (e.g. tsunamis 
and earthquakes); and man-made ones (e.g. wars and terrorist attacks) (Hendricks and Singhal, 
2005; Tang, 2006). Amongst these, buyer and/or supplier induced transgressions are the major 
source that causes supply chain disturbances (Waters, 2011). This thesis particularly is focused 
on supplier-induced transgressions, because they are more prevalent, well-documented, and 
easily detected (Reinmann et al., 2017).  
 
2.1.2. Trust as the focal mechanism  
There are two common focal domains where transgressions and potential recoverable actions 
have negative and positive effects respectively on buyer-supplier relationships, namely the 
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transactional and relational domains (Dirks et al., 2009; Hammervoll, 2011). The transactional 
domain refers to the extent to which transgressions disrupt the exchange of physical materials 
and products and cause monetary losses, while the relational domain refers to the extent to 
which transgressions reduce the level of confidence in the form of trust, commitment, and 
satisfaction towards the violator (Hammervoll, 2011). These domains dynamically change 
with events and (re)actions initiated by buyers and suppliers (Hibbard et al., 2001).  
Generally, there are four streams of literature that examine how firms are affected by and 
how they deal with transgressions, namely supply chain disruption recovery, service failure 
recovery, conflict/dispute resolution, and trust repair. The aforementioned two domains serve 
as a useful differentiator across alternative mechanisms that have arisen from several streams 
of literature (Table 2-1).  
 
 Transgression (negative) Recoverable responses 
(positive) 














Trust repair         
Conflict/dispute 
resolution 




  -    -  
Service failure 
recovery 
-    -    
Table 2 - 1. The comparison of different streams of literature in relation to the transactional 
and relational domains 
 
 The supply chain disruption recovery literature primarily investigates the interruption 
and facilitation of the flow of physical products and information in on-going business 
exchanges, where activities from the transactional domain are emphasised (Macdonald and 
Corsi, 2013). Conversely, the service failure recovery literature largely focuses on the 
dynamics of expectations according to (dis)confirming events and (re)actions that result in 
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corresponding levels of (dis)satisfaction (Vaerenbergh and Orsingher, 2016). In this line of 
research, the relational domain (e.g. expectation, satisfaction, and fairness) is centred (Hess et 
al., 2003).  
In terms of the conflict resolution literature, many studies view conflicts as a 
manifestation of trust violations, which lead to reduced commitment and performance, and 
deem the resolution of conflicts as being a set of measures that aims to settle operational and 
financial problems (Malhotra and Lumineau, 2011). While this stream of literature captures 
both the transactional and relational domains, it borrows extensively from trust violation and 
repair studies on its effects on the relational domain, which makes it less directly concerned 
with the focal domains (Lumineau et al., 2015). On the whole, the first three streams of 
research tend to capture immediate or short-term responses after transgressions, such as 
settlement and reconciliation (Tomlinson et al., 2004).  
 On the other hand, the trust violation and repair literature map the negative effect of 
transgressions and signal positive expectations on three aspects, namely cognition, emotion, 
and exchange, where the first two are concerned with the relational domain and the last is 
related to the transactional domain (Dirks et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2014). Trust repair goes 
beyond settlement and reconciliation (Li et al., 2013). It is an effortful endeavour that requires 
a longer timeframe to complete (Tomlinson et al., 2004). A more detailed review of trust repair 
literature will be presented later in this chapter.  
 Compared to other mechanisms, inter-organisational trust is the most all-encompassing 
one, because it directly captures both transactional and relational domains over the complete 
buyer-supplier relationship recovery after transgressions and also, has the most comprehensive 
theoretical foundation. Thus, this thesis is set to examine inter-organisational trust as the 
dependent variable. The following section introduces the conceptualisation of inter-
organisational trust.  
 
2.2 THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF INTER-ORGANISATIONAL TRUST 
Inter-organisational trust is defined as “the extent of trust placed in the partner organisation 
by the members of a focal organisation” (Zaheer et al., 1998, p. 142). Whilst a firm cannot 
literally trust another firm, its members can form a collective trust orientation towards a 
collaborating one (ibid). Organisational members from a trusting firm (a trustor hereafter), 
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especially purchasing managers, key account managers and project managers, are boundary 
spanners who facilitate social and economic exchanges, translate the trustor’s interests, and 
convey expectations towards a trusted firm (a trustee hereafter) (Perrone et al., 2003). These 
boundary spanners act as judges when making decisions about whether or not to trust as they 
transform their perceptions towards the trustee into recommended actions initiated by the 
trustor (Luo, 2008).  
 Inter-organisational trust, therefore, travels across different levels, from individual level 
trust gradually transcending to organisational level trust through the process of 
institutionalisation (Schilke and Cook, 2013; Zaheer et al., 1998). This transference process 
begins with intra-organisational trust developed by the trustor’s boundary spanners towards 
the trustee (as an organisation) based on preliminary research and secondary data about its 
capabilities (Figure 2-1). Following that, the boundary spanners between the trustor and the 
trustee engage in more frequent interaction, establishing interpersonal trust through their intra- 
and extra-role behaviour (Kroeger, 2012). That is, boundary spanners not only behave 
according to their prescribed organisational roles, for they also engage in extensive faceworks 
“devised or improvised by the individual actor” (Kroeger, 2012, p. 748). Since the boundary 
spanners’ behaviour is essentially guided by norms and routines assigned by their 
organisations, trust possessed by these boundary spanners regarding the trustee’s boundary 
spanners can be gradually transferred into attributes of the corresponding organisation (Schilke 
and Cook, 2013). Over time, these attributes of the trustee then become externalised, whereby 
trust orientation diffuses into its members forming ‘a collective orientation’ towards the 
partnering firm (Zaheer et al., 1998).  
 This definition means that inter-organisational trust is not simply an aggregation of the 
trust held by each individual within a trusting firm towards a trusted one, but rather, it is driven 
by boundary spanners who possess power and authority, manifested in their roles and 
resources (e.g. corporate and executive staff), which allows them to translate their positive 
expectations into actionable decisions towards a trustee (e.g. key components procurement or 
new product development) (Zhong et al., 2017). The implication of this definition means that 
interpersonal and inter-organisational trust overlap with the characteristics of boundary 
spanners (i.e. power, authority, and resources) (Knights et al., 2001; Kroeger, 2012). Thus, 
inter-organisational trust should be studied in tandem with interpersonal trust, which largely 
exists between boundary spanners with decision making power (Zhong et al., 2017).  
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 It should be noted that the trustor and the trustee can either be a buyer or a supplier. In 
buyer-supplier collaborations, the literature contends that supplier-induced disruptions are 
more likely to occur than buyer-induced ones (e.g. Reimann et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2014). 
This means that, the buyer tends to be the party, the inter-organisational trust of which, is more 
frequently violated than the supplier. Hence, this thesis, hereafter, the buyer is adopted as 
representing the trustor, while the supplier is taken to denote the trustee in inter-organisational 




Figure 2 - 1. The processual model of the emergence of inter-organisational trust (adapted from Schilke and Cook, 2013, p. 286) 
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2.2.1 Dimensions of inter-organisational trust 
Among a myriad of dimensions of inter-organisational trust, two of them, namely competence 
and goodwill, have received the most attention in buyer-supplier relationships (Das and Teng, 
2001; Dyer and Chu, 2003; Lui and Ngo, 2004). That is, despite there being other trust 
dimensions (e.g. contractual trust, deterrence trust, and institutional trust), these two aspects 
have been commonly adopted dimensions in prior studies (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Ireland and 
Webb, 2007). 
 Competence trust is defined as “the expectation of technically competent role 
performance” towards the supplier (Das and Teng, 2001, p. 256). This means, it denotes a 
supplier’s “ability to perform according to agreements” (Nooteboom, 1996, p. 990). It 
captures the main performance-related criteria, including ability, resources, and reputation 
(Bachmann and Inkpen, 2011). It should be noted that competence trust not only can be built 
incrementally over a series of consistent and reliable performance (Lee, 2004; Whipple and 
Frankel, 2000), for it also can be established based on institutional arrangements, such as 
corporate reputation and certification (Bachmann and Inkpen, 2011). Corporate reputation 
mitigates the uncertainties and risks associated with the partner’s competence in that it is 
perceived to be important social capital to firms, which they are unlikely to undermine by 
acting against the agreed tasks (Bachmann and Inkpen, 2011). In addition, certification 
promotes behavioural norms by signalling compliance with standardised procedures of 
industrial quality or safety (ibid). Competence trust is, therefore, a function of repeated cycles 
of exchange and/or external institutions that provide safeguards (Inkpen and Currall, 2004).  
 On the other hand, goodwill trust is defined as “the expectation that some others in our 
social relationships have moral obligations and responsibility to demonstrate a special 
concern for other’s interests above their own” (Das and Teng, 2001, p. 256). It denotes a 
supplier’s “intentions to perform according to agreements” (Nooteboom, 1996, p. 990). This 
dimension has social and relational underpinnings that emphasise the motives, honesty, and 
character of a supplier (Kramer et al., 1996). Over repeated cycles of exchange, these values 
and motives are manifested in anticipated behaviour, preferences, and the priorities of the 
partner reinforcing goodwill trust (Lewicki et al., 2006). Hence, goodwill trust is inherently 
concerned with the alignment of motives and interests of partners.  
 Past studies have treated these two dimensions as mutually exclusive constructs (e.g. 
Dirks et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2006). This reflects the notion that a supplier perceived as 
technically incapable regarding agreement fulfilment does not necessarily indicate that it has 
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ill intention, while one with a lack of goodwill simply does not mean that it is not capable in 
the inter-organisational relationship (Ferrin et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2004). The extant literature 
tends to overlook the connection and interaction between these two trust dimensions. 
Laaksonen et al. (2008) argue that competence and goodwill trust can coexist in an inter-
organisational relationship and develop dynamically over time. A recent study by Connelly et 
al. (2018) seems to be the first attempt to tackle the differential effects of competence and 
goodwill trust on inter-organisational performance, reduction in transaction cost, in particular. 
The authors suggested that competence and goodwill trust differentially contribute to inter-
organisational performance through different mechanisms, because of the role of domain 
specificity (which will be returned to later in the chapter).  
 So far, the conceptualisation of inter-organisational trust has been explicated in terms of 
its definitions, transference, and dimensions. It is important to understand its benefits before 
moving on to the trust violation and repair sections, because these provide fundamental reasons 
for firms to build and rebuild trust. Thus, the next section reviews the consequences of inter-
organisational trust.  
 
2.2.2 Outcomes of inter-organisational trust 
A plethora of studies have focused on the positive effects of inter-organisational trust within 
buyer-supplier relationships through its direct, indirect, and relational outcomes (Delbufalo, 
2012). First, its direct outcomes encompass enhanced financial and operational performance 
through reduced purchasing costs (Spekman et al., 1998), reduced lead time (Panayides and 
Lun, 2009), and lower transaction costs as well as improved efficiency and productivity 
(Handfield and Bechtel, 2002; Narasimhan and Nair, 2005). Second, inter-organisational trust 
indirectly leads to better performance via governance-related aspects, such as improved 
contract flexibility (Johnston et al., 2004; Luo, 2002); improved process and product 
innovations; joint problem-solving; increased likelihood of investing in relation-specific 
assets; and information sharing (Dyer and Chu, 2003). Finally, with respect to relational 
outcomes, inter-organisational trust engenders commitment (affective and calculative), better 
cooperation, lower conflict (Zaheer et al., 1998), loyalty (Jambulingam et al., 2009), 




 Inter-organisational trust not only brings about benefits, for it also comes with some 
negative effects. Prior studies have examined i) disadvantages associated with close 
relationships; ii) the consequences of negative effects; and iii) the emergence and management 
of negative effects. First, this stream of studies has discovered that excessive trust leads to 
optimistic bias (Atuahene-Gima and Li, 2002); relational inertia, caused by over-
embeddedness (Gargiulo and Ertug, 2006); complacency (Day et al., 2013); higher risks of 
opportunism and betrayal (Leonidou et al., 2018; Skinner et al., 2014); and over-investment 
due to the ‘lock-in’ effect (Villena et al., 2011).  
 The second group of studies has identified the potential outcomes, if the negative effects 
are not properly resolved, such as supplier switching behaviour (Mir et al., 2017) and 
relationship dissolution (Fleming et al., 2016; Giller and Matear, 2001; Pressey and Qiu, 
2007). This stream of research has investigated the process, reasons, and contextual factors of 
relationship ending, which is intertwined with external (e.g. recession and changing market 
preferences), relational (e.g. lack of trust and commitment), and organisational factors (e.g. 
financial burden and poor sales) (Halinen and Tahtinen, 2002; Tidstrom and Ahman, 2006). 
However, it does not address how a deteriorating inter-organisational relationship can 
progress, to a certain point, and turn around afterwards, leaving a more dynamic middle ground 
between relationship dissolution and relationship continuity under-studied.   
 Finally, a further body of studies has focused on the process of how inter-organisational 
relationships are damaged. It is widely acknowledged that disruptions and conflicts are ever-
present phenomena in inter-organisational relationships (cf. Lumineau et al., 2015; cf. Wang 
et al., 2014), with those adversarial incidents, accidentally or intentionally induced, having a 
severe impact on inter-firm performance (Craighead et al., 2007). This stream of literature 
encompasses trust violation (Bell et al., 2002; Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan, 2009; Wang 
et al., 2014), one of the key concepts of this research study.  
 Notably, damaged relationships and violated trust should be carefully managed, where 
termination is not an option due to significant relationship-specific investment; costs of the 
dissolution process; potential sanctions for future business; network limitations; and/or costs 
of new relationship establishment, thus leaving repair as the only viable solution (cf. Salo et 
al., 2009; Tahtinen and Vaaland, 2006). Moreover, damaged relationships warrant repair 
efforts, if one or both parties would like to sustain the benefits associated with the trusting 
relationship (cf. Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan, 2009). This prompts consideration of 
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another key concept of this research study, trust repair (Dirks et al., 2009; Janowicz-Panjaitan 
and Krishnan, 2009; Stevens et al., 2015).  
 So far in this section, a thorough conceptualisation of inter-organisational trust and an 
outline of the context associated with trust repair has been provided (Figure 2-2). Trust repair 
by its nature is a processual phenomenon, which involves several temporal stages 
characterised by different relational attributes, trigger events, and interactions experienced by 




Figure 2 - 2. A breakdown of inter-organisational trust conceptualisation  
Inter-organisational trust
Definition: "the extent of trust placed in the partner 
organization by the members of a focal organization" 
(Zaheer et al., 1998, p. 142)
Trust
Definition: "positive expectations regarding the other in a risky situation"
(Das and Teng, 2001, p. 255)
Dimensions
Competence trust
Definition: "the expectation 
of technically competent role 
performance" (Das and Teng, 
2001, p. 256) 
Goodwill trust
Definition: "the 
expectation that some 
others in our social 
relationships have moral 
obligations and 
responsibility to 
demonstrate a special 
concern for other’s 
interests above their own" 




Direct: reduced purchasing costs; reduced lead time; 
lowered transaction costs; higher efficiency and 
productivity
Indirect: improved contract flexibility; higher 
innovativeness; enhanced social control 
Relational: relationship dissolution; prevention; 
greater information sharing; joint goal fulfilment; 
dispute resolution facilitation
Negative effects
Threats to relationship with excessive trust: 
optimistic bias, relational inertia, complacency, over-
investment
Terminal outcomes if not dealt with properly: 
supplier switching behaviour, relationship dissolution
The emergence and management of these negative 
effects: trust violation and repair
32 
 
2.3 THE PROCESS OF TRUST VIOLATION AND REPAIR  
In general, a complete cycle of trust repair encompasses four temporal stages, namely: pre-
transgression stage; trust violation stage; trust repair stage; and post-repair stage (Figure 2-3). 
The above graphical representation of the trust violation and repair process is established based 
on the contribution of various studies in order to fill the current void of temporal dynamics in 
the literature. For this thesis, Dirks et al.’s (2009) process of relationship repair is adopted as 
the overarching framework. Several terms are adjusted to tailor to the context of this work on 
trust violation and repair.   
 No research has examined the trust violation and repair stages together. Thus, for this 
thesis, definitions from two separate studies on each stage are adopted: Janowicz-Panjaitan 
and Krishnan (2009) on the trust violation stage and Kim et al. (2006) on the trust repair stage. 
Whilst Dirks et al. (2009) offer descriptions of each temporal stage, the critical transitions 
between them are overlooked. These critical moments break the trajectory of the routine 
process and signal a shift from one stage to the next (cf. Putnam and Fuller, 2014). For this 
thesis, the concept of turning points is borrowed from the negotiation literature, because the 
trust repair process inherently involves interactive cycles of actions and reactions in response 
to the counterpart, over time resulting in mutually acceptable outcomes (Llorente et al., 2013). 
In addition, Kim et al. (2009) depict the trust repair process as a negotiation between the trustor 
and the trustee (at the interpersonal level) in an attempt to resolve disagreements over whether 
the latter should be trusted. Hence, the incorporation of turning points is particularly pertinent 
and appropriate to the process of trust violation and repair.  
 A turning point “alters the process significantly and compels confronting parties to 
reassess the situation and to formulate a response” (Llorente et al., 2013, p. 219). This 
research involves investigating the negative and positive turning points (2 and 4, respectively, 
from Figure 2-3). A negative turning point is characterised by decreasing trust levels, which 
challenge the prior trust in the pre-transgression stage and diminishes the trustor’s competence 
and goodwill trust placed on the trustee. On the other hand, a positive turning point is 
characterised by increasing trust levels, which signals the repair of violated trust. Moreover, 
the transient period signals the end of the trust violation stage, but yet to begin the trust repair 
stage, referred to as deadlock (Faure, 2005). The buyer and the supplier have to overcome the 
deadlock resulting from the trust violation so that the positive turning point can be triggered 






2.4 INTERPERSONAL TRUST VIOLATION  
This section begins with a review of the definition and types of interpersonal trust violation. 
Next, several of its consequences are discussed, followed by consideration of the factors 
affecting the violation. 
 The definition of a trust violation refers to the perceptual discrepancy between the level 
of trust before and after a transgression (Ferrin et al., 2007; Schweitzer et al., 2006), which 
signals a failure in the fulfilment of expectations (Kim and Harmon, 2014; Grover et al., 2014; 
Frawley and Harrison, 2016). It “causes the positive states that constitute the relationship to 
disappear and/or negative states to arise, as perceived by one or both parties” (Dirks et al., 
2009, p. 69). Not every transgression leads to a trust violation. One is only actualised when a 
trustor perceives that a transgression has violated its trust (Tomlinson and Mayer, 2009). The 
Figure 2 - 3. The process of trust violation and repair adapted from Dirks et al. (2009); 
Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan (2009); Kim et al. (2006); and Lewicki and Bunker (1996) 
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premise of a trust violation is the notion of disconfirmation of established norms perceived by 
the trustor (Ganesan et al., 2010; Ren and Gray, 2009).  
 The most examined types of transgression involve competence- and integrity-based 
violations (e.g. Kim et al., 2004; 2006; Dirks et al., 2009). The former triggers an extensive 
cognitive judgment resulting in a competence trust violation, whilst the latter tends to engender 
both cognitive and emotional judgment, resulting in a goodwill trust violation (Lewicki and 
Brinsfield, 2017). The extant literature suggests that “individuals tend to weigh positive 
information about competence more heavily than negative information about competence, they 
tend to weigh negative information about integrity more heavily than positive information 
about integrity” (cf. Kim et al., 2006, p. 51). That is, a single competence-based violation tends 
to be discounted as individuals are likely to perceive that even a competent person can 
occasionally perform poorly. Conversely, a single integrity-based violation would engender a 
more intense reaction that is less likely to be discounted, because only an individual with low 
integrity would engage in dishonest acts (ibid).  
   
2.4.1 Consequences of interpersonal trust violation  
The potential outcomes of an interpersonal trust violation can be classified into three 
categories, including cognitive, emotional, and behavioural aspects. With respect to cognitive 
outcomes, a trust violation gives rise to reduced organisational commitment (Robinson, 1996), 
lower satisfaction (Restubog et al., 2006), and higher turnover intentions (Kickul and Lester, 
2001). In terms of emotion-related outcomes, a trust violation leads to negative effects, such 
as disappointment, frustration, and anger (Barclay et al., 2005; Bies and Tripp, 1996). Those 
negative cognitions and emotions have critical implications for the trustor, not only in 
suspending positive exchange, but also, triggering negative exchange behaviour (Dirks et al., 
2009). With respect to behavioural consequences, a trust violation may lower the level of 
cooperation (Bottom et al., 2002), reduce bargaining outcomes (Lount et al., 2008), damage 
performance, and/or undermine organisational citizenship behaviour (Restubog et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, a trustor may also engage in negative exchange, such as deviant acts in the 
workplace, including absenteeism, aggression, and sabotage (Robinson and Bennett, 1995; cf. 
Luchies et al., 2013); anti-social behaviour in the organisation (Giacalone and Greenberg, 
1997); as well as punitive actions, including retaliation and retribution (Bies and Tripp, 1996).  
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2.4.2 Factors affecting interpersonal trust violation 
Two major categories underlining interpersonal trust violation involve relationship- and 
violation-specific factors. The first category addresses the quality of the relationship between 
individuals. Prior research has shown that relational closeness between two parties can 
significantly mitigate the negative perception of a trust violation (Strelan et al., 2017). This 
relational closeness also leads to higher satisfaction and commitment towards the relationship, 
which helps to buffer the negative effect of a trust violation (Luchies et al., 2013).  
 To be specific, relationship dependence includes i) the trustor’s investment in the 
relationship; ii) the quantity and quality of alternative relationships; and iii) structural 
commitment. The first element refers to instrumental (e.g. money and time) and/or emotional 
(affective bonds) resources invested in the relationship. The second, suggests that individuals 
constantly compare the current relationship with alternatives with respect to attractiveness as 
well as satisfaction (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959). The last element indicates the situation where 
individuals feel it as being difficult to leave or compelled to continue due to external 
constraints, such as high switching costs and institutional arrangements (Lewicki and Bunker, 
1996). Theoretically, relationship dependence constituted by the three elements moderates 
how a trust violation is perceived, reacted to, and dealt with (Tomlinson, 2011).  
 Regarding violation-specific factors, the first refers to the attribution of the cause of 
transgression. When the trustor encounters such an incident, he or she will attempt to 
determine its cause (Tomlinson and Mayer, 2009). A causal ascription will be carried out to 
determine the locus, controllability, and stability of the incident (ibid). Locus of causality 
refers to the entity responsible for the cause of a transgression. It can be internal (i.e. by the 
trustee) or external (i.e. by another party or by the situation (Heider, 1958). Controllability is 
associated with the entity’s volitional control or the degree of accountability over a negative 
outcome. Last, stability refers to the degree of volatility of the cause, i.e. the extent to which 
it fluctuates or remains constant (Kelley, 1967), which informs the likelihood of future 
occurrences. These three dimensions of the attribution on transgressions drive the trustor’s 
cognitive, affective, and behavioural reactions as well as the corresponding reparative 
responses needed (Elangovan et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2006; Tomlinson and Mayer, 2011).  
 The second factor concerns the timing, i.e. whether the trust violation occurs in the early 
or late phase of a relationship, for which there is no consensus in prior studies. Kim et al. (2009) 
argued that trust in the early phases tends to be fragile and likely to be purely transaction-
based, with relatively little emotional attachment, which thus exerts a weaker buffering effect 
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regarding the violation. Empirically, Lount et al.’s (2008) findings supported the belief that 
early trust violations tend to be more damaging than later ones. While with the counter-
perspective, it is argued that later trust violations can shatter the identity and values built over 
time (Lewicki and Wiethoff, 2000). This implies that a trust violation that occurs later signals 
a larger discrepancy with respect to ex-ante and ex-post expectations, as individuals from 
relationships with a longer history tend to have higher trusting expectations (Robinson et al., 
2004). Empirically, Bottom et al. (2002) verified that later violations are more impactful than 
early ones, because of their surprising nature, which triggers more intense emotional and trust-
oriented reactions.  
 The third violation-specific factor is the notion of causal ambiguity. This fundamentally 
indicates how difficult the cause of a transgression can be precisely determined (Tomlinson, 
2011). The causal ambiguity of a transgression is found to negatively affect benevolent 
attributions stemming from relational closeness, because it triggers a calculative mindset of 
the trustor to assess the trust violation (ibid). On the other hand, other research has suggested 
that relationships with a higher dependence tend to demonstrate more benevolent attributions 
when the cause of a trust violation is ambiguous, which in turn, mitigates the negative impact 
of the violation (Weber et al., 2005).   
 The fourth violation-specific factor concerns severity. A trust violation must be large 
enough to constitute a serious threat to the trustor’s self-interest and relational norms (Thibaut 
and Walker, 1975). Tomlinson (2011) further elaborated that a violation can be evaluated 
based upon the magnitude of the harm, irreversibility of outcomes, and magnitude of 
disconfirmation. Minor violations may be neutralised by the trustor’s forgiveness or other 
tolerance mechanisms, such as social and cultural norms that counter the negative effect on 
trust (Schoorman et al., 2007).  
 This section has reviewed the relevant studies on interpersonal trust violation, with 
respect to its definition, types, consequences, and moderating factors (Figure 2-4). The same 
review process will be applied to the inter-organisational trust violation literature in the 




Figure 2 - 4. A breakdown of the interpersonal trust violation literature 
 
 
2.5 INTER-ORGANISATIONAL TRUST VIOLATION 
This section presents the definition of inter-organisational trust violation, followed by a 
summary of past studies on different types of trust violation. Next, a range of consequences 
caused by trust violations is discussed. Last, factors that affect inter-organisational trust 
violation are delineated.  
 An inter-organisational trust violation refers to “a situation where a trustor perceives 
that a trustee has failed to meet their expectations” (cf. Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan, 
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2009, p. 249). The most common types examined in the literature are competence- and 
integrity-based violations (e.g. Bell et al., 2002; Wang and Huff, 2007). With respect to a 
competence-based violation, this signals that a firm lacks the organisational capabilities to 
fulfil expected tasks (Li et al., 2013; Wang and Huff, 2007). Thus, as aforementioned, 
competence-based violations inherently undermine competence trust. On the other hand, 
integrity-based violations refer to transgressions that disrupt the behavioural norms accepted 
by the buyer (Wang and Huff, 2007), thereby violating goodwill trust. It is argued that 
competence-based violations are more readily observable compared to integrity-based ones 
(Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan, 2009). However, the latter tend to trigger more intense 
negative emotions than the former, especially in the early phases of the relationship (Wang 
and Huff, 2007). 
 As most prior studies do not specifically address the notion of trust violation (with the 
exception of Bell et al., 2002; Harmon et al., 2015; Laeequddin and Sardana, 2010), for this 
thesis, similar constructs from adjacent literature have to be relied upon, including inter-
organisational relationship quality fade (Whipple and Roh, 2010), reduction of social approval 
(Bundy and Pfarrer, 2015), B2B infidelity (Leonidou et al., 2018), relationship deterioration 
(Marcos and Prior, 2017; Vidal et al., 2016), supply chain unethical behaviour (Hill et al., 
2009; Kaynak et al., 2015), and psychological contract breach (Eckerd et al., 2013). They share 
a somewhat similar definition, only slight nuanced, with inter-organisational trust violation, 
which refers to the buyer’s perceived failure in the fulfilment of expectations and the resulting 
decline in confidence and relational norms in the trustee. These similar constructs are included 
in the literature review for a more holistic overview.  
 
2.5.1 Consequences of inter-organisational trust violation 
Inter-organisational trust violation gives rise to cognitive, emotional, and behavioural 
outcomes. Regarding cognitive ones, a trust violation causes the buyer to adjust negatively 
their trust placed on the supplier (Stevens et al., 2015; Wang and Huff, 2007). As a result, the 
buyer will need to reassess and evaluate the level of risk entailed in the relationship in order 
to determine whether it is willing to accept further vulnerability (Laeequddin and Sardana, 
2010; Leonidou et al., 2018). As to emotional outcomes, a trust violation normally signals 
unfair treatment (Eckerd et al., 2013), which brings about anger, disillusionment (Hill et al., 
2009), resentment, and frustration (Hibbard et al., 2001). However, Eckerd et al. (2013) found 
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that decision makers tend to suppress their emotions in making trusting decisions and 
behaviours without being biased by emotional outcomes. 
 These behavioural outcomes can involve reputational damage, whereby the buyer 
spreads negative word of mouth and publicity against the supplier (Wang and Huff, 2007). 
That is, when the buyer shares detailed information of transgressions to others, this will 
undermine the supplier’s trustworthiness as well as bargaining power with other companies 
(Hill et al., 2009). Moreover, transgressions may negatively affect the buyer’s intent to offer a 
price premium or repurchase (Eckerd et al., 2013). Thus, a trust violation may cause significant 
financial loss for the buyer and supplier (Laeequddin and Sardana, 2010). Accordingly, a trust 
violation can require costly operational, human, and time resources in order to repair the 
damage caused (Laeequddin and Sardana, 2010; Li et al., 2013). Moreover, the supplier may 
also face a claim or compensation (Wan et al., 2011; Leonidou et al., 2018). Frequently, 
multinational conglomerates (e.g. Foxconn and Samsung) lodge for compensation of millions 
of US dollars to their suppliers when they have failed to fulfil the required standards 
(technews.tw). Additionally, prior studies have shown that the buyer may directly reduce the 
orders placed with the supplier (Eckerd et al., 2013), search for alternatives, and/or choose to 
switch to other firms (Hill et al., 2009). That is, in some serious cases, a trust violation will 
result in relationship termination (Holmlund and Hobbs, 2009; Tahtinen and Vaaland, 2006).  
 
2.5.2 Factors affecting inter-organisational trust violation 
As with interpersonal trust violation, the inter-organisational trust violation literature shares 
similar factors, including violation-specific (attribution of causes, severity, and timing) and 
relationship ones.  
 
Violation-specific factors  
Extant literature has shown that the dimensions (i.e. locus, stability, and controllability) of the 
buyer’s attribution to a transgression significantly predict the effect of a trust violation. The 
literature has ascribed transgressions with an external locus and low controllability as 
‘disruption’, while those with an internal one and high controllability have been termed 
‘reneging’. A transgression associated with reneging triggers more intense reactions than one 
with disruption (Eckerd et al., 2013; Hill et al., 2009). In terms of stability, Wang and Huff 
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(2007) suggested that transgressions with a higher likelihood of reoccurrence tend to trigger 
more intense buyer reactions contingent on relationship maturity.  
 With respect to severity, the magnitude of the violation is a frequently examined 
dimension (e.g. Wang and Huff, 2007; Eckerd et al., 2013). It signals the extent of salience 
and harm associated with a violation (Zhao et al., 2007). It has been found that the greater the 
loss, the greater the decline in trust and the more intense the negative affect (Smith et al., 1999). 
The magnitude of the perceived violation serves as a key determining factor of whether trust 
shifts from unconditional (defined as identification-based trust by Lewicki and Bunker, 1996) 
to conditional trust (Jones and George, 1998). Wang and Huff (2007) also argued that even if 
the expected future occurrence is small, the magnitude of the violation can also undermine the 
inter-organisational trust. That means, inter-organisational trust is continuously authenticated 
based on updated and comprehensive information rather than relying on a particular source 
(i.e. stability of the cause).  
 Prior studies have revealed that the earlier a trust violation occurs in an inter-
organisational relationship the more negative a trustor will respond to it (Eckerd et al., 2013; 
Wang and Huff, 2007). Empirical findings seem to support the proposition that prior relational 
history acts as a buffer to trust violations. Wang and Huff (2007) suggested that the longer the 
past interaction the greater the zone of trust violation tolerance there will be. Additionally, 
Eckerd et al. (2013) found that a trust violation is perceived more negatively in a relationship 
with a shorter prior interaction duration. In relationships with a longer history, a trustor reacts 




There are three relationship-specific factors identified in the literature, including contract 
frame, social approval, and risk-bearing capacity. First, Weber (2017) argued that contract 
frame (prevention vs promotion) moderates the effect of trust violation (competence- and 
integrity-based violation in particular). The author suggested that firms with a prevention 
contract are more likely to react intensively to competence-based violations due to perceived 
inefficiency of existing governance, while they tend to behave less intensively towards 
integrity-based violations, because of the assumed supplier opportunism. Conversely, firms 
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with a promotion contract tend to tolerate more competence-based violations, but integrity-
based violations are perceived to be more damaging. 
 Second, social approval refers to “evaluators’ general affinity towards an organisation” 
(Zavyalova et al., 2012, p. 1079). It is an intuitive and affective mechanism for an evaluator 
(in this case, the trustor) to make sense and attribute responsibility at the onset of a trust 
violation characterised by high uncertainty and ambiguity regarding responsibility and 
consequences (Bundy and Pfarrer, 2015; Scherer et al., 2013). Thus, the trustor is inclined to 
rely on heuristic processes to evaluate the situation (cf. Bundy and Pfarrer, 2015). The authors 
argued that high social approval may attenuate certain negative effects brought about by the 
incident and mitigate the need for an extensive information search in the attribution process.  
 The third factor pertains to the risk-bearing capacity of the trustor. For larger and less 
dependent (on the trustee) firms, the risk associated with a negative incident may be perceived 
to be low, so they can easily forget the issue as long as it is dealt with in an acceptable manner 
(Laeequddin and Sardana, 2010). In this situation, a negative incident will not be perceived as 
a trust violation, because the effort of the attribution process can be alleviated or may be 
deemed unnecessary (ibid). These two factors contribute to the notion of trust resilience, a 
defensive mechanism that counters the perception of trust violation before initiating the 
attribution process (Bell and Anderson, 2000; Bell et al., 2002). This section has reviewed the 
relevant studies of inter-organisational trust violation with respect to its definition, types, 




Figure 2 - 5. A breakdown of the inter-organisational trust violation literature 
 
 
2.6 SYNOPSIS OF THE CROSS-LEVEL TRUST VIOLATION LITERATURE  
In the cross-comparison between interpersonal and inter-organisational trust violation 
literature, it can be seen that interpersonal studies capture more moderating factors than their 
inter-organisational counterparts, which reflects the argument that the interpersonal level of 
analysis is more advanced. Regarding possible consequences of trust violation, both the 
interpersonal and inter-organisational literature cover a full range of outcomes, including 
cognitive, affective, and behavioural aspects. In relation to the moderators, the interpersonal 
trust violation literature has been more thorough, including relationship-, violation-, and 
disposition-specific factors. 
 The literature generally holds a linear logic that treats the initial transgression and its 
consequences as a direct and instant cause-and-effect. It has failed to incorporate turning point 
Inter-organisational trust 
violation
Definition: "A situation where a 
trustor perceives that a trustee 
has failed to meet the 
expectations" (Janowicz-Panjaitan 



























Contract frame; social 




analysis to the trust violation stage under the assumption that the trust violation is a one-off 
phenomenon. Such an automatic reaction rules out the possibility that the trustor and the 
trustee will engage in communication and interaction to influence the ongoing trust violation 
process. Such linear logic overlooks the temporal thresholds and laggard effects of 
transgressions as well as other intervention mechanisms on trust. Hence, a more processual 
perspective that delineates how a trust violation unfolds over time is warranted.  
 Furthermore, both interpersonal and inter-organisational studies have rarely taken a 
bilateral perspective in the trust violation stage, thereby leaving the richness of the interactions 
between the buyer and the supplier understudied. This is understandable, because a trust 
violation is essentially determined by the trustor. Accordingly, the literature tends to treat the 
trustor as a passive observer that does not act and react after a transgression breaks out. Next, 
the trust repair stage will be illustrated in accordance with the same structure as for the trust 
violation stage.   
 
 
2.7 INTERPERSONAL TRUST REPAIR  
This section presents the definition, antecedents (in the form of repair approaches), possible 
outcomes, and corresponding situational factors from the extant literature to facilitate the 
cross-comparison with its inter-organisational counterpart as well as identifying theoretical 
and empirical gaps. 
 Interpersonal trust repair is defined as “activities directed at making a trustor’s trusting 
beliefs and trusting intentions more positive after a violation is perceived to have occurred” 
(Kim et al., 2004, p. 105). A successful trust repair must encapsulate cognitive, affective and 
behavioural aspects (Dirks et al., 2009). If only the behavioural aspect (exchange-specific) is 
addressed in the process of trust repair, negative cognition and affect could backfire, which 
could eventually undermine the sustainability of a trusting relationship. Similarly, if only 
cognition is recovered, which does not translate into behavioural exchanges, the repair effort 
is also deemed ineffective. Hence, reparative responses initiated by the trustee and/or trustor 
should aim to address all three elements. The reparative responses adopted by individuals are 




2.7.1 Responses to interpersonal trust repair 
The extant literature encompasses three major categories of reparative responses, including 
social, economic, and structural approaches. Notably, with respect to social approaches, verbal 
responses appear to be the most studied among the three in the interpersonal context. These 
mainly involve apologies, explanations, denial, reticence, and promises. Previous studies have 
shown that apologies can recover interpersonal trust effectively (e.g. Kim et al., 2004; Bottom 
et al., 2002), because they convey perceived repentance and acknowledgement of 
responsibility of the trustee regarding a violation, thereby signalling a desire to avoid future 
offences (Dirks et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2006). However, apologies tend to only work when 
they are considered to have been conducted sincerely (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996; Hui et al., 
2011) and accompanied by consistent behaviour afterwards (Elangovan et al., 2015; Lount et 
al., 2008).  
 Since these verbal responses are rarely incorporated individually or in isolation, more 
recent studies have examined the combined effect of multiple verbal responses on repairing 
trust (e.g. Schniter et al., 2013; Tomlinson, 2012). Schniter et al. (2013) proposed that a hybrid 
approach of apology and promise is more effective than a single approach alone. Furthermore, 
Lewicki et al. (2016) distilled the key features from those verbal responses into a structured 
apology that consists of six components, namely expression of regret, explanation, 
acknowledge of responsibility, declaration of repentance, offer of repair, and request for 
forgiveness. The more components in an apology, the more effective it is to repair damaged 
trust (ibid). Despite the wide array of verbal responses available, some scholars regard them 
as “cheap talk” (Bottom et al., 2002; Schweitzer et al., 2006).  
 With respect to economic approaches, these refer to various forms of compensation, 
including “discounts, free merchandise, refunds, coupons, and so forth” (Smith et al., 1999, p. 
359). The extant literature has investigated the effect of financial compensation across 
different contingencies (e.g. Desmet et al., 2011; Haesevoets et al., 2013; 2015). Financial 
compensation has been found to be more effective than verbal responses in repairing 
cooperative exchange, as it conveys repentance and remedy, which mitigates the negative 
effect from the violation (Bottom et al., 2002). However, prior research reveals that financial 
compensation can recover damaged trust only if it is carried out voluntarily (Desmet et al., 
2011). Furthermore, in terms of the scope of financial compensation, Haesevoets et al. (2015) 
revealed that over and equal compensation (in relation to losses incurred) does not make a 
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significant difference in its effect on repairing trust. This implies that there may be a threshold 
of economic responses, such that financial compensation alone may be limited in repairing 
trust. It may improve the trustor’s willingness to reconcile, but it does not necessarily lead to 
continuity intentions (Tomlinson et al., 2004). Apart from the provision of financial 
compensation, another substantive strategy emphasises different structural arrangements 
(Dirks et al., 2011).  
 Structural responses are aimed at imposing regulations on the exchange relationship that 
limits, if not eliminating, the reoccurrence of the violation (i.e. perceived prevention) (Dirks 
et al., 2011). These involve the use of policies, contracts, monitoring, and/or hostage posting 
(Lewicki and Brinsfield, 2017; Nakayachi and Watabe, 2005). Hostage posting refers to a self-
sanctioning system signalling that the trustee is willing to give up certain controls or choices, 
if an expectation is not fulfilled (Nakayachi and Watabe, 2005). It is argued that, only if 
hostage posting is voluntarily imposed, can trust be recovered, because it not only modifies 
the current incentive structure, but also conveys the good intentions of the trustee (ibid). 
Indirectly, voluntary hostage posting indicates that the trustee is confident in meeting the 
expected tasks, thereby recovering competence-based trust.  
 Despite a myriad of reparative responses being examined in the extant studies, few have 
investigated different reparative responses in tandem. For example, whilst Lewicki et al. (2016) 
and Schniter et al. (2013) addressed the effectiveness of multiple means of verbal approaches, 
the authors did not investigate the effect of incorporating these responses in a particular order. 
Similarly, Dirks et al. (2011) examined substantive and non-substantive responses in tandem, 
but they overlooked the potential synergic and/or interactive effect among different 
approaches.  
 Apart from those repair approaches, another antecedent to interpersonal trust repair 
warrants further attention, which is the bilateral perspective in the process. The majority of 
prior studies have focused on the effect of one or more reparative responses initiated by the 
trustee on repairing damaged trust. Only a few scholars have investigated trust repair from a 
bilateral perspective by considering the active role of the trustor (e.g. Grover et al., 2014; Kim 
et al., 2009). It has been argued that trustors can significantly influence the effect of the trust 
repair process, not only because they inherently evaluate the outcome of the reparative 
responses received, but also, because they are actively involved throughout the process (Kim 
et al., 2009). The authors conceptualise the process of trust repair as a dynamic interaction 
between reparative responses provided by the trustee and level of resistance by the trustor, 
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contingent to the attribution and sense-making of the violation. That is, the trustor may choose 
to avoid or confront the trustee, which discounts the effect of their repair efforts. In the same 
vein, another scenario is that the trustor could actively and positively engage in the repair, by 
signalling tangible instructions and information that clear the air and also, convey ‘last change 
reactions’ (Grover et al., 2014). Thus, the trustor explicitly clarifies its expectations and 
provides feedback during the process of trust repair. This processual logic has rarely been 
examined in the extant literature. Whilst Kim et al. (2009) conceptually addressed the temporal 
dynamic of trustor-trustee interaction, they largely focused on social responses. Similarly, 
Grover et al. (2014) explored the bilateral interaction in terms of the communicative elements.  
 
2.7.2 Consequences of interpersonal trust repair   
Empirically, most studies have involved adopting surveys and scenario-based experiments 
conducted on one side of the dyad. Their aim has been to examine the effectiveness of the 
aforementioned reparative responses on different dimensions of damaged trust, cognition, 
affect, and exchange, in particular (Dirks et al., 2011). Trust repair in the cognitive dimension 
is focused on recovering the willingness to make oneself vulnerable in relation to the trustee’s 
qualities (e.g. Dirks et al., 2011; Ferrin et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2004; 2006). In terms of affect-
specific trust repair, past studies have rarely empirically captured it (e.g. Ren and Gray, 2009). 
Regarding the exchange dimension of trust repair, this has been investigated in terms of the 
level of cooperation (Bottom et al., 2002) and exchange behaviour (Schweitzer et al., 2006; 
Schniter et al., 2013). Among the extant studies, the interaction between the different 
dimensions remains unclear, because of inherent constraints on the research design. This 
means that, the temporal effect on different trust dimensions in the trust repair stage has been 
largely overlooked. Importantly, the existing research has rarely involved examining the 
difference in trust during the post-repair stage and pre-transgression stages as well as the 
reasons that accounted for such difference. Conceptually, Lewicki and Bunker (1996) 
proposed four possible consequences, including rupture, restoration, upward recalibration, and 
downward recalibration ex-post the repair effort. Rupture indicates that a relationship is still 
terminated after a trust violation, despite repair efforts. It may be that the violation is too severe 
and hence, is beyond repair. Alternatively, the reparative responses offered by the trustee have 
failed to meet the trustor’s expectations.  
 Restoration refers to trust being recovered to the exact level in the pre-transgression stage. 
Whilst the level of trust may be restored, the nature and characteristics of the trusting 
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relationship before and after the violation and subsequent repair remain unclear. Prior studies 
have overlooked the subtle difference of relationship idiosyncrasies in relation to the 
competence and goodwill dimensions between the pre-transgression stage and the post-repair 
stage (Kramer and Lewicki, 2010). Downward recalibration as an outcome indicates that the 
violation has not been satisfactorily settled, so the trustor may well still hold a negative view 
towards the trustee. In addition to that, the trustor may still perceive that similar trouble may 
occur in the future, thereby discounting its trusting intention. However, despite the level of 
trust being negatively recalibrated compared to the pre-transgression stage, both parties can 
demonstrate an interest in continuing the relationship (Six and Skinner, 2010). In contrast, 
upward recalibration suggests that the post-repair trust is higher than that pre-transgression. 
The relationship is in fact strengthened and deepened as reparative responses effectively lead 
the trustor to rely more on the trustee. This scenario has only been mentioned conceptually 
and hypothetically. Moreover, past studies have not explicitly depicted the underlying 
mechanism(s) of how reparative responses function to achieve higher post-repair trust (Grover 
et al., 2014; Kramer and Lewicki, 2010).  
 Overall, these outcome categories seem to remain conceptual, because the majority of 
prior studies have not measured pre-transgression trust. Instead, they have tended to place 
emphasis on the mitigating effect of reparative responses on violated trust (e.g. Bottom et al., 
2002; Desmet et al., 2011; Dirks et al., 2011). To this researcher’s best knowledge, only Lount 
et al. (2008) have illustrated that trust cannot be fully restored, thereby supporting the notion 
of downward recalibration. The consequences of restoration and upward recalibration of trust 
have experienced a lack of theoretical and empirical support. Regarding the outcome of rupture, 
there are already plenty of studies that have investigated relationship termination or exit. As 
the interest of the present thesis lies in the repair of trust, then unsuccessful repair efforts that 
result in the rupture of relationships are beyond its remit.  
 
2.7.3 Factors affecting interpersonal trust repair  
In general, the extant literature offers three main categories of situational variables, including 
violation-specific factors, relational characteristics, and environmental factors. These 
situational variables regarding interpersonal trust repair research, to some extent, share some 
similarities with those identified in the trust violation section.  
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 First, the characteristics of a violation significantly influence the effect on and the 
preference for reparative responses (e.g. Kim et al., 2004; 2006; 2009), involving types, 
severity, timing, and dimensions of attribution. In terms of violation type, competence-based 
violations can be more effectively repaired by providing apologies that signal internal 
attribution, while integrity-based ones can be better managed by offering a denial that signals 
external attribution (Kim et al., 2006). Furthermore, some scholars have suggested that 
competence-based violations (e.g. supervisory incompetency, lack of caring, and interference) 
are reparable, whereas integrity-based ones (e.g. deception and abuse of power) are not, in 
leader-follower relationships (Grover et al., 2014). Schweitzer et al. (2006) also revealed that 
trust violations can generally be repaired as long as deception is not involved. The severity of 
violations is a more straightforward factor, being negatively associated with the effect of 
reparative efforts (Tomlinson, 2011). If a violation is perceived to be very severe, it can only 
lead to relationship termination. The characteristics of a violation are largely determined by 
the perceptions of the trustor; their attribution of a violation inherently affects their behaviour. 
Research has suggested that the trustor can be actively involved in the repair process, rather 
than acting as a passive observer (Kim et al., 2009). As the trustor, over time, finds out about 
more attributes of a violation, such as culpability, locus, and fixability, he or she may actively 
resist the repair efforts offered by the trustee, thereby undermining the effect of trust repair 
(ibid).  
 Second, regarding relational characteristics, it entails two factors, namely relationship 
interdependence and relational closeness. The former has been previously comprehensively 
discussed in the trust violation section. In a highly interdependent relationship, the trustor and 
trustee will be more motivated to solve a violation and associated problems jointly (Andiappan 
and Trevino, 2010). As a result, more effort is likely to be invested in the process of trust repair, 
which will result in more effective repair of trust. In terms of relational closeness, one of the 
indicators is the level of prior exchange. Studies have found that previous histories between 
individuals facilitate forgiveness (Hui et al., 2011) and trust repair (Schniter et al., 2013). 
Another indicator refers to the level of commitment. A high level of commitment in an 
interpersonal relationship provides extra motivation to maintain it (Andiappan and Trevino, 
2010) and helps to mitigate the negative effects of the violation (Grover et al., 2014).  
 Third, there are two environmental factors identified from the literature, namely 
organisational setting and competition. With respect to organisational setting, organisational 
justice plays a critical role in shaping individual perceptions of the quality of the workplace 
49 
 
(Colquitt et al., 2001). It is argued that procedural justice is likely to promote forgiveness and 
reconciliation of violated staff, because fair and well-equipped procedures in a firm offer 
effective intervention to the trust repair process after an interpersonal conflict (Aquino et al., 
2001). Regarding the notion of competition, the level has been shown to affect trust repair (Lei 
et al., 2014). The authors introduced a competing group to the targeted group, where 
interpersonal trust repair then took place. They found that an external threat from a rival group 
would facilitate trust repair, because the internal tension can be alleviated by diverting the in-
group hostility towards the out-group (ibid). 
 
 
Figure 2 - 6. A breakdown of the interpersonal trust repair literature 
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 So far, the repair of trust at the interpersonal level (Figure 2-6) has been reviewed. The 
next section considers inter-organisational trust repair based on similar structures.  
 
 
2.8 THE REPAIR OF INTER-ORGANISATIONAL TRUST 
There have been limited prior studies on inter-organisational trust repair, and of those available, 
a significant portion of the terminology and conceptualisation is borrowed from the 
interpersonal trust repair literature. Ironically, those studies also generally acknowledge that 
this is a limitation and that the reparative responses required and available are different from 
their interpersonal counterparts. In addition, inter-organisational trust repair is inherently more 
complicated, because of the various boundary spanners involved in facilitating the process as 
well as multiple facets involved in locking in future business continuity (Janowicz-Panjaitan 
and Krishnan, 2009; Wang et al., 2014). This section presents the definition, repair approaches, 
possible outcomes, and corresponding moderators from the extant literature to facilitate the 
cross-comparison with the interpersonal counterparts as well as identifying the theoretical and 
empirical gaps.  
 A widely adopted definition of relationship repair is “…activities by one or both parties 
substantively return the relationship to a positive state” (Dirks et al., 2009, p. 69). This is 
relatively broad, as the authors intended to provide a grand definition for relationship repair 
that fits various disciplines as well as multiple levels (organisational and inter-organisational 
in particular). A more fine-grained and tailored definition is “activities directed at making trust 
[…] more positive after a violation is perceived to have occurred” (Kim et al., 2006, p. 56). 
These activities are aimed at demonstrating the trustee’s trustworthiness and to regulate 
untrustworthy behaviour in the future in an attempt to facilitate the trustor’s willingness to 
reconcile and to pursue continuity with the trustee (Gillespie and Dietz, 2009). The concrete 




2.8.1 Responses to inter-organisational trust repair  
Similar to the interpersonal counterpart, there are several categorisations of reparative 
responses available for recovering damaged trust, such as the substantive vs. non-substantive 
(Dirks et al., 2009), legalistic vs. non-legalistic (Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan, 2009), 
cognitive vs. affective (Li et al., 2013), and organisational justice responses (Wang et al., 2014). 
These responses tend to overlap to some extent from category to category. Among these 
classifications, Wang et al.’s (2014) organisational justice perspective appears to be the most 
all-encompassing framework that facilitates the integration of various reparative responses 
into different organisational justice approaches (i.e. distributive, procedural, interpersonal, and 
informational justice approaches).  
 
Distributive justice approach  
Distributive justice approaches repair inter-organisational trust through modifying the rule of 
equity after a trust violation. This means that, “if a supplier invests equitable amounts of efforts, 
resources, and time into the disruption resolution as its buyer does”, the buyer will have more 
trust in it (Wang et al., 2014, p. 376). These approaches not only take the form of investments 
of resources (e.g. new machinery and new QA recruits), for as Wang et al. (2014) articulated, 
they also include the provision of financial compensation, which is a critical element in 
facilitating the reconciliation process by making up the losses from transgressions. The 
distributive justice approach resembles the economic approach identified in the previous 
section and remains under-researched compared to interpersonal trust repair literature. 
 
Procedural justice approach  
Procedural justice approaches aim to facilitate mutual learning about buyers and suppliers’ 
concerns through rules of accuracy, bias-suppression, representativeness, consistency, and 
correctability (cf. Leventhal, 1980). These rules ensure that reparative responses are formed 
jointly, with the needs of both sides being properly construed. As such, these approaches 
empower both parties and enhance their involvement in deriving decisions. They allow for a 
timely and appropriate resolution procedure to be formed with minimal disturbance and 
without future conflict (Wang et al., 2014). 
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 Furthermore, procedural justice approaches have the purpose of providing a fair 
environment for the continuation of the relationship through enhanced coordination, learning, 
and routinisation (Luo, 2008). The notion of routinisation is particularly critical to inter-
organisational trust repair, because it eliminates the possibility of the same trust violation or 
similar events from occurring again in the future (Weber, 2017). Kumar et al. (1995) added 
that routinisation can take the form of structural governance, which consists of operational and 
contractual arrangements. Hence, the trustee and/or the trustor can refine their operational 
procedures (e.g. more checkpoints in manufacturing processes) in order to prevent the 
reoccurrence of faulty issues.  Regarding contractual arrangements, a trust violation 
potentially signals that the current ones may not be sufficient to protect the trustor’s welfare. 
So, the trustor might resort to the modification of existing contracts in order to safeguard future 
exchanges (e.g. increased monitoring or penalties) (Weber, 2017). In addition, Janowicz-
Panjaitan and Krishnan (2009) proposed that trust can be recovered, if such contractual 
modifications are made voluntarily by the trustee. Malhotra and Lumineau (2011) have 
empirically examined the longitudinal effect of contractual resolution, in the forms of control 
and coordination functions, on recovering competence and goodwill trust.  
 However, despite many of the aforementioned actions residing in procedural justice 
approaches, they have not yet been empirically studied in the trust repair context, except by 
Malhotra and Lumineau (2011) and Wang et al. (2014). The paper by Wang et al. (2014) did 
not examine specific procedural justice approaches per se, but rather, focused on the effect of 
the induced positive procedural justice perception (as per their survey design) on mitigating 
different dimensions of trust. 
 
Interpersonal justice approach  
Interpersonal justice approaches refer to interpersonal treatments received in communicating 
the allocation of resources, such as demonstration of regular visits and willingness to help (Liu 
et al., 2013) as well as whether the trustee treats the trustor with sensitivity, dignity, politeness 
and respect (Luo, 2007). These approaches are similar to verbal and social responses identified 
in the interpersonal trust repair literature, but they have been rarely examined at the inter-




Informational justice approach  
Informational justice approaches focus on the content of information exchanged during the 
trust repair process. They concern whether the trustor and trustee “communicate candidly, 
explain procedures thoroughly and reasonably, communicate details in a timely manner, and 
tailor communications to each other’s specific needs” (cf. Liu et al., 2012: 359). Li et al. (2013) 
addressed the dynamic of such an approach from a bilateral perspective. They argued that at 
the beginning of the trust repair process, the trustor may play a more active role in clarifying 
the problem identification and damages incurred for the trustee (termed ‘clearing the air’), 
while the latter starts to take an active role subsequently in providing feedback regarding the 
progress of the repair process.   
 So far, this subsection has integrated inter-organisational repair responses from the 
organisational justice literature, according to Wang et al.’s (2014) framework. However, 
whilst this framework has been heavily relied upon, the authors did not specifically investigate 
the actual reparative responses adopted, simply drawing upon different organisational justice 
perceptions (ex post the actual effect of different organisational justice approaches). The 
following subsection discusses the possible outcomes of inter-organisational trust repair.  
  
2.8.2 Consequences of inter-organisational trust repair 
As with the interpersonal trust repair literature, the same possible outcomes are conceptualised 
and proposed, i.e. upward trust recalibration, restoration, and downward trust recalibration 
(Dirks et al., 2009; Tomlinson et al., 2004), but have remained unexamined due to a lack of 
empirical findings (e.g. Li et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2014). With respect to the upward 
recalibration of the post-repair trust, some scholars have argued that the process of trust repair 
offers an opportunity for both the buyer and supplier to reflect upon and refine their current 
exchange structures, including operational and contractual arrangements (Li et al., 2013; 
Kramer and Lewicki, 2010). However, the extant literature focuses on the effectiveness of 
reparative responses in offsetting the negative impact from trust violations (e.g. Wang et al., 
2014); the general repair process; or the key factors of reparative responses (e.g. Crossley, 
2015; Li et al., 2013). Since prior studies have not explicitly examined the level of inter-
organisational trust in the pre-transgression stage and the post-repair stage, it has not been 
possible to evaluate the outcome of trust repair (i.e. upward recalibration) and the 
corresponding conditions that contribute to such an outcome. Moreover, the majority of trust 
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repair studies have focused on how the negative effects of trust violation are mitigated in a 
linear cause-and-effect logic, while how the trust repair process actually alters the operational 
capabilities, contractual arrangements, and also, the relational characteristics, has been 
overlooked despite some scholarly claims on the potential relational opportunities resulting 
from such repair (Li et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2014).  
 In a similar vein, with respect to trust restoration, damaged trust may also be neutralised 
completely, whereby the post-repair trust is identical to that pre-transgression. This means that 
the trustor is willing to look past the violation and to maintain its continuity intention as at the 
pre-transgression level. Similar to upward recalibration, prior studies have failed to explore 
the intricate modifications during the process of trust repair.  
 Regarding downward recalibration of post-repair trust, it leads to two possible outcomes, 
with the first referring to the perseverance of the existing relationship (Janowicz-Panjaitan and 
Krishnan, 2009). Reparative responses may partially recover damaged trust, leaving some 
negative effects unaddressed (Tomlinson et al., 2004). In this scenario, the trustworthiness of 
the trustee is somewhat discounted after the reparative effort, which may manifest itself in a 
reduction in exchange volume or fewer projects being available to the trustee. That is, the 
dyadic relationship endures, but the quality of the ongoing one is undermined. The second 
possible result is relationship termination, which is beyond the scope of the thesis.  
 Since reparative responses are hardly ever adopted individually in practice, it is 
suggested that “any isolated manner can hardly effectively achieve the repair” (Li et al., 2013, 
p. 97). Apart from Wang et al.’s (2014) preliminary study of different reparative responses in 
tandem, the majority of inter-organisational trust repair studies remain conceptual in nature. 
Not only has the extant literature not examined the relative effectiveness and the particular 
orders of different reparative responses in their ability to recover damaged trust, for it also has 
not provided the fundamental rationale behind when and why a particular repair approach is 
enacted.  
 
2.8.3 Factors affecting inter-organisational trust repair 
Three main categories of situational factors associated with inter-organisational trust repair 
can be identified as: i) violation-specific, ii) dependence structure and iii) exchange structure. 
First, regarding violation-specific factors, scholars have found that the characteristics of trust 
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violation, including intentionality, frequency, severity, and type, moderate the difficulty of 
trust repair (Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan, 2009; Hammervoll, 2011). The more negative 
the trustor attributes the nature of the violation, the more difficult the trust repair will be to 
mitigate this effect.  
 Second, dependence structure concerns the number of alternatives, switching costs, and 
interdependence (Hammervoll, 2011). Specifically, interdependence refers to total 
dependence (i.e. the sum of both firms’ dependence), while relative dependence refers to one 
firm’s dependence on one another (Kumar et al., 1995). Thus, high relative dependence of the 
buyer suggests that it may be forced to accept suboptimal treatments of reparative responses 
(Hammervoll, 2011). Whilst high total dependence means that the exchange accounts for a 
significant volume for both parties, which manifests itself in more frequent communication 
and a potentially closer relationship. This brings forward the next category, relationship quality. 
Scholars have found that, the quality of business relationships may serve as a buffer to 
recovering the relationship (Vidal et al., 2016). That is, relationships with higher commitment 
are less likely to experience hindrance during the repair process (ibid).   
 Last, in terms of exchange structure, business relationships may have different governing 
mechanisms, including market and relational governance. The former underpins structural 
governance in terms of extensive monitoring and contractual clauses, while the latter 
emphasises social elements and implicit understanding. Such a difference in exchange 
structure determines the preferred reparative responses (Hammervoll, 2011). For example, 
firms operating under market governance may favour the imposition of new contractual 
arrangements that eliminate potential violation reoccurrences. However, such a contention has 
yet to be examined.  
 All in all, factors affecting the process of trust repair are similar to those regarding trust 
violation, in general, with an additional factor, the exchange structure, as shown below (Figure 
2-7). Whilst extensive factors are proposed in the literature, most of them have not been 
empirically verified. The extant work seems only to capture snapshots of particular moderators 
(e.g. Wang et al., 2014; Yu et al., 2017), because the majority of researchers have tended to 
view the process of trust repair as a cross-sectional phenomenon. As a result, the dynamic of 




Figure 2 - 7. A breakdown of the inter-organisational trust repair literature 
 
 
2.9 SYNOPSIS OF THE CROSS-LEVEL TRUST REPAIR LITERATURE 
Interpersonal and inter-organisational trust repair differ in terms of several characteristics 
(Table 2-2), such that the latter is more complex than the former. In the cross-level comparison 
of reparative responses, it can be seen that interpersonal trust repair studies have involved 
examining a wide array of reparative responses, but majorly the verbal and social ones. The 
advancement of interpersonal studies not only reflects the number of reparative responses 
researched, with the effect of these reparative responses being examined collectively. 
Inter-organisational trust 
repair
Definition: "Activities by one 
or both parties substantively 
return the relationship to a 
positive state" (Dirks et al., 
2009, p. 69)
Reparative 
responsesDistributive justice approach: 
Investment of resources; 
financial compensation 
Procedural justice approach: Joint 
decision making, timely and 
appropriate resolution procedure ; 
routinisation of operational and 
contractual elements ; refinement of 
operational procedures; voluntary 
contractual modifications 
Interpersonal justice approach: 
Regular visits, demonstration of 
willingness to help; treat the trustor 
with sensitivity, dignity, and respect
Informational justice approach: 
Communicate candidly, explain 
procedures thoroughly; 
communicate details in a timely 
manner, tailor communications to 
each other's specific needs; clarify 


























Moreover, recent interpersonal research has viewed trust repair as an interactive process in 
which both the trustor and the trustee actively pursue their best interests (e.g. Kim et al., 2009). 
On the other hand, regarding inter-organisational studies, scholars have explored a range of 
reparative responses (e.g. Dirks et al., 2009; Stevens et al., 2015), but the interaction between 
the trustor and the trustee remains understudied.  
 
 Interpersonal trust repair  Inter-organisational trust repair 
Level of 
interactions 
Between individuals (e.g. Ren 
and Gray, 2009; Kim et al., 
2004) 
Between boundary spanners and 
organisations (e.g. Janowicz-Panjaitan 
and Krishnan, 2009) 
Decision 
making 
Individual (e.g. Gillespie and 
Dietz, 2009)   
Collective (e.g. Janowicz-Panjaitan and 
Krishnan, 2009) 
Incentives  Self-interest (e.g. Schweitzer et 
al., 2006)  
Self and organisational interests (Zhang 
et al., 2011) 
Governance  Informal (e.g. Schweitzer et al., 
2006) 




Cognitive and emotional aspects 
(e.g. Tomlinson and Mayer, 
2009) 
Cognitive, emotional, and exchange 
aspects (e.g. Li et al., 2013). 
Table 2 - 2. An overview of the key differences and similarities in trust repair at the 
interpersonal and inter-organisational levels 
 
 With respect to moderators, both interpersonal and inter-organisational trust repair 
studies share similar factors to the violation domain. To be specific, the literature tends to 
conflate these relational variables in the pre-transgression stage across the trust violation and 
repair stages, assuming that the effect would be the same over time. Furthermore, trust repair 
studies across the two levels have incorporated violation-specific factors in the repair process 
without actually investigating the trust violation process itself. This poses a big problem, as 
the moderating effect (violation-specific) can be unreal or biased, if trust violations are not 
comprehensively understood prior to the trust repair. To this researcher’s best knowledge, 
there has not been a temporal investigation focused on both the trust violation and repair stages, 
which would require a processual and longitudinal design to proceed.  
 In terms of consequences of trust repair across the two levels, it is clearly the case that 
the differential and intrinsic consequences of trust repair (i.e. restoration, upwards, and 
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downwards recalibration) have to be captured. This can be partially explained by the vague 
definition of trust repair, which means that there is no clearly defined endpoint to the repair 
process. Thus, it brings about some lingering questions, such as what constitutes an effective 
or successful trust repair and when does the process stop; the literature has not provided 
answers to these questions. Furthermore, the extant studies have not compared the outcomes 
between the pre-transgression and post-repair stages, which prevents researchers from 
knowing how these different outcomes are essentially induced, under what circumstances and 
by what repair approaches. It may well the case that different reparative responses may exert 
different effects and this could also be so, if implemented in different orders and/or with 
different intensity. A static research design limits the understanding of temporal effects of 
reparative responses enacted and corresponding contingencies.  
 In addition, the inter-organisational trust repair studies have overlooked the behavioural 
outcomes from the trust repair (e.g. Wang et al., 2014; Yu et al., 2017), as compared with the 
interpersonal perspective (e.g. Bottom et al., 2002; Schweitzer et al., 2006). The notion of trust 
repair invariably encapsulates both cognitive and behavioural elements, the latter being 
particularly critical in the inter-organisational context, as it signals that the trustor is still 
willing to rely on the trustee (Schoorman et al., 2007). Such reliance manifests itself in the 
actual exchange between the two parties after the repair effort, which the extant literature has 
failed to capture. In a similar vein, it can be seen that in the inter-organisational trust repair 
literature, trust has been largely treated as a unidimensional construct, thus failing to capture 
more detailed multidimensional attributes. That is, competence and goodwill trust, as well as 
their interplay over the repair process, are still understudied. Through the consideration of 
prior studies on trust violation and repair across the interpersonal and inter-organisational 
levels, key theoretical and empirical gaps have been identified and integrated to develop the 
research questions of this thesis, which are provided in the next section.  
 
2.10 THE DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
This section identifies theoretical and empirical gaps as well as developing the main research 
questions, according to the literature review. As aforementioned, the extant literature reveals 
that interpersonal trust violation and repair have a wider and more detailed body of knowledge 
when compared to its inter-organisational counterpart. Yet, even within interpersonal studies, 
the dynamics of trust violation and repair processes are far from clearly understood. The trust 
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violation and repair literature has shared some similar blind spots, as identified by Lumineau 
and Oliveira’s (2018) recent study, with respect to buyer-supplier relationships. The trust 
repair literature suffers from four key shortcomings, which include: i) single point in time, ii) 
single dimension of trust, iii) single party focus, and iv) single outcome of trust repair.  
The first gap concerns the assumed linearity, which manifests itself in the relatively static 
nature of the trust violation and repair processes. Currently, these processes are treated as a 
one-off static phenomenon, which overlooks other possible thresholds, lag effects, or 
interactions over time (Bachmann et al., 2015; Stevens et al., 2015). A process of trust 
violation and repair consists of multiple feedback loops from interactions between two firms. 
The state of trust can be changed by additional information acquired in the process (Hui et al., 
2011). For example, in the trust violation stage, the trustor may, over time, become more 
acquainted with the central cause of the violation. As a result, that partner can adjust and 
readjust their perception towards the trustee, accordingly. For the abovementioned issues, a 
processual perspective is required to reveal the dynamics of trust over time. When 
incorporating this processual perspective, critical turning points (i.e. negative and positive 
ones) should be examined in order to reveal how trust varies across the trust violation and 
repair stages. The extant literature has not studied the notion of turning points in terms of what 
characterises a negative and positive turning point and what effect they have on trust dynamics 
(Gillespie, 2017).  
 Second, extant studies are characterised by assumed unidimensionality, whereby trust is 
treated as an aggregated and unidimensional construct (a notable exception is Malhotra and 
Lumineau, 2011). This aggregated construct hinders a more granular understanding of how 
inter-organisational relational characteristics develop over time. From the conceptualisation 
of trust, it can be seen that competence and goodwill trust represent two distinct constructs 
that operate under different functions. However, the literature has not only failed to incorporate 
both dimensions of trust in the trust violation and repair processes, for it has also overlooked 
the potential interplay between the two constructs. In a similar vein, past studies have assumed 
that competence- and integrity-based violations affect competence and goodwill trust with 
differential intensity. Specifically, interpersonal trust repair studies reveal that integrity-based 
violations are more difficult to repair compared to competence-based ones. However, the type 
of trust violation has never been studied empirically at the inter-organisational level, not to 
mention the temporal dynamics of it.  
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 Third, the existing studies are characterised by the assumed unilaterality, whereby they 
have typically centred on the perception of the trustor to assess the trustee’s repair efforts. The 
extant studies have rarely incorporated a bilateral perspective in understanding the trust 
violation and repair process. It is critical to understand the interaction between the trustor and 
the trustee and how such interaction and constituting actions and reactions affect trust 
dynamics, because the violation and repair are inherently a negotiation process between the 
dyad.  
 Last, the extant literature has never measured the pre-transgression and post-repair trust. 
The single outcome of trust repair is, in fact, a by-product of the assumed linearity and without 
capturing the complete cycles of episodes across trust violation and repair process, it is 
impossible to gauge what really constitutes different trust outcomes, namely restoration, 
upward, and downward recalibration (Kramer and Lewicki, 2010). Therefore, it prevents the 
researcher to draw potential facilitating and constraining factors from different trust repair 
outcomes, limiting the ability to provide prescriptive advice to the theory and practice 
(Gillespie, 2017). 
To address these shortcomings, this thesis is aimed at exploring the overall dynamics of 
trust in the violation and repair stages. Two research questions are developed that will address 
the four key gaps identified above as follows: 
Research Question 1 
What are the dynamics of competence and goodwill trust in the trust violation stage?  
Research Question 2  




This chapter started by identifying sources of buyer-supplier relationship vulnerability and 
justifying the selection of inter-organisational trust to be the focal mechanism. Next, the 
conceptualisation, dimensions, consequences of inter-organisational trust in buyer-supplier 
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relationships were examined. Then, the process of trust violation and repair has been 
delineated. The trust violation literature was then reviewed across the interpersonal and inter-
organisational levels, with respect to their definition, antecedents, consequences, and 
situational factors. Likewise, the trust repair literature from the two levels also underwent the 
same process. Lastly, two overarching research questions derived from the extensive literature 
review were introduced. The next chapter presents the philosophical and methodological 




CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
 
INTRODUCTION TO THE CHAPTER  
This chapter covers the research philosophy and methodology adopted in this thesis. It begins 
with a consideration of various philosophical positions (section 3.1) and then continues with a 
discussion on the research nature (section 3.2), and approach (section 3.3). The following 
sections explain and justify the adoption of a case study research strategy (section 3.4) along 
with the overall research process (section 3.5). Section 3.6 describes the research design phase 
concerning the unit of analysis, processual design, longitudinal approach, multiple case design, 
case selection logic, and pilot study. Section 3.7 presents the data collection phase, outlining 
the techniques adopted and access to data. Section 3.8 explains the data analysis phase, 
including within- and cross-case analysis. Section 3.9 explains the criteria of research 
credibility and how this research attended to enhancing these. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the ethical considerations and how confidentiality was ensured (section 3.10).  
 
3.1 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY  
Following Saunders et al.’s (2009) research onion (Figure 3-1), most research begins broadly 
with a set of philosophical assumptions, also known as a paradigm, which entails ontological, 
epistemological, and methodological stances (Guba, 1990). These stances reflect the 
researcher’s world view and in turn, determine the research strategy adopted to address the 
research questions (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). Ontological stance refers to the form and 
characteristics of the social reality that the researcher believes in, while the epistemological 
stance refers to the way in which this reality can be known to the researcher. Methodological 
stance refers to techniques the researcher adopts to gain knowledge of the reality (Easterby-




Figure 3 - 1. The research onion adapted from Saunders et al. (2009) 
 
The spectrum across these paradigms spans from positivism at one end to interpretivism 
at the other end (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). As summarised in the table below (Table 3-1), 
positivists believe that the reality and the process of capturing it is value-free and mainly rely 
on numerical methods and experiments to derive the objective fact. They embrace empiricism 
and strive to test causal relationships (Burgess et al., 2006). Interpretivists, on the other hand, 
believe that reality is socially constructed so they “study things in their natural settings, 
attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring 
to them” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000, p. 3). In this thesis a critical realism position is adopted, 
because it allows for a phenomenon to be studied in its natural setting and reveals alternative 
mechanisms operating behind it (Bhaskar, 2010), which is perfectly compatible with 






 Positivism  Critical Realism  Interpretivism  
Ontology – the 
nature of 
reality 
Naïve realism – 
reality exists 
independently 
from the human 
mind 
Ontological realism – 
reality exists independently 
from the human mind and is 
stratified by empirical, 
actual, and real domains.  
Ontological 




– the nature of 
knowledge  
Objectivism – 
reality is knowable 
Epistemological relativism 
– the real domain is not 
observable. The actual 
(event) and the empirical 
domains (experienced 
events) are knowable and 
observable  
Epistemological 
relativism – facts can 















Deductive and/or inductive 
Critical multiplism  













qualitative – case study, 
statistical analysis, survey, 







Table 3 - 1. Descriptions of three research paradigms adapted from Guba and Lincoln (1994) 
 
 Critical realists assume that reality exists independently from the researcher and is 
stratified into three domains, namely real, actual, and empirical domains (Bhaskar, 2009 Sayer, 
2010). The researcher can only draw inferences based upon observations collected in the 
empirical domain and in turn, analyse these potential event-generating perceptions, processes, 
and practices to reveal, completely or partially, causal structures and generative mechanisms 
in the actual domain (Rotaru et al., 2014, Ryan et al., 2012). However, accessing the real 
domain is not guaranteed. Epistemologically, critical realists believe that social phenomena 
are inherently constituted by materials and meanings, which are ascribed by social actors and 





3.2 RESEARCH APPROACH 
Following the research philosophy, the research approach is explained. Most research involves 
adopting a deductive or an inductive approach. With the deductive perspective, a positivistic 
stance is taken that focuses on hypothesis development and testing, while an inductive one is 
underpinned by interpretivism that aims to generate theories from collected empirical data 
(Saunders, 2007). The deductive approach relies on quantitative research data, whereas the 
inductive approach is based on the qualitative form. It should be noted that there is another 
approach, namely the abductive approach, proposed by Dubois and Gadde (2002). This refers 
to an iteration of both deductive and inductive elements, which simultaneously and 
interactively incorporate empirical data and theories. For this thesis, the abductive approach is 
adopted, because it realistically captures the cumulative research process that is intertwined 
by general theory and empirical context (Ketokivi and Choi, 2014).  
With the abductive approach being chosen, there are three different types of research 
identified by Yin (2003), including exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory research. These 
forms serve different purposes with regards to the phenomenon a researcher seeks to 
investigate. It should be noted that the boundaries between these research types are blurred 
(Yin, 2003). Given the research questions formulated in the literature review chapter, this 
thesis resides in exploratory and explanatory research, because the phenomena regarding inter-
organisational trust violation and repair remain broadly defined, with a lack of understanding 
on the temporal dynamics and boundary conditions. Furthermore, the research questions of 
this study strive to explore the causal relationship between reparative responses and the 
corresponding consequences. In addition, since the extant literature suffers a lack of the 
availability of theoretical frameworks, the explanatory nature allows for the researcher to seek 
theoretical explanations for the reasons behind some of the cause-and-effect discovered from 
the empirical investigation. Given that the research approach and the type of research have 






3.3 RESEARCH STRATEGY  
A research strategy is defined as “a general orientation to the conduct of research” (Bryman, 
2008, p. 698). There are six commonly adopted research strategies that examine inter-
organisational relationships. These include survey research, experiment research, case study, 
action research, grounded theory, and archival research (Table 3-2). The table below illustrates 
the descriptions, advantages, and disadvantages with respect to each research strategy. To 
choose an appropriate research strategy, it should satisfy three conditions, which are i) the 
form of research questions, ii) the control over behavioural events, and (iii) the focus of 
contemporary events (Yin, 2003). 
With respect to the first condition, referring back to the research questions of this study, 
they essentially seek to address the notion of how the trust violation and repair processes 
unfold with respect to competence and goodwill trust. It requires a research strategy that 
enables the researcher to trace events, (re)actions, and corresponding perceptions between 
buyers and suppliers over time. The second condition refers to the extent of control a 
researcher has over the actual behavioural events. In this study, the researcher had no control 
over the actual behaviour of inter-organisational relationships and events. Finally, regarding 
the degree of focus on contemporary events, this thesis is aimed at revealing the dynamics of 
the two trust dimensions over the course of trust violation and repair, for which the processual 
and bidimensional perspectives are novel, not to mention that scholarship of the phenomenon 
at the inter-organisational level is itself rare. Since the current knowledge about the process 
(unclear causality and mechanisms) and factors involved (unknown boundary conditions) is 
limited, survey and experiment research can be easily ruled out, leaving case study, action 





 General characteristics Selection criteria 
Research 
strategy 












Collecting data from large 
samples and analysing them to 
demonstrate a statistic picture 
or test relationships between 
factors 
- Relatively easy 
- Low cost 
- Can reduce sample bias 
- Context-insensitive 








Seeking to determine if a 
specific treatment influences 
an outcome and to test theories 
- Control of variables 
- Replicable 
- Limited realism 
- Unknown generalisability 
How, why Yes Yes 
Case study Developing an in-depth 
description and analysis of a 
case or multiple cases 
- Process understanding 
- Demonstrate causality 
- Natural settings 
- Rich data 
- Costly 
- Time demanding 
- Limited generalisability 
- No experimental control 
How, why No Yes 
Action 
research 
Engaging a direct interaction 
with research objects, with a 
potential intervention 
- First-hand experience 
- Applying theory to practice 
- A close relationship with 
subjects 
- Ethics consideration 
- Researcher bias 
- Time demanding 
- Unknown generalisability 
How, why No Yes 
Grounded 
theory 
Developing a theory grounded 
in data from the field 
- Creative 
- Potential to conceptualise 
- Rich and in-depth data 
- Time demanding 
- Researcher bias 
- The assumption on no 
previous research available 
- Limited generalisability 
How, why No Yes 
Archival 
research 
Seeking out and extracting 
evidence from archival records 
(e.g. manuscripts, documents, 
records, objects, and sound) 
- Unobtrusive 
- Exact details 
- Broad coverage 
- Can be accessed multiple 
times 
- Low retrievability 
- Reporting bias 






Table 3 - 2. An overview of research strategies adapted from Creswell (2002) and Yin (2003)
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The methodological fit, proposed by Edmondson and McManus (2007), was taken into 
consideration by assessing three criteria (i.e. prior work, research design, and contribution to 
literature) amongst the remaining research strategies. Action research is not appropriate, 
because the research design of this thesis is inherently retrospective in nature. Active 
engagement with buyers and suppliers not only does not guarantee the real-time occurrence of 
a trust violation and repair, but it can also prevent data access because either the buyer and/or 
the supplier might not be willing to reveal critical information regarding transgressions to the 
outsider who investigates both firms.  
Grounded theory is also not well suited, because it assumes that there are no other 
explanatory theories available in the prior work. However, in the previous chapter, the trust 
violation and repair literature was reviewed, which identified a solid theoretical foundation 
especially from the interpersonal level. Despite the literature lacking a processual and inter-
organisational focus, the researcher should not assume that theories used at the individual level 
do not apply to inter-organisational relationships. In fact, many prior studies on buyer-supplier 
relationships have relied on those theories (e.g. organisational justice theory, social exchange 
theory, and attribution theory) (Tomlinson and Mayer, 2009; Wang et al., 2014). Thus, it is 
inappropriate to adopt grounded theory. Besides, grounded theory approach does not comply 
with the pre-specified abductive approach as the research process of this thesis aims to 
commute between theories and practices and balance theory generation and theory elaboration.   
Finally, archival research alone is not suitable for this thesis due to the concern of data 
availability regarding the research design. It is possible that firms record every action and 
reaction carried out in the event of trust violation and repair, but it is almost impossible to log 
the changing perceptions from both parties over the process. In addition to this, it is unlikely 
that firms would give the researcher unlimited access to retrieve everything relevant from their 
database. Thus, allowing for a certain flexibility and other complementary forms of data (e.g. 
narratives drawn from multiple informants) is critical to collecting data around sensitive 
issues. A case study methodology was ultimately chosen, because it is more suitable than other 
research strategies in terms of addressing the research questions at hand. In the next section, 





3.3.1 Justification of a case study research strategy  
The case study method “focuses on understanding the dynamics present within single settings” 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 534), which captures the temporal orientation as well as the contextual 
influences of the studied phenomenon across multiple levels of analysis as well as through 
multiple sources of data (Meredith, 1998). It can involve collecting both qualitative and 
quantitative data, including financial data, interviews, observations, and archival data 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The case study method allows the researcher to study contemporary 
phenomena in their real-world settings in which observable practices and patterns can be 
processed and understood fully to generate relevant theory (Meredith, 1998). It enables the 
researcher to gain more understanding of complex and emerging phenomena as well as 
exploring little known variables (ibid). It should be noted that the use of the case study method 
needs to be carefully justified as it is not suitable for all research purposes and circumstances 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Stake (2005, p. 443) proposes that “case study is not a methodological 
choice but a choice of what is to be studied”. The case study method was adopted, because it 
can best address the research questions posed and this is for the following three reasons. 
 First, trust repair between firms operates in a more complex environment than 
interpersonal trust repair in that the former deals with more subsystems than the latter 
(Lumineau et al., 2015). These subsystems manifest themselves in multiple layers of 
organisational structures across staff (from operating to corporate levels) and departments 
(from R&D to production and procurement) within a trusting firm to a trusted one. Such 
subsystems may generate many contingencies and factors that are difficult to capture with 
experiments and surveys (Stuart et al., 2002). The case study method can overcome such 
difficulties by allowing for extensive contact between the researcher and the real-life 
phenomenon, such that the former can gain a holistic view of how companies identify, 
negotiate, and resolve trust violations as well as identify implicit and explicit rules (e.g. 
shadow of the past, relationship dependence, and other external factors) that govern decisions 
made during the trust repair process (Gillespie, 2017).  
 The case study method is deemed well equipped when studying the phenomena in buyer-
supplier relationships (Dubois and Araujo, 2004). In particular, the method facilitates more 
effectively reconciling differences drawn from multiple respondents with contradictory 
reasons than statistical methods (Baba, 1988). Additionally, it provides a fruitful avenue to 
triangulate multiple sources of evidence through which different perspectives can be 
understood (Yin, 2003). That is, it can capture the interplay between agents with different 
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agendas and structures with enabling and/or disabling effects (Aastrup and Halldorsson, 2008). 
Furthermore, the use of multiple sources of data collection and analysis (e.g. interviews, 
archival documents, and other media) deepens the understanding of the researched 
phenomenon and cross-verifies the results, which perfectly aligns with the researcher’s critical 
realist philosophy (Easton, 2010). 
 Second, past studies have either been based upon Dirks et al.’s (2009) theoretical 
consolidation, which lacks empirical verification, or with little theoretical foundation 
whatsoever. Notably, the authors urged that more theories need to be incorporated and 
developed. Hence, with little theoretical underpinning regarding the phenomenon of interest, 
the case study method can facilitate the researcher in identifying less studied constructs as well 
as probing their effects on and associations with trust violation and repair (McCutcheon and 
Meredith, 1993).  
 Third, the case study method has recently been recommended by trust scholars and 
operations management academia to enhance existing knowledge of the studied phenomena 
(e.g. Dirks et al., 2009; Gillespie, 2017; Ketokivi and Choi, 2014; Lewicki and Kramer, 2010). 
The majority of extant studies on inter-organisational trust repair remain conceptual and in the 
form of commentary (Gillespie, 2017; Weber, 2017). Among the empirical papers, the survey 
method appears to be the most dominant research method, which only offers limited 
understandings due to its cross-sectional focus (Wang et al., 2014). The use of case study 
research strategy for this thesis enriches current understanding of trust violation repair 
literature by allowing the researcher to capture the processual perspective of the studied 
phenomenon (as per research questions), revealing reasons and perceptions behind each event 
and response, and accommodating different research techniques (e.g. interviews and archival 
documents). In the next section, the research design phase is explained.  
 
 
3.4 RESEARCH DESIGN PHASE  
The research design is illustrated in Figure 3-2 below. Next, as part of this case study process, 
there is a specification of the unit of analysis, temporal orientation, and the explanation for a 
selection of multiple cases. Then, a pilot study that was conducted before the final data 




Figure 3 - 2. The overall research processes 
 
3.4.1 Unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis indicates the nature of the case examined, which is determined by the 
research questions (Yin, 2003). These essentially concern (re-) calibration of trust perceptions 
in the event of trust violation and repair between buyers and suppliers. Hence, the unit of 
analysis adopted in this thesis is the buyer-supplier relationship.  Whilst this research 
captured both the buyer and supplier perspective in an attempt to reconstruct and deconstruct 
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the historical events of trust violation and repair, the buyer’s trust perception was 
predominantly focused on as an indication of inter-organisational trust, because this is the 
party that makes the ultimate trusting decision towards the supplier (Doney and Cannon, 
1997). The majority of inter-organisational trust violation and repair studies have ascribed the 
role of the trustor to the buyer in inter-organisational relationships (with an exception of Bell 
et al., 2002). In contrast, the supplier’s responses help to delineate how a series of events 
emerged, how various solutions were negotiated, and how different actions were enacted. 
 It should be noted that the case study method does not necessarily imply a processual 
logic. As per the research questions, the study is aimed at exploring the temporal orientation 
underlying sense-making, interaction, and decision making as well as the corresponding 
impact on competence and goodwill trust between buyers and suppliers over a complete cycle 
of the trust repair process. A processual perspective is required to capture the dynamics of 
temporally evolving trust in the event of violation and repair. 
 
3.4.2 Temporal orientation 
For this study a processual view was adopted, one focused on the emergence of a sequence of 
events, activities, and decisions made across predefined stages (Bizzi and Langley, 2012). 
Pettigrew (1997) suggested that process research should meet six requirements. It needs to 
capture both vertical and horizontal levels of analysis. The former refers to the impact of 
multiple actors involved in the process (ibid), whilst latter is centred on the temporal 
interconnectedness, whereby the phenomenon should be traced back in time and across 
different periods (Bizzi and Langley, 2012). Events and activities triggered by it should be 
explained holistically, not linearly, in terms of temporality and reasonability (Pettigrew, 1990). 
In addition, contextual conditions must be understood, as they are “continually reconstituted 
within and by processes of interaction over time, generating unexpected and largely 
uncontrollable chains of activity and events” (Langley et al., 2013, p. 5).  
 The extant literature suffers from a lack of processual logic due to the assumed linearity 
on the process of trust violation and repair. This, it is contended here, can be effectively 
challenged through identifying a longitudinal evidentiary chain through case study research 
(Stuart et al., 2002). Moreover, process research offers a critical means to understand the time-
dependent relationship of trust perceptions, reactive responses, and the effect of the reparative 
responses between the dyad along the trust violation and repair process. Through incorporating 
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a processual view in the case study method, chronological flow of episodic trust violating and 
repair incidents can be preserved that allows the researcher to examine the cause-and-effect of 
different events with perceptual and behavioural responses (Miles and Huberman, 1994). For 
this research, the retrospective design was adopted that was aimed at accessing the process 
through multiple points in time so as to “reconstruct and deconstruct events through actors’ 
memory” (Halinen et al., 2012, p. 219). This thesis seeks to trace retrospective incidents of 
trust violation from its emergence, through its development, to its repair. The case study 
method also ensures access to different actors involved in the cycle of inter-organisational trust 
repair.  
 The processual logic informs the time horizon of the case study. For this thesis, a 
longitudinal approach was employed such that the case studies were carried out over a long 
period of time. This provides researchers with the opportunity to trace and compare perceptual 
changes over time (Robinson et al., 1994). A longitudinal approach is particularly pertinent to 
exploring inter-organisational trust repair for five reasons. 
 First, due to the vague definition of trust violation and repair, this prevents researchers 
from being sure about when the process has come to an end. Hence, the longer the time of the 
investigation the greater the likelihood that the whole process from violation to repair can be 
observed. In addition, key boundary spanners would be cognizant to temporally separate the 
trust violation and repair process from regular supply chain disturbances. Furthermore, with a 
prolonged time frame, the respondents would adopt an ex-post attribution towards the overall 
trust violation and repair. This would allow them to identify clearly relevant transgressions 
that set off the trust violation and a series of reparative responses that effectively mitigate the 
violation in the trust repair stage. Second, the longitudinal approach allows researchers to 
follow and get involved along the trust repair process with the respondents. That is, it facilitates 
real-time observation, which can lead to a more realistic nature of the studied phenomenon 
being captured. Third, a prolonged investigation allows for the respondents to temper some of 
their immediate negative emotions attached to the transgressions and thus, facilitates their 
being able to provide more objective narratives. It should be noted that it is impossible to 
capture completely value-free narratives. A certain degree of subjectivity also prompts more 
realistic findings, because a trust violation is expected to engender cognitive, emotional, and 
behavioural impacts.  
 Fourth, trust violation and repair can be a very sensitive topic in terms of data collection, 
especially when an inter-organisational relationship is under tension. It is unlikely for 
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researchers to gain immediate insights into the violation and repair processes, because each 
party has their own interest to protect and to pursue, which they will be reluctant to let go of 
initially. Last, but not least, the involved parties would be concerned about sharing such critical 
information with the researcher, because they may lose some advantages in the negotiation to 
resolve the matter, if it is leaked too soon.  
 
3.4.3 Multiple case study design and sampling  
A multiple case study design was employed for this thesis, because it provides the opportunity 
to explore the dynamics of inter-organisational trust with respect to differential outcomes. As 
previously discussed, the literature suggests that four possible outcomes can be witnessed in 
the post-repair stage, including upward recalibration, downward recalibration, restoration, and 
termination (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). However, there has yet to be research examining 
systematically inter-organisational trust in the pre-transgression and the post-repair stages as 
well as how the different outcomes have been arrived at.  
 The multiple case study design can be experiment-like replications across a number of 
cases (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007), used to elaborate contrasting results with explainable 
theoretical reasoning (Ellram, 1996). This study is aimed at comparing and contrasting the 
responses and interaction initiated by buyers and suppliers across trust violation and repair 
together with identifying the contextual factors that yield different repair outcomes. As 
aforementioned, the focus is on three possible outcomes (i.e. upward, downward recalibration, 
and restoration). That is, termination is intentionally excluded as it is beyond the scope of the 
definition of trust repair, which refers to “…activities by one or both parties substantively 
return the relationship to a positive state” (Dirks et al., 2009, p. 69).  
 Multiple case studies are particularly suitable for examining time-dependent 
relationships in which trust repair process is temporally characterised by negative and positive 
trigger points, corresponding buyer-supplier responses, and the following effects. It allows the 
researcher to isolate the effect of causal paths through the replication and extension among 
individual cases (Eisenhardt, 1991). Consequently, this design enhances generalisability (i.e. 




 The multiple case study design, however, has been criticised for its lack of depth and 
weaker understanding compared to the single case design (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991). For the 
present study, this limitation was ameliorated by incorporating responses across vertical (i.e. 
operating and corporate level staff) and horizontal (longitudinal design) levels (Barratt et al., 
2011). The next subsection discusses what constitutes a ‘case’.   
 
3.4.4 Case study selection 
This section explains the sampling logic of the selection of particular cases, which can be 
broken down into three aspects: i) the selection of theoretical samples, ii) the selection of 
industry, and iii) the control of confounding factors.  
 Sampling techniques help the researcher to collect only data from the subject of interest 
rather than all cases (Saunders et al., 2007). In conducting case studies, theoretical sampling 
is normally adopted, which means that the criteria of the choice of cases should “extend the 
emergent theory or fill theoretical categories and provide examples of polar types” 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 537). The theoretical sampling adopted in this study concerns different 
consequences of the level of inter-organisational trust in the post-repair stage compared to that 
in the pre-transgression stage. For this inquiry, cases with respect to three distinct outcomes in 
the post-repair stage were selected, namely upward recalibration, downward recalibration, and 
restoration (Table 3-3). In sum, this sampling plan was chosen with the purpose of deepening 
the extant understanding of how the process of trust violation and repair results in differential 
consequences.  
 
The outcomes of trust repair Sample  
Upward Recalibration  Case 1 
Restoration Case 2 
Downward Recalibration  Cases 3 and 4 
Table 3 - 3. An overview of the theoretical sampling prior to data collection 
 
It should be noted that the theoretical sampling only served as guidance prior to the data 
collection, because there was no guarantee that the identified cases would match what was 
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proposed. It was assumed that downward recalibration tends to prevail across cases since a 
trust violation fundamentally brings about a negative impact on the trustor’s financial and 
operational performance, which may not be easy to get over. Overall, four cases were chosen, 
which is consistent with Eisenhardt (1989), who argued that four to ten useable sites for 
multiple case studies are manageable and representative.  
 In terms of the selection of the industry, the decision was taken to investigate inter-
organisational relationships with respect to the Taiwanese electronics industry for three 
reasons. First, the extant literature suggests that buyers in the high-tech industry tend to place 
a higher importance on trust towards suppliers, which manifests itself in a sense of affiliation 
and identification (Ruyter et al., 2001). The industry is characterised by high supply and 
demand uncertainties, relatively high switching costs and interdependence. As a result, many 
buyers simply adopt single source suppliers (ibid). In addition, Taiwanese electronics 
manufacturers maintain their cost competitiveness via close cooperation with upstream and 
downstream actors (Hwang and Choung, 2014). Therefore, buyers and suppliers operating 
under such an environment are likely to demonstrate a higher motivation to recover their trust 
after transgressions and tend to have more buffers in the event of trust violation, than other 
industries where single sourcing is less likely to prevail.  
 Second, it is argued that the criteria of case selection should be meaningful and 
representative as well as being worth investigating (Stuart et al., 2002). In other words, the 
selected industry and cases should be important and well-known in terms of the significance 
and relevance. Regarding which, the Taiwanese electronics industry was made a research 
object, not only because it plays a critical role in the world, but also, the extant literature lacks 
an understanding of this particular industry (it is predominantly about the automotive industry). 
The Taiwanese electronics industry is renowned for its complete electronic eco-system supply 
chain, encompassing integrated circuit (IC) design and manufacturing activities from upstream 





Figure 3 - 3. An overview of a typical electronic supply chain in Taiwan (Source: the researcher)
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 The Taiwanese electronics industry excels in performance from electronic components 
to consumer goods (Table 3-3). In terms of electronic components, Taiwan accounts for over 
70% of wafer foundry, 50% of IC assembly and testing, 40% of panels, and nearly 30% of 
LCD panels and LEDs worldwide. Regarding consumer goods, Taiwanese electronics firms 
play a critical role in almost all smartphones, tablets, and laptops’ R&D, assembly, and 
manufacturing (ITRI). In addition, four Taiwan-based manufacturers were listed as the world’s 
top 10 electronics manufacturing services (EMS), with seven Taiwan-based companies listed 
as the world’s top 50 EMS in total (Manufacturing Market Insider, 2017). Hence, this thesis 
involved collecting data from some of the well-known companies in the industry, which 
complies with Stuart et al.’s (2002) recommendation.  
 
Product Category Description Performance 
Integrated Circuit 
(IC) 
Upstream IC design house 
Midstream IC manufacturing 









Upstream key components 




Upstream epitaxy growth 
Midstream chip manufacturing 
Downstream packaging 
3rd globally 
Consumer Products Laptops, smartphones, and tablets National growth of 
3% - 5% annually 
Table 3 - 4. The significance of the Taiwanese electronics industry (ITRI, 2014) 
 
 The last reason for choosing the Taiwanese electronics industry lies in operational 
considerations. One of the main drawbacks of case study research is that it is costly and time-
consuming. Hence, in order to manage effectively the budget and time, the industry and the 
target country were selected based on the least cost and geographical proximity, as suggested 
by Stuart et al. (2002), for which the focal industry in Taiwan was an ideal candidate. This was 
particularly the case given the researcher was of that nationality.   
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 With respect to the control of confounding attributes, a case study involves controlling 
for these by setting the boundaries of the study. In this instance, these attributes include the 
target industry, the country of origin, the characteristics of exchange products, and the length 
of relationships prior to the violation as well as the overall buyer-supplier relationships. The 
samples of the present thesis were constrained to the electronics industry in Taiwan with 
supply chain partners exchanging key components with at least six months of a business 
relationship prior to the trust violation and at least five years of an overall partnering 
relationship. These criteria controlled for certain extraneous variation, whilst also leaving 
some room for operational flexibility. 
 
3.4.5 Pilot study 
Pilot interviews were conducted with five industry experts, who had worked in the electronics 
industry for over 10 years, with middle to senior level positions from various departments 
(Table 3-5). These interviews helped to clarify the wording used in the industry in relation to 
conceptualisations, implications, and the general industry characteristics regarding inter-
organisational trust, trust violation, and trust repair. The use of a pilot study can help prevent 
mistranslation and misunderstanding between academia and practitioners (Seidl, 2007). A 
summary note from the pilot study is attached (Appendix I).  
 
Respondent  Company Job title and years of experience 
1 Cisco Systems Senior engineer, 18  
2 ChipMOS Technologies 
Inc. 
Plant manager of production department, 
18 
3 Royal Philips Electronics Director of the automation department, 20 
4 AsusTek Computer Inc. Senior project manager, 9 
5 Lite-On Technology 
Corporation  
Senior project manager, 16  




 The pilot interviews facilitated the shaping of the data collection strategies for the main 
study in four ways. First, they allowed the researcher to compare and contrast the terms and 
constructs utilised in the literature and the practice, for it was found that some of the constructs 
were used differently by the practitioners (Appendix I). Thus, the pilot interviews further 
refined the interview guide in terms of the measurement criteria of the trust dimensions across 
the stages. 
 Second, due to the highly sensitive nature of the data, the researcher decided to approach 
buying firms as an access point, because they are more likely to reveal trust violation inflicted 
by supplying firms. In particular, the buyer is more likely to complain about the violated 
supplier because their interests have been harmed. Furthermore, the researcher also decided to 
access the distributors of large manufacturers to increase the chance of a positive response. 
These firms not only serve as passive and knowledgeable observers of trust violating and repair 
incidents, but they are also more likely to be willing to share the details of the story. 
 Third, the snowballing technique was adopted to capture the dyadic view of the trust 
violating and repair incidents. When the researcher approached a buyer for retrospective 
insights of a complete trust repair process, he asked whether that party was willing and able to 
help reach the corresponding supplier for interviewing. This implies that the party may have 
moved on from the past transgressions. Such an act not only would most likely guarantee 
access to the violating party for a bilateral perspective, but it would also provide the supplier 
more freedom to elaborate upon the incidents, which was critical to the data collection of this 
study.  
 Last, it should be noted that the industry experts were only able to provide a general 
picture of trust violation and repair they had experienced with lopsided descriptions due to the 
different organisational positions held, in different hierarchies and departments. Moreover, 
since most of the experts were at the management level, their answers lacked details of 
violating and repair incidents. Furthermore, they concurred that in order to achieve data 
saturation, cross-hierarchy and cross-functional respondents should be reached. In particular, 
according to the pilot interviews, project managers and procurement managers were 
considered to be the most relevant and knowledgeable boundary spanners in the process of 
trust repair. But this does not detract from the importance of collecting data from corporate 
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staff such as VPs or directors, as they are critical sources for understanding the goodwill trust 
of dyads.  
 
 
3.5 DATA COLLECTION PHASE 
Prior to conducting the interviews, the researcher set out the main questions, follow-up 
questions, and probes to use in them (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). The research questions 
determined the main questions, which were conveyed in words and phrases that were 
considered to be more accessible for the interviewees. The follow-up questions comprised 
keywords for obtaining further relevant information, whilst the probes acted as interview 
facilitators, which assisted in managing the flow and clarifying unclear meanings. After 
conducting and comprehending the pilot interviews, the interview guide was formulated by 
incorporating the industry wisdom obtained from them (Appendix II). The data collection 
phase took the form of semi-structured interviews conducted with key boundary spanners in 
buyer-supplier relationships.  
 
3.5.1 Semi-structured interviews  
Semi-structured interviewing is the primary data collection method of this case study research. 
The method was deemed the most appropriate for this research, because it could provide a 
structured framework for the interviewer to follow and at the same time allow for open-ended 
questions to be put in a conversational manner (Yin, 2003). Each individual case consisted of 
both buyers and suppliers. Multiple informants were interviewed from the buyer and the 
supplier side across different levels of boundary spanners, including corporate and operating 
staff (cf. Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan, 2009). This design method strives to enhance the 
validity of the information provided by comparing that provided by one boundary spanner with 
that of another (Glick et al., 1990).  
Since semi-structured interviews make a compromise between the formal structured and 
informal approaches, a graphical illustration and interview guide (Appendix II) were drawn up 
to facilitate the interview process in a systematic and consistent manner as well as keeping it 
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casual and open for new insights (Berg et al., 2004). The respondents were asked to tell a story 
as detailed as possible through the stages on the graphical illustration (Figure 3-4). They were 
asked to follow and complete the whole cycle of trust repair by means of both narratives and 
drawings. That is, not only did the respondents have to describe what was going on in the event 
of trust violation and repair, but they also had to draw the pattern of inter-organisational trust 
the relationship went through on a graph as well. Every fluctuation in the dynamics of inter-
organisational trust was probed with justifications being requested. Furthermore, the 
researcher prevented interview biases by i) using technical terms that were comprehensible to 
the industry experts (from the pilot workshop); ii) avoiding leading questions; and iii) using 
tape recording to present the evidence verbatim (Sousa and Voss, 2002).  
 
 






3.5.2 Data access   
The data collection phase began with initiating contacts with potential companies through 
telephone, email, and in person (a sample of the request for interview email can be found in 
Appendix II). Based on the pilot study, the first step of the data collection phase was to reach 
distributors and, buyers because they were deemed to be more knowledgeable about the 
occurrences of trust violation and repair, with less conflict of interest. Moreover, buyers have 
been reported as being less reluctant to share past transgressions compared to suppliers. The 
researcher had attempted to contact as many as possible buyers and distributors in the 
Taiwanese electronics industry for interview opportunities, because the expected response 
would be extremely low, particularly when aiming to collect narratives from a dyadic 
perspective. 
 Second, not only does a trust transgression entail sensitive information held by 
companies, for it also requires within-firm and inter-organisational collaboration across 
different departments. Hence, in order to ensure the necessary access to critical information 
and relevant boundary spanners from companies, the researcher sought out VP and director 
level staff permission and delegation, initially. They were staff who could truly make a call on 
such a decision. It was considered that with their approval, the data collection process would 
be significantly facilitated.  
 Third, the researcher adopted a snowballing technique, as mentioned in the previous 
section, asking the approved buyers and distributors to make a referral to the corresponding 
suppliers at the end of every interview session. However, the majority of buyers and 
distributors were reluctant to share their violating suppliers’ contact details, so the researcher 
had to leverage information obtained from the interviews from the buyer’s perspective to 
initiate additional contact with the stated suppliers. Accordingly, the researcher sent emails 
and made phone calls to request a number of suppliers to agree to be interviewed in order to 
corroborate information yielded from the buyer’s side. 
 In two years of data collection (2016 – 2017), for this study, 59 face-to-face interviews 
were yielded in total, with a wide array of personnel across organisational hierarchies and 
functionalities (e.g. CEOs, GMs, purchasing managers, R&D engineers, and quality assurance 
teams). The vast majority of the interviews were recorded on tape, except for two, for which 
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the researcher took extensive notes and asked for additional clarification on every decision 
made during the trust repair process in order to minimise the chance of misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation. Overall, 3,060 minutes of interview data were recorded, with an average of 
52 minutes per respondent (Table 3-6). 
 
 Number of interviews Length of interviews (in mins) 
The four case studies 39 1,965 
Industry background and 
other firms in the industry 
20 1,095 
Total 59 3,060 
Table 3 - 6. An overview of the interviewing time 
 
 From the 59 interviews, four case studies were constructed based on 39, which satisfied 
the predetermined theoretical profiles and the dyadic perspective (Table 3-7). The remaining 
20 interviews (Appendix VI) did not capture the bilateral view on trust violation and repair. 
Nevertheless, these not only provided useful insights into the industry, but they also allowed 
the researcher to cross-validate the findings derived from the theoretical sample.  
Referring back to the initially proposed theoretical samples based on differential 
outcomes of trust repair, the four empirical cases satisfactorily met the three post-repair 
outcomes, upwards, downward recalibration, and restoration. As the data analysis progressed, 
these outcomes were further be delved into two trust dimensions, competence and goodwill 
trust (Table 3-8). In addition to the initial sampling logic, other attributes and factors from the 
four empirical cases were acknowledged. In particular, the four cases show a mix of two 
different interdependencies. Cases 2 and 3 are of high interdependence, while for cases 1 and 
4 this is low. Despite categorising as low interdependence, it is a relative term, for the inter-
organisational relationships are still financially important to both the buyers and the suppliers. 
In addition, the four cases show a mix of four different buyer-supplier configurations. Case 1 
is characterised by a big buyer and a small supplier, while case 4 is the opposite, entailing a 
small buyer and a big supplier. Case 2 is characterised by a small buyer and a small supplier, 




Case  Perspective Post Experience in the 
industry (in years) 
Interview length (in 
mins)  
Collection period  
1  Buyer (GN) Director of supplier management 
department  
18 76; 72 Mar 2016; Mar 2017 
Purchasing manager 9 32 Mar 2016 
Project manager 11 31 Apr 2016 
Supplier (GE) General manager  25 76 Mar 2016 
Sales manager  10 55 Mar 2016 
Sales executive   - 15 Mar 2016 
2  Buyer (HE) General manager  20 45 Dec 2015 
Senior purchasing manager  18 52 Jan 2016 
Quality assurance engineer - 15 Jan 2016 
Procurement agent  - 15 Jan 2016  
Supplier (IE) General manager  18 76 Dec 2015 
Account manager  18 55 Jan 2016 
Field application engineer  12 15 Jan 2016 
3 
 
Buyer (AC) Deputy executive officer  25 61 Mar 2017 
Senior vice president  23 66 Dec 2015  
Senior purchasing manager  19 36 Mar 2016 
Senior engineer at research and development  11 33  Mar 2016 
Engineer at research and development  8 30 Mar 2017 
Supplier (AE) Executive vice president 20 46 ;71 Mar 2016; June 2017 
Senior project manager  12 74; 95 Mar 2016; June 2017 
Purchasing agent  8 30 Mar 2016 
Senior sales manager 10 56 June 2017 
Sales manager 8 40 Mar 2016 
Field application engineer - 17 Mar 2016 
4 
 
Buyer (SC) Senior purchasing manager  20 60; 38 Dec 2015; Jan 2016 
R&D engineer 11 30 Dec 2015 
Senior R&D engineer  17 50 Mar 2016 
Purchasing agent  8 30 Mar 2016 
Distributor 
(SH)  
General manager  25 70; 70 Nov 2015; Jan 2016 
Sales engineer 1 5 70 Dec 2015 
Sales engineer 2 6 120; 30 Dec 2015; Mar 2016 
Assistant vice president  11 60 Dec 2015 
Supplier (SM) Production engineer 8 50 June 2017 




 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
Buyer profile  Global Navigation (GN) HiTech Electronics (HE) Alpha Computer (AC) SemiCon (SC) 
Financial indicator (revenue) $3.5 billion (2016) $8 million paid in capital $19 billion (2010) 
$15 billion (2011) 
$13 billion (2012) 
$350 million (2014) 
$270 million (2015) 
Number of employees 10000 200 10000 3000 
Year of establishment  1990 1985 1980 1998 
Nature of business  GPS device manufacturer  Electronic device manufacturer (power 
supplies in particular)  
Consumer electronics OEM Semiconductor assembly and testing  
Supplier profile Giga Tech (GT) Integral Electronics (IE) Advanced Electronics (AE) SemiElectro Materials (SE) 
Financial indicator (revenue) $6 million paid in capital $3 million paid in capital $30 billion (2010) 
$22 billion (2011) 
$20 billion (2012) 
$10 billion (2012) 
Number of employees 250 120 50000 6500 
Year of establishment  2000 1990 1985 1970 
Nature of business  Metal stamping OEM PCB manufacturer Consumer electronics ODM Semiconductor chemicals  
Power structure  Asymmetric (large buyer small supplier) Symmetric  
(small buyer small supplier) 
Symmetric  
(large buyer large supplier) 
Asymmetric  
(small buyer large supplier) 
Overall interdependence Low High High  Low 
Relative dependence (from the buyer 
perspective) 
Moderate to high  Moderate Somewhat high High  
Supply chain configuration  Midstream Midstream  Downstream  Upstream 
The level of post-repair competence trust Upward Recalibration Upward Recalibration Downward Recalibration Restoration 
The level of post-repair goodwill trust  Upward Recalibration Restoration Upward Recalibration Downward Recalibration 
Table 3 - 8. Cross-comparison of the investigated companies from the four cases 
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 Notably, not all the interviews from the four cases were carried out at once. They were 
collected over time (December to April 2016; April to June 2017), which offered a unique 
opportunity for the researcher to investigate certain trust repair incidents as they progressed, 
evolved, and were completed, as suggested by Suddaby (2006). That is, the value of adopting 
a processual approach and longitudinal time frame could be maximised through enhanced 
richness, vividness, and validity of the interview data (Langley, 2007).  
 The researcher wrote the transcriptions, made the translations, and carried the analysis 
alongside the data collection process. The interview recordings were transcribed verbatim. 
Since the data collected were in Mandarin, the researcher translated the contents of the 
transcripts. Then, two doctoral researchers, who were bilingual Mandarin and English 
speakers, were asked to conduct back the translation of two of the four cases to ensure the 
accurate representation of the content during the translation process. Such a process helped the 
researcher to identify unclear concepts or emerging themes during the data collection phase. 
Moreover, the researcher could go back to the field and obtain clarification until the point 
where no more new and important information could be provided. This refers to the saturation 
point, where the researcher decides to terminate the data collection phase, because any further 
evidence would only marginally contribute to the findings of the study (Eisenhardt, 1989) or 
maybe not at all.  Apart from the semi-structured interviews, sources of secondary data were 
relied upon, which are discussed in the next subsection.  
 
3.5.3 Secondary data 
For this research, secondary data were collected, including: i) industry reports, mainly 
retrieved from government databases and industrial think tanks; ii) company reports, 
downloaded from their annual report for shareholders; iii) relevant news obtained online; iv) 
technical reports, supplied by the interviewees, such as failure diagnosis reports, return 
merchandise authorisation (RMA), and corrective action preventive action (CAPA); and v) 
communicative evidence, supplied by a few respondents involving key emails acknowledging 
the violation.  
 Documentary analysis was for the purpose of retrieving critical background information 
on the studied organisations in terms of their operational strategies and strategic decisions, as 
well as their financial performance. Notably, since many of the case study firms are well-
known and listed companies, critical issues (i.e. trust violation) induced by their supply chain 
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partners and/or corresponding impact are often made public on the news. Moreover, the impact 
of trust violation is also likely to be reflected in their financial performance depending on the 
level of its severity. Hence, these sources enabled the researcher to track key event 
chronologies for verification and supplementary purposes (Bizzi and Langley, 2012). The 




Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
Industry 
report 
1. Metal stamping 
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1. The buyer’s 
annual report (2012 
- 2014)  
2. Academic 
literature on the 
buyer’s company 
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2. The supplier’s 
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buyer to the world’s 
No.1 PC 
manufacturer 
1. The financial 
plummet of the 












N/A 1. Failure diagnosis  
















Table 3 - 9. An overview of the secondary data utilised  
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 It should be noted that for some cases the interviewees accessed the database directly to 
retrieve those relevant to corroborate their narratives. These documents not only substantiated 
the actions and interaction adopted during the trust violation and repair, but also facilitated the 
interviewees in retaining their best memory of the incidents experienced.  
 
 
3.6 DATA ANALYSIS PHASE  
This section concerns the within-case, and cross-case analysis. It should be noted that data 
collection and analysis are inherently interconnected with each other. For, the present study, 
as previously mentioned, data collection and analysis were conducted synchronously, in an 
iterative and sequential manner, with the aim of fulfilling the critical realism stance of 
revealing the actual domain. Transcribed and translated documents with extensive notes taken 
from the field and the secondary documents retrieved were incorporated into the case study 
database from the cloud. Then, these transcripts, notes, and secondary documents were 
imported into the data analysis software NVivo10 (Appendix VIII as a snapshot). This 
computer-based tool improved the data analysis through facilitating their management 
(storing, retrieving, and sorting) (Dainty et al., 2000). 
 
3.6.1 Within-case analysis 
The within-case analysis aims to gain an in-depth understanding of individual cases. With 
process research, making sense of the data can be difficult, because of hard-to-conceptualise 
sequences of events (Bizzi and Langley, 2012), multiple levels and units of analysis with 
unclear boundaries (Pettigrew, 1990), changing temporal embeddedness (e.g. duration and 
relevance) (Bizzi and Langley, 2012), and competing interpretations between informants and 
business parties (Buchanan and Dawson, 2007). In order to alleviate these difficulties, for this 
work, temporal bracketing, narrative, and visual mapping strategies from Langley (1999) were 
adopted (Table 3-10). These are not mutually exclusive, but rather, act as complementary tools 
to facilitate data analysis (ibid). How the three strategies are combined in analysing processual 




Strategy Description Key anchor 
point 
Narrative  Draw thick descriptions to depict stories, meanings, 




Break down the passage of time in a relationship with 
logical phases to the description of events 
Phases 
Visual mapping Represent the order of events of several cases by 
graphical and tabular illustrations 
Events 
Orderings 
Table 3 - 10. Three strategies to facilitate analysis of processual data 
 
 The processual data collected were, firstly, subject to a temporal bracketing strategy, 
which aimed to “define phases within certain continuity and certain discontinuities at its 
frontiers” (Langley, 1999, p. 703). The strategy itself has no theoretical significance, but it 
does provide a logical structure to the description of events (ibid). That is, the process of a 
complete trust repair cycle was divided into four stages, viz. the pre-transgression, the trust 
violation, the trust repair, and the post-repair stages.  
 The breakdown of the processual stages allowed the researcher to reveal how context at 
a particular point in time “leads to actions that reconstitute contexts in subsequent time periods” 
(Bizzi and Langley, 2012, p. 231). Hence, by bracketing the different time periods, this enabled 
the capturing of significant reparative responses (actions) and boundary conditions (contexts) 
in relation to their consequences. The temporal bracketing strategy uncovered the multi-
directional causality and facilitated the researcher in deducing potential causes of successive 
periods, by explicitly exploring previous actions and contexts as well as changes within them 
(ibid). It not only captured the non-linear dynamics of inter-organisational trust triggered by 
different events and corresponding interaction, for it also identified feedback mechanisms 
underlying multiple events (ibid). Consequently, the temporal bracketing strategy transformed 
fuzzy and large chunks of data into more discrete, logical, and connected ones. These discrete 
blocks of temporal data stages were then filled with thick description, termed the narrative 
strategy.  
 The narrative strategy is aimed at illustrating the causal linkages across levels of analysis 
and to “establish early analytical themes” (Pettigrew, 1990, p. 180). This is the most elaborate 
method in case study research. It was adopted so as to provide a thick description that would 
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enable the audience to assess the transferability of the cause and effect of a particular event. 
That is, each stage from the temporal bracketing strategy was supplemented with detailed 
vicarious experiences collected from the field to ensure the richness and depth as well as the 
chain of evidence. How could these thick descriptions across temporal stages be presented in 
a coherent and concise fashion? An incorporated visual mapping strategy was deployed to 
achieve this.  
 Data processed through temporal bracketing and narrative strategies should be 
synthesised and consolidated in order to be sensibly reasoned (Miles and Huberman, 1994). A 
visual mapping strategy is aimed at transforming rich data into graphical and tabular display 
formats (Langley, 1999). The strategy allowed the researcher to demonstrate thick descriptions 
with multiple dimensions simultaneously, such that critical events and corresponding 
perceptions across the passage of time could be illustrated in parallel (Langley, 1999). 
Accordingly, “local causal maps” were provided with mid-level theoretical explanations (ibid, 
p. 702), thereby facilitating the following within-case and cross-case analysis. Notably, the 
visual mapping strategy simplified extensive raw data into a comprehensible data illustration 
for readers, which is critical for ensuring construct validity. 
 For this thesis, Miles and Huberman’s (1994) analytical framework including data 
reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing was adopted. It should be noted that strategies 
identified by Miles and Huberman (1994) and Langley (1999) overlap to some extent, 
especially between data display and visual mapping. Hence, this section focuses on data 
reduction and conclusion drawing.  
 
Data reduction  
The initial datasets yielded over 100-page case reports for individual cases, with such data 
overload thus hindering the researcher’s ability to make sense of them and extract their essence 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). The texts from the transcripts were firstly broken down into 
passages. Then, these were abstracted through sorting, discarding, and organising and in turn, 
assigned into corresponding codes. Codes refer to “tags or labels for assigning units of 
meaning to the descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study” (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994, p. 56). For this study, two coding methods were adopted, namely open and 
axial coding. For the former, the transcripts from the interviews are summarised and 
condensed with labelling, whilst through the latter, emergent themes and theoretical constructs 
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are identified. The relationship between these constructs is clarified and explained by existing 
theories (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
 After the researcher had familiarised himself with the transcripts, notes, and secondary 
documents, open coding was implemented in NVivo 11. It should be noted that the data 
reduction of this research began with a set predetermined coding structure derived from the 
literature (Appendix VII). In addition to the pre-determined codes, open coding allowed the 
researcher to assign emerging ideas to new codes. These were continuously revised and 
occasionally (re-) grouped into categories, which gradually formed a clearer pattern of the data, 
in the form of themes. After that, axial coding was adopted to cluster emerging themes and 
categories into certain theoretical constructs that allowed for further reflection from the extant 
literature. It should be noted that the majority of the codes derived were based on the literature 
review and were compatible with the theoretical constructs, thereby limiting the number of 
categories and facilitating the comparison and analysis of the data. Through the process of 
coding, contexts that were embedded within the four cases could be identified and explored.  
 As abovementioned, for this study, both open and axial coding were adopted with respect 
to various temporal stages created by a temporal bracketing strategy, which enhanced 
comparability across the focal cases. As an example, relationship dependence themes along 
with respective categories were initially generated to depict relationship characteristics of 
buyer-supplier relationships in the pre-transgression stage. With respect to the trust violation 
stage, codes were derived from interpretation of the descriptions relating to how relationship 
characteristics buffered or exacerbated the violation, how buyers and suppliers responded to it 
(perceptual changes, emotional reactions, and behavioural manifestations), what consequences 
it brought to the dyad, and what the characteristics of the transgression were.  
 
Conclusion drawing  
Conclusion drawing is the final stage of within-case analysis, as proposed by Miles and 
Huberman (1994). It is aimed at identifying patterns and causality between the variables in the 
data, which require further explanations to draw the necessary conclusions. For example, the 
themes relating to trust perceptions in the event of trust violation were compared with those 
relating to relationship characteristics as well as violation characteristics so as to identify 
relevant patterns. The process of pattern matching resulted in the development of several 
theoretical constructs, which allowed for further reflection on the existing literature. The 
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present research also allowed for emergent constructs to be uncovered between the general 
theory and empirical observations (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Moreover, emergent empirical 
patterns were constantly matched with the research questions to arrive at a firmer conclusion. 
In addition, to facilitating conclusion drawing, the researcher of this thesis had met with his 
supervisors at regular intervals to ensure that there was a consensus when interpreting the data.  
 To sum up, the within-case analysis captured the differences and similarities of the 
empirical observations from the different respondents within each case. First, the researcher 
separated 59 interviews into two categories, four dyadic and 15 non-dyadic case studies. The 
former were built on 39 interviews that yielded dyadic responses, while the latter were formed 
based on 20 interviews that yielded unilateral responses. Then, those case studies were divided 
into temporal stages based on temporal bracketing strategy that broke the whole duration of 
the inter-organisational relationship down into several logical discrete blocks (i.e. pre-
transgression, trust violation, trust repair, and post-repair). Next, the researcher streamlined 
every incident, action, and reaction within each discrete stage (i.e. trust violation and trust 
repair stages). A narrative strategy was deployed to provide thick descriptions of each temporal 
block. Those thick descriptions were compared to and contrasted with the graphical 
illustrations yielded from the interviews to explain the patterns and identify unclear or 
mismatch between the narrative and the pattern (the researcher then went back to the 
respondents for further clarification). 
 Following that, the transcripts were coded and transformed into categories and themes 
that were theoretically meaningful. Last, a visual mapping strategy was incorporated to display 
the constructs drawn from the data and to deliver insights with categorical and graphical 
representations. Within-case analysis facilitates providing explanations about the case and 
maintaining conceptual coherence with the empirical data (Yin, 2003). Then, the within-case 
analysis from the different cases was integrated, thus allowing for cross-case analysis.  
  
3.6.2 Cross-case analysis  
The cross-case analysis helps researchers to integrate the findings of a series of case studies 
(Yin, 2003). It boosts transferability as the patterns from the within-case analysis are identified 
and recognised across different case studies (Miles and Huberman, 1994). That is to say, it 
enables generalisation across the findings. The authors also proposed that cross-case analysis 
enriches the researcher’s understanding of the social phenomenon investigated, because it 
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allows for drawing more insights from similar settings. As held by Miles and Huberman 
(1994), the key challenge is a balance between the particular and the universal. In this study, 
the findings of within-case analysis fed into a cross-case analysis for similarity and difference 
identification across the four cases. Furthermore, the researcher then sought explanations for 
any differences revealed. In particular, this study involved following Stake’s (2006) three-
track technique to achieve such a balance (Table 3-11).   
 
 Aim Description 
Track I Emphasising 
the findings  
Individual contexts of different cases are kept tentatively. 
Track II Merging the 
findings 
Different cases are sorted based on their similarities. 
Similar cases are merged. 
Brief contextual backgrounds are maintained. 
Track III Factorising 
the findings 
Context-bound findings are transformed into factors. 
Information about contextual backgrounds is removed. 
Factors are sorted and merged based on the similarity.  
Table 3 - 11. Three tracks that guide cross-case analysis adapted from Stake (2006) 
 
 It should be noted that it is virtually impossible to compare across cases based on the 
absolute figures reported by individual cases. For example, a trust violation in one case may 
cause a loss of $10 million and $20,000 from another, but the two violations may be perceived 
to have the same severity by the two different buyers due to their level of risk tolerance. To 
facilitate cross-case comparison with respect to various constructs, for this study, a benchmark 
(e.g. the closest alternatives) was established, which enabled the researcher to make sense and 
determine the relative level of relationship characteristics between the four cases. For example, 
if the supplier could not be replaced by their closest alternatives at all, the relationship 





3.7 RESEARCH CREDIBILITY – RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY  
Many scholars argue that the rigour of case study research should be assessed based on three 
types of validity, namely construct, internal, and external, and reliability (Seuring, 2008; Stuart 
et al., 2002). The researcher is fully aware that the case study method is not without limitations. 
It has been widely criticised for its lack of generalisability, rigour, operationisation, and 
justification. First, the major concern of the case study method lies in its lack of generalisability. 
This limitation is generally built on the assumption of statistical generalisation. However, case 
studies rely on analytical generalisation, with the emphasis being on theoretical propositions 
rather than populations (Yin, 2003). In particular, regarding the single case setting, such a 
theory-focused approach can lead to narrow, idiosyncratic, and occasionally too complex 
theories as this is too context-specific, which undermines generalisability (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The robustness of the theory can be reconciled and enhanced by adopting the multiple case 
design that replicates theoretical patterns of expected outcomes (Barratt et al., 2011).  
 The second concern about the case study method is its lack of rigour. Many studies have 
demonstrated a weak linkage between the literature reviewed and the methodology adopted as 
they tend to proceed with a presumption that an applicable theory does not exist and have 
failed to address their theoretical contributions clearly (Stuart et al., 2002). Moreover, many 
researchers have failed to justify systematically the use of the case study method or have 
simply adopted it to collect additional supporting evidence (Seuring, 2008). Hence, due to 
ambiguous justifications of the method used and data analysis carried out the rigour of case 
study research cannot be ensured (Ketokivi and Choi, 2014).  
 Some of the aforementioned criticisms were alleviated by systematic and careful 
justification of the deployment of the case study method in the current work. This means that 
the rationale of this method was connected closely with the literature and research questions. 
Then, an analytical approach was adopted to carry out multiple case studies with a processual 
focus rooted in a critical realism perspective (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Langley, 1999). 
Furthermore, several measures were deployed to enhance research credibility, as delineated 




Credibility  Description  Strategy   
Construct 
validity  




are supposed to 
(Yin, 2003) 
Triangulation 
Data were collected from key informants and 
secondary documents from the target companies (e.g. 
company annual reports, news, and internal reports)  
Demonstrating a chain of evidence 
The analysis process was conducted step-by-step in 
order to inform the reader how the summary was 
derived.  
Asking key informants to review the case study 
research 
The longitudinal approach allowed the researcher to 
ask key informants to review the draft of a preliminary 






others can be 
established (Yin, 
2003).  
Pattern matching between actual and proposed patterns 
A cross-comparison between the empirical evidence 
and the theoretical framework derived from the 
literature was conducted. If different patterns across 
multiple cases can be explained by understandable 




The extent to which 
the research 
findings can be 
generalised beyond 
the particular case 
study (Yin, 2003). 
Different logic behind generalisation 
Unlike statistical generalisation from survey and 
experiment methods, case studies rely on the analytical 
generalisation that generalises results to the general 
theory (Yin, 2003). Case study research relies on 
theoretical sampling, whereby cases with significant 
theoretical differences are selected to yield better 
theoretical niches (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Reliability  The extent to which 
the operations of 
the research can be 
repeated with the 
same results (Yin, 
2003).  
 
Case study protocol 
A case study protocol was utilised that demonstrated 
clear procedures with sufficient reasons regarding how 
the data were generated and interpreted.  
The use of a database 
A case study database was established that enable notes 
on the research to be easily retrieved. 




3.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
Given the importance of ethics in conducting research, especially on sensitive topics like this 
one, several ethical considerations were taken into account to ensure that the study was 
conducted in an appropriate manner. Following Bryman and Bell (2007), all the research 
participants were asked to provide full consent to be interviewed and audiotaped. In particular, 
only two interviewees were reluctant to be taped. Then, the written consent form (attached in 
Appendix III) was provided and reiterated before the interview started. Next, a brief 
introduction of the research purpose was explained to the participants and they were told they 
could withdraw at any point during the interview, if they felt uncomfortable about continuing. 
In addition, the confidentiality of the research data is of paramount importance. The research 
participants were fully informed that the full research data would only be accessible to the 
researcher, his supervisors, and examiners. Further, they were told that the names of the 
companies involved would be anonymised, any part of this study were to be published. 
Moreover, since dyadic perceptions of the buyer and the supplier were intended to be collected, 
no leakage of confidential data from one party to another was ensured. Last, the protection of 
the participants’ anonymity was guaranteed by excluding their names from the thesis.  
 
 
CHAPTER SUMMARY   
This chapter has discussed the philosophical stance of the researcher, critical realism, 
pertaining to the world view of the inherent nature of reality and knowledge. Then, the 
justification for descriptive and explanatory research, abductive research, and the case study 
method, was provided in keeping with the critical realism philosophy and the research 
questions. There was also an explanation of the process and longitudinal nature of the case 
study. Following that, the data collection methods, including semi-structured interviews and 
secondary documents, were delineated. Then, the data analysis procedures with respect to 
within-case and cross-case analysis were explained. Last, there was a discussion on the means 
adopted to enhance research rigour, including validity and reliability. The following chapter 




CHAPTER FOUR: WITHIN-CASE ANALYSIS 
 
INTRODUCTION TO THE CHAPTER 
The within-case analysis section describes the dynamics of competence and goodwill trust 
across each of the four episodes of trust violation and repair. It begins with a case background, 
which presents company information about the buyer and the supplier, portraying the nature 
of the buyer-supplier relationship. Then, an overview of the case dynamics is delineated with 
a timeline of critical events as well as its descriptions in a corresponding case. After that, the 
results of the within-case analysis are illustrated in relation to six temporal dimensions 
respectively, with key terms being adopted (Table 4-1).  
 
Table 4 - 1. A graphical illustration of the different temporal dimensions 
Temporal 
dimension 
Illustration Specification  
The  
pre-transgression 
stage (t0 - t1)  
 
The characteristics of the buyer-supplier 
relationship prior to the initial transgression. 
The negative 
turning point (t1)  
The description of the initial transgression.  
The trust violation 
stage (t1 - t2) 
 
The effect of the initial and subsequent 
transgressions on trust that deteriorates from 
the pre-transgression to the lowest level (viz. 
a deadlock).  
The term, reparative attempt, is used to 
describe the responses that the buyer and the 
supplier adopt (yet ineffective) over the trust 
violation stage. 
The positive 
turning point (t2)  
The description of the deadlock and the point 
where reparative responses are initiated by 
the buyer or the supplier.  
The trust repair 
stage (t2 - t3)  
The effect of reparative responses enacted by 
the buyer and the supplier on trust that 
rebounds from the lowest to the post-repair 
level.  
The post-repair 
stage (t3 onwards)  
The outcome of trust repair after a series of 
reparative responses implemented (viz. 
reparative effort) over the trust repair stage, 
determined by the buyer as the level of trust 
reaches an equilibrium. 
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4.1 CASE 1: BUYER (GN) – SUPPLIER (GT) 
4.1.1 Case background  
Buyer: Global Navigation  
The Global Navigation (GN hereafter), established in 1990, offers global positioning system 
(GPS) navigation, wireless devices and applications. It is listed in the NASDAQ 100 Index, 
with over $3.5 billion in revenue generated in 2016 and has 10,000 employees worldwide 
(Markets.ft.com, accessed in 2018). GN’s product categories involve personal navigation, 
outdoor, fitness, marine, aviation, and automotive OEM devices, for which GN is the market 
leader in the first five categories. The aviation and marine equipment are developed and 
manufactured in the US, while the others are jointly designed by American and Taiwanese 
subsidiaries, being manufactured in the latter. In fact, despite GN’s headquarters being located 
in the US, over 90% of GN’s product offerings are manufactured in Taiwan (GN Company 
Website, accessed in 2018). 
 Since 2008, growth in the personal navigation device market has stagnated due to the 
increasing popularity of smartphones. This greatly affected GN’s revenue, which reduced from 
approximately $4 billion in 2008 down to $2.8 billion in 2010. At that time, GN decided to 
diversify its market portfolio by shifting towards the auto OEM market (Digitimes.com 
accessed in 2018). The supplier of Case 1, Giga Tech, was introduced in 2011 during the 
transformation process. 
 
Supplier: Giga Tech 
Giga Tech Co. Ltd (GT), established in 2000, is a Taiwan-based company that offers 
customised solutions of design, processing, and manufacturing for mechanical components, 
automated equipment, plastics machinery, etc. GT is a world-leading provider of hygrometers, 
thermometers, panels, controllers, and AI modules for electronic appliances (e.g. fridges and 
air conditioners) (GT Company Website). It has over 250 employees. GT is GN’s 
subcontractor responsible for metal stamping components for auto OEMs, with the product 
being highly customised to accommodate different automotive models. 
 Before elaborating upon the details of each of the temporal dimensions from the case, 
firstly, an overview is presented that serves as a snapshot of what happened (including 
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transgressions and reparative responses) between the dyad across the entire trust repair 
process, which helps the reader to become familiar with the case.  
 
4.1.2 Overview of the case 
This subsection provides an overview of the dynamics between competence and goodwill trust 
in the trust violation and repair stages. The graphical illustration (Figure 4-1) demonstrates 
how the two trust dimensions changed over time. Specifically, the colour (high: green; 
medium: yellow; low: red) indicates the relative magnitude of trust across the four cases. 
Competence and goodwill trust varied with corresponding transgressions and reparative 
responses. These critical incidents and responses are delineated on a processual timeline, 
which addresses their locus and actions, as induced by GT (supplier) and GN (buyer). The 






Figure 4 - 1. A graphical illustration of the complete episodes of the trust repair process for case 1 (buyer’s perspective)
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4.1.3 The pre-transgression stage  
This subsection describes the relationship characteristics between GT and GN prior to the trust 
violation (Table 4-2). GN’s perceived relationship dependence was moderate to high, despite 
the significant imbalance of the company size of the buyer and the supplier, 12,000 and 130 
employees, respectively. GN responded that “there are still second sources out there, but it 
may incur some additional efforts and resources” (Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 1), 
however, it was constantly under time pressure induced by their downstream automotive 
customers. Thus, GN was expected to operate “within a tight time frame to deliver the product 
to their downstream customers” (Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 1). Besides the pressure 
from downstream customers, GN suffered somewhat from high structural commitment, 
because “this tooling was quite expensive to make (at the buyer’s expense) and it would begin 
to pay off after nearly a year” (General Manager, supplier, case 1).  
 On the other hand, since “GN had just started developing automotive OEMs […] still in 
the burgeoning stage of R&D” (Project Manager, buyer, case 1), not only was the product 
unfamiliar to both firms, but also, the volume was relatively small and unstable. According to 
GT, “[GN’s] order was not huge in terms of volume […] over 2,000 stamping components on 
a monthly basis” (Sales Manager, supplier, case 1) and “GN’s orders only accounted for about 
1/10 of our overall volume” (General Manager, supplier, case 1). Furthermore, prior to the 
dyad being formed, among GN’s approved vendors, only GT was willing to submit a request 
for a quotation due to the inherent uncertainty and economic unattractiveness associated with 
the product at the time. 
 The inter-organisational relationship was characterised by moderate competence trust, as 
perceived by GN: “[the auditing report] suggested that GT’s competence was higher than our 
expectation. […] we were not very mature on the design, because this product was still in the 
development phase. […] GT did have some experience in the product design that we could 
rely on” (Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). Moderate competence trust refers 
to the notion of swift trust, which indicates the level of sufficient trustworthiness about the 
supplier’s competence before engaging in business collaboration. In this case, the buyer 
gauged the supplier’s competence shortly after an extensive audit was conducted.  
 Conversely, GN placed low goodwill trust on GT due to the lack of a prior engagement. 
GN perceived that “in the beginning when we just started working with them, the level of 
[goodwill] trust was not too high” (Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). It 
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indicates that the dyad was predominantly based on the capability of the supplier, with limited 
relational embeddedness, as they had been collaborating for under six months. 






to low  
“It is not like we could replace any supplier at any 
time. The first constraint was about the auditing 
[required time]. The second reason was that we 
had already made a lot of tooling in GT’s factory. 
It simply would not be enough time to immediately 
approve another supplier to take over” (Director of 




Moderate “[…] it is not so easy to cultivate an alternative 
supplier, because our products do have some 
unique attributes” (Purchasing Manager, buyer, 





“After the contract was signed, tooling was built. 
This is GN’s property since they are customised 
items that are only applicable to our products. 
Other firms cannot use them” (Director of Supplier 
Management, buyer, case 1) 
Competence trust Moderate  “As a GN’s supplier, it requires passing the survey 
and certification conducted by us, initially. If the 
supplier has passed the survey, we basically 
believe that the supplier is qualified to manufacture 
for us” (Project Manager, buyer, case 1)  
Goodwill trust Low “We were unfamiliar with this company in terms of 
how they conducted business and their attitudes 
towards partners as well as members within the 
company” (Director of Supplier Management, 
buyer, case 1) 
Prior relationship Nearly six months 
Table 4 - 2. Relationship characteristics in case 1 (t0 - t1) 
 
 In addition to the low perceived goodwill trust, “[…] at that time we [GN] had just 
started developing the automotive OEM, still in the burgeoning stage of R&D […] asked the 
supplier [GT] to jointly design with us” (Project Manager, buyer, case 1). The buyer and 
supplier had experienced a period of constant adaption with respect to operational and 
technical aspects due to the product’s inherently high customisation and precision. GN 
demanded and expected GT to be cooperative and flexible in terms of product specifications, 
delivery terms and conditions. However, “[GT] felt that GN had been continuously giving 
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orders and throwing up new requirements” (General Manager, supplier, case 1), which 
foreshadowed conflict over operations.  
 
4.1.4. The characteristics of the negative turning point  
This section describes the initial transgression that set off the process of trust violation, which 
is known as a negative turning point. It began when GT had not consistently and completely 
manufactured the metal stamping components for all the required workstations in the 
manufacturing process before delivering to GN, such that “products GT delivered tended to 
lack some workstations, especially tapping” (Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 
1). Besides, this transgression was not a one-off phenomenon, for it tended to occur 
repetitively (referring to a stable cause of a transgression). 
 This transgression had caused disruptions to the buyer not only because it posed certain 
difficulties to its quality inspection, as “[missing tappings] were actually not easy to spot from 
a distance” (Project Manager, buyer, case 1), but also, because it disturbed the buyer’s 
production line and caused failures and suspensions after assembling different modules on the 
metal stamping components. The disruptions with respect to quality control (incoming (IQC), 
in-process (IPQC), and outgoing (OQC)) and the assembly lines resulted in an increase in the 
buyer’s costs and resources. The transgression was perceived to be of the operating level and 
not very severe, because the buyer was able to contain the transgression completely through 
its IQC and OQC. The buyer “found a defective item and returned the whole batch […] did 
not affect downstream customers” (Project Manager, buyer, case 1).  
 Whilst the incident was not severe, it did cast a “certain doubt […] on their process 
management and quality control” (Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). This 
perceptual change reflected that GN’s perceived risk on GT’s ability to fulfil its requirements 
had heightened. In response, GN had shifted from sampling inspection to full inspection of 
incoming deliveries, emphasising a “zero defect return policy; and “delivery-arrives-with-staff 
policy”, with the convenience of sorting” (Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). 
Initially, once GN found “one defective item, the whole lot would be sent back to GT’s factory 
for further reworking” (Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). As GN’s doubt 
regarding GT’s competence increased, a ‘delivery-arrives-staff-arrives policy’ was conducted, 
which indicates that the former was demanding that the latter’s field application engineers 
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(FAEs) or quality assurance personnel (QA) come with the batch delivery to its factory. If 
there were any defective item discovered by IQC, these FAEs and/or QAs had to implement 
on-site sorting.  
 All in all, the negative turning point triggered by the transgression, incomplete 
workstations, was an internal locus and competence-based violation, as the buyer perceived 
that the supplier “had great technical know-how [in R&D and manufacturing]”, just needing 
to be more attentive to quality control (Table 4-3). Initially, the buyer believed that “many 
process management tools could be deployed to eliminate incomplete workstations” (Director 
of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). This means that the buyer perceived that through 
more effective implementation of quality control on the supplier’s production line by GT’s 
operating staff, the incident could be minimised. However, the incident had reoccurred 
frequently since no preventive responses had been incorporated. Thus, the transgression was 
deemed as being a stable cause, which then led to more frequent and detailed inspection and a 
stricter return policy enacted by the buyer. Despite frequent occurrences, it did not seriously 
affect GN’s production, because “the volume was not very big […] did not arrange JIT 
production” (Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). 
 
Violation characteristics Descriptions 
Locus  Internal  The issue occurred within the dyad.  
Controllability  High The event was within full control of GT. 
Stability  High The event was perceived to be recurrent in nature. 
Severity Low The defective items were discovered and 
returned, so this did not affect GN’s production 
lines. 
Type Competence-based Missing workstations were caused by a lack of 
capability in the manufacturing process and 
quality control.  
Hierarchy  Operating level The event was inherently caused by an operating 
level dysfunction.  




4.1.5 Trust violation stage  
This subsection describes how competence and goodwill trust were violated following the 
negative turning point. Multiple transgressions occurred across this stage and this section 
examines the multiplicative effect of these on violating trust (rather than specifying the details 
of each incident) (Table 4-4). The trust violation stage, which had lasted for one month, began 








in workstations  
The remains of 





The request to 
quit  
Type Competence  Competence Competence Integrity  
Locus  External  External  Internal  Internal  
Severity  Low  Low Low Low 
Table 4 - 4. An overview of the transgressions in the trust violation stage 
 
Competence trust 
After the transgression, the frequent occurrence of incomplete workstations, which set off the 
negative turning point, the buyer’s perceived competence trust had begun to decline, as the 
series of aforementioned preventive responses was implemented (i.e. zero defect and delivery-
arrives-staff-arrives policies). Besides incomplete workstations, the buyer had discovered 
other transgressions in parallel, including excessive iron filings on stamping components and 
various surface issues, such as unevenness, bumping, and scratches. Despite GT’s frequent 
reparative attempts to contain the issue (e.g. tightened control and operational adjustments 
conducted after manufacturing with tooling), such manual adjustments inevitably heightened 
the variation to the production due to quality inconsistency.  
 As a result of the accumulating transgressions, GN’s corporate staff were informed by 
their operating staff and began to feel “[…] unhappy and dissatisfied with the quality GT had 
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been delivering […] across different criteria” (Project Manager, buyer, case 1). “Once 
multiple minor defects accumulated, GN started to get frustrated” (General Manager, supplier, 
case 1). With intensified restrictive approaches being imposed on GT, this had further posed 
difficulties to its fulfilment of consistent deliveries. Thus, for once, “they [GT] caused a delay 
to our production line […] affecting the delivery to our end customer. We claimed 
compensation from them according to the hourly based rate of our production line being idle” 
(Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). After that, this further violated GN’s 
perceived competence trust.  
 
Goodwill trust  
After GN filed a compensation claim to GT, the latter’s corporate staff felt upset about it, 
because “not only did GT not make profits out of GN’s project due to labour intensive 
recalibrations, but GT also had to pay extra money as a penalty” (General Manager, supplier, 
case 1). In response, GT’s sales team filed “an official letter […] GT would like to quit” 
(Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). At this point, GN perceived that “[…] GT 
simply could not just quit arbitrarily like that. We could not simply find another firm to take 
over the production all of a sudden” (Project Manager, buyer, case 1). This act was perceived 
to harm GN’s profit, thereby signalling a violation of their goodwill trust. “This was actually 
the straw that broke the camel’s back […] the point where our trust significantly deteriorated” 
(Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). GN reported that “[at this point] it was 
probably the time our relationship hit deadlock” (Director of Supplier Management, buyer, 
case 1).  
 It should be noted that, it was the goodwill-transgression that brought the trusting 
relationship to its lowest point, which was characterised by high tension between the buyer 
and the supplier stemming from a conflict of interests. Moreover, the transgressions had been 
gradually moved up from the operating to corporate levels, as GN perceived that “[…] the 
quality issues had not converged, but rather, diverged. […] the problem handling of their staff 
was questionable. […] we then escalated the matter to their executive level” (Director of 
Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). 
 The following subsection identifies some factors affecting the process of trust violation 
from case 1, including 1) domain specificity, 2) permanent solution unavailable, 3) lack of 
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communication, and 4) perceptual gap between the dyad regarding technical and delivery 
requirements.  
 
Domain specificity  
The supplier-induced transgressions were perceived to fall within a single domain, which is 
the supplier’s quality control, while other domains within the competence dimension seemed 
to buffer the erosion of trust. That is, the buyer gave credit to the supplier’s other capabilities, 
such as R&D and manufacturing. This attitude counteracted the negative effect of 
transgressions, as the buyer believed that “if they [GT] were willing to conduct investment or 
improvement on these issues […] they really had got what it takes to manufacture properly” 
(Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). 
 
Unavailability of permanent solutions 
Whilst GT “had tried their best to collaborate with GN to achieve their demanded 
requirements” in the trust violation stage (Sales Manager, supplier, case 1), these reparative 
attempts were not effective nor permanent. GT reported that “[…] it is very difficult to add 
certain variations of the previously built tooling […] If we wanted to change this tooling to 
match their new requirements, probably 90% of the tooling would have had to be rebuilt” 
(General Manager, supplier, case 1). Since the issues could not be contained and resolved early 
in the trust violation stage, they accumulated and over time exacerbated the situation.   
 
A lack of communication  
Another factor is that the buyer and the supplier had not communicated and interacted 
frequently during the trust violation process, especially between corporate level staff. This is 
because of the relationship being characterised by low goodwill trust. The dyad tended to stick 
to standard operation procedures (operation-centric) in the early collaboration, reflected in: 
“[when we encountered] operational issues reported by GN […] we simply just kept our nose 
to the grindstone and tried to fix the issue alone. […] We should have communicated with GN 
[…] we did not have to go through many stages to reach the person or division we needed” 
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(General Manager, supplier, case 1). This inefficient communication seemed to pose some 
difficulties for the dyad in reaching early solutions and thus, alleviate relationship tension.  
 
Ambiguities associated with technical and delivery requirements  
A specific factor residing in this case is the “gap [between the buyer and the supplier] with 
respect to the understanding of specs and inspection requirements” (Director of Supplier 
Management, buyer, case 1). At the outset of the collaboration, such misunderstanding was 
not profound, but the gap had begun to emerge over time “when MP had carried out […] with 
increasing volume […] GT found that the requirements of GN’s R&D were not exactly the 
same as we [GT] first agreed and negotiated [with the presence of such discrepancies]. GT 
had to collaborate, with extra effort, with GN’s production lines that required significant 
operational adjustments” (Sales Manager, buyer, case 1). As a result, “this was a huge burden 
to GT as they perceived that GN did not clarify the situation regarding that before sending 
their products back” (Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). That is to say, 
ambiguous technical requirements with unclear return policies set off a negative spiral that 
accelerated the trust violation process.  
 
Heightened conflict of interests  
From case 1, it is clearly evident that a conflict of interests in the dyad had gradually 
exacerbated, which brought the relationship into deadlock. From GT’s perspective, “[despite 
extensive adjustments and additional resources spent on manufacturing capacity and human 
resources], we did not add any more costs to GN’s total manufacturing expenses […] GN’s 
constant addition of requirements […] these should have been reflected in their costs. Yet we 
did not request any increase of costs to GN” (General Manager, supplier, case 1). In fact, “they 
[GT] felt that other customers were easier and less strict than us, perceiving it as being very 
difficult to do business with us” (Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). In addition, 
along with the trust violation process, stricter policies had been promulgated to punish quality 
failures. This had further undermined GT’s interests due to additional requirements and 
increased costs, not to mention the compensation claim from GN. As a result, such an 




4.1.6 The characteristics of the positive turning point  
The positive turning point occurs when one or both parties initiate reparative responses 
actively to repair violated trust. In order to comprehend the characteristics of this turning point, 
the transition from deadlock, where trust is at the lowest with intensified conflict of interests 
to the point where the buyer and/or the supplier is willing to move on and repair violated trust, 
should be unpacked. 
 In this transition period, since there had been a lack of communication between the dyad 
due to low goodwill trust, this provided a certain distance for both parties to reflect on the 
violation. GN admitted that they shared some responsibility for the violation: “[GN] started 
to realise that maybe there were some communication issues […] why a once competent 
supplier would choose to quit all of a sudden, because of our returns policy and additional 
quality requirements” (Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). In addition to the 
perceived guilt, the dependent relationship structure also drove GN to resolve the issue 
quickly, not only because of the pressure from downstream customers, but also, owing to the 
limited alternatives available. In fact, there were “[…] some stamping component suppliers 
out there, but they would not invest many resources on this project […] other issues might also 
occur with new suppliers […]” (Project Manager, buyer, case 1). Thus, “it is not easy [for GN] 
to develop a [new] competent supplier” (Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). 
These statements indicate a mix of guilt and concerns about relationship dependence, which 
provided a certain impetus that drove GN to re-approach GT. Thus, GN sent their director of 
supplier management to clarify the situation and to engage in a final conversation with its boss.  
 In contrast, GT also engaged in a rational cost-benefit process. Whilst they thought they 
had been exploited by the buyer, they also admitted that “considering the phase-in period […] 
the both parties did share some responsibility. I cannot deny it” (General Manager, supplier, 
case 1). GT’s management revisited the prospect of GN during the transition period: “we think 
GN has the potential. […] people and other companies like them […] a very positive company” 
(General Manager, supplier, case 1). This perceptual reorientation shaped GT’s intention as it 
reinforced the belief that “[…] as a subcontractor, can you say no to that? If you wanted to do 





4.1.7 The trust repair phase  
This subsection describes the dynamics of how competence and goodwill trust were repaired 
over time following the positive turning point. The trust repair process lasted five months in 
case 1. Initially, both parties revisited their cost-and-benefit analysis in the period of the 
positive turning point, which translated into the motivation to repair the relationship. GN 
initiated the contact with GT in an attempt to “[…] clarify GT’s [continuity] intentions and to 
discuss issues they had discovered from their QC audit report” (Director of Supplier 
Management, buyer, case 1). GN discovered that GT’s request to quit “[…] was actually not 
instructed by GT’s boss, but an emotional response from their sales team. […] they believed 
that the project with GN would continue to drain a lot of money and resources. […] let’s just 
quit” (Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). Hence, GN directly asked about GT’s 
expectation regarding future business: “General manager Lin, what attitude do you have 
towards GN after all? Do you feel that GN is indispensable to you or do you value us very 
much? If you don’t place importance on our company’s orders, we shall depart as early as 
possible” (Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1).  
In the conversation, GN encouraged GT to keep trying (possibly due to their dependence 
structure): “We still had hope in you […] if you hung in there and tried harder, even if the 
improvement might not have been perfect initially, you might probably achieve 70 or 80 […] 
you still got the opportunity” (Project Manager, buyer, case 1). Because the transgressions 
were considered to be domain specific ones, GN still perceived GT as possessing the core 
technical capabilities with a lack of corresponding supporting ones. GN also urged GT to 
demonstrate some initiatives by “facilitating the cooperativeness of GT’s operating staff to 
fulfil GN’s requirements” and also encouraged GT “to raise any unreasonable requirements 
any time” (Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). 
 In response, “GT’s boss demonstrated a very active and positive attitude unlike their 
operating staff […] stated that GN was our important customer” (Director of Supplier 
Management, buyer, case 1). GT also agreed to pay the compensation resulting from the last 
return merchandise authorisation (RMA) through account receivable. Its boss promised to 
relieve the internal tension and implement improvement actions via a top-down approach, 
because “[…] operating staff always need to be pushed by their corporate staff” (Director of 
Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). At this point, GN’s perceived goodwill had somewhat 
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been repaired, whereby mutual intentions towards future collaboration had been realigned. 
Also, GN asked GT to develop an improvement schedule, so that it could audit its operations 
and processes accordingly. 
 Then, the realignment of expectations, manifested itself in the form of somewhat repaired 
goodwill trust, paving the way for the following trust repair with respect to specific operational 
arrangements, as “the resolution of this cognitive discrepancy could somewhat facilitate the 
following task-specific recovery” (Project Manager, buyer, case 1). After corporate staff in the 
dyad set the tone for the upcoming tasks for repairing trust, more frequent communication and 
collaboration between operating staff across functional and organisational boundaries was 
established. The two firms started to discuss how “GT could prevent quality issues through 
improving control of raw materials, manufacturing, packaging and delivery” (Director of 
Supplier Management, buyer, case 1).  
 The first thing the dyad conducted was to sort out GN’s production line idleness to restore 
its manufacturing for its downstream customers. In parallel, GN helped GT to implement 
improvements by elaborating upon terms and conditions in relation to quality requirements 
specified on the contract to eliminate any ambiguities along with “[…] sending a quality 
improvement team to offer on-site advice […] to help them discover potential negligence or 
unaware practices” that caused quality issues (Project Manager, buyer, case 1).  
 With the help of improved communication and an involved buyer, this facilitated the 
implementation of the agreed tasks, which started to work towards eliminating the causes of 
the transgressions experienced in the trust violation stage. This means that, both parties had 
strived to reach permanent solutions. First, in order to ensure the consistency of quality 
inspection, the inspection gauge against which GT’s products was examined had been 
standardised in concert with GN’s compromises. Second, GT had attempted to modify the 
tooling as much as possible to comply with GN’s quality requirements. However, because “it 
is too difficult to apply large variations to the previously built tooling […] If we wanted to 
make this tooling fully compliant to GN’s new requirements […] probably 90% of the tooling 
had to be remade” (Sales Manager, supplier, case 1), GT still had to “[…] conduct manual 
recalibration for items with unamendable tooling” to meet the buyer’s specifications (General 
Manager, supplier, case 1). Then, GT had also tightened their QA and OQC simultaneously, 
by “[…] adopting full inspection to the finished product to ensure that no iron filings and other 
defects were present” (Sales Manager, supplier, case 1).  
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 These initial reparative responses had moderately repaired GN’s competence trust, as 
“GT had reflected upon its practices and capabilities to some extent and demonstrated 
satisfactory outcomes […] during the middle of the repair process, we had started to accept 
[their batches] gradually […] GT’s perceived competence had been recalibrated upwards” 
(Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). However, despite the effort of GT, GN still 
perceived that “they could only achieve so much in terms of the quality standard based on the 
technical capability of GT’s Taiwanese factory […] the quality had reached a threshold” 
(Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). GT had “[…] utilised a lot of resources 
(e.g. human, delivery, and materials) to fix the issues and recover the relationship” (General 
Manager, supplier, case 1), but the quality could not be further improved to match GN’s 
expectation. 
In order to overcome this threshold, GT decided to transfer its VP from their manufacturing 
plant in China back to Taiwan for three months to provide intensive quality training and refine 
the manufacturing process, as “GT’s plants in China did very well in terms of systematic 
quality control” (Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). Consequently, “the 
training session did go well as it reflected on the quality of products GT delivered” (Director 
of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). The quality of GT’s products increased significantly 
and then stabilised after two months. Accordingly, full inspection carried out by GN’s IQC 
was cancelled after 10 consecutive satisfactory deliveries and so, GT was removed from their 
watch list.   
 GN’s competence trust in GT had been repaired over time, in that “[…] we would review 
suppliers’ IQC performance, production control, process control, engineer capability, and 
management capability […] to determine their competence […] after their reparative 
attempts, if the supplier could reach the score above the pre-set level of competence. Trust 
[competence] is not unrecoverable” (Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 1). By the time that 
GN’s quarterly report was conducted, GT yielded good results for quality, cost, and service. 
That is, “GT had successfully improved its competence” (Director of Supplier Management, 
buyer, case 1).  
 The successful competence trust repair had engendered the repair of goodwill trust, 
because GT exceeded GN’s expectations in their reparative efforts and also demonstrated their 
ability to deliver proactive scaling. This meant that, GT’s perceived goodwill was positively 
recalibrated, because GN would appear to have expected that it could not pass the threshold. 
The competence threshold perceived by the buyer was overcome, because GT transferred its 
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VP to implement a “large-scale quality overhaul in its factory in Taiwan [exceeding GN’s 
expectation]”. Moreover, this act was perceived to repair goodwill trust as well because it 
signalled “[…] sincerity, determination, willingness to go the extra mile in the collaboration 
with GN” (Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). Moreover, this act was also 
perceived as evidence of proactive scaling, which GN valued significantly: “we might not trust 
suppliers lacking flexibility and continuous improvement, because they could not continue to 
grow with us and adapt with our requirements in the future” (Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 
1).  
 Moreover, GT’s continuous quality improvement had caused GN to “[…] award GT 
some new projects” (Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1) not only because its 
automotive OEMs yielded satisfactory market penetration, but also, because GN perceived 
that “GT was currently performing well […] had undergone a lot of improvement” (Director 
of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). Such success in the market led to an increased 
investment in both instrumental and emotional resources. As a result, GN felt that “the 
relationship [goodwill trust] actually became better than in the pre-transgression stage” 
(Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). 
 To summarise, the relational buffer established between corporate staff in the dyad 
initiated the repair of goodwill trust after the deadlock. The increased goodwill trust, 
manifested in the form of realigned expectations, then facilitated the arrangements of 
operational tasks. Following that, both firms minimised ambiguities in future collaboration, 
such as the reiteration of quality requirements and the unification of inspection tools in an 
attempt to eliminate the causes of the transgressions. Then, competence trust was gradually 
recovered, because of the effective implementation of the prespecified arrangements. In the 
presence of a quality threshold, GT was able to surmount this by transferring its overseas VP 
back for quality training and improving the manufacturing process, which also proved its 
ability for proactive scaling. Not only did the reparative responses adopted by the supplier 
exceed the buyer’s expectation, for it also led to favourable market performance. As a result, 





4.1.8 The post-repair stage                                       
This subsection compares the level of trust in the post-repair and the pre-transgression stage, 
which determines the outcome of the trust repair process.  
 
Competence trust: upward recalibration  
After the process of trust repair, GN actually placed higher competence trust in GT as “[the 
repair] had reinforced our belief that this firm did not only view us as a dispensable client, 
but they also attached great importance to their own improvement” (Project Manager, buyer, 
case 1). Likewise, the director of the supplier management from GN stated that “GT had 
undertaken a large-scale overhaul including the manufacturing process and quality 
management […] the competence trust was higher in the post-repair stage”. The repair had 
lowered the risk for the future collaboration in that “GN thought the following collaboration 
would be smooth without any problems” (Project Manager, buyer, case 1).  
 
Goodwill trust: upward recalibration  
With respect to goodwill trust, GN perceived that “goodwill trust had definitely increased in 
the post-repair stage, because we did not place much goodwill in GT in the beginning” 
(Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). Apart from the level of prior goodwill, GN 
“had not only affirmed GT’s competence, but GN had also witnessed GT’s faith and sincerity 
invested in the relationship” (Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). 
 In sum, after five months of reparative efforts, GN’s competence trust in GT had been 
repaired to a higher level compared to the pre-transgression stage. Likewise, GN’s goodwill 
trust had been repaired to a level that was higher than in the pre-transgression stage. The 
improved perceived competence and goodwill trust of GN had led to GT receiving new 
projects. However, the latter had become more vigilant and selective in terms of taking GN’s 
projects, whereby they only accepted orders when GN allowed them to become involved in 




4.2 CASE 2: BUYER (HE) – SUPPLIER (IE) 
4.2.1 Case background  
Buyer: HiTech Electronics Corporation 
HiTech Electronics Corporation (HE hereafter), founded in 1985, is a Taiwan-based company 
that specialises in manufacturing standard, modified, and customised power supplies. It has 
two ISO9001 manufacturing plants, headquarters in Kaohsiung, Taiwan and a mass production 
centre in China. HE manufactures for a range of products including switchers, adaptors, PCB 
mount modules, compact peripheral component interconnect, and so on. It currently has 200 
employees (HE Company Website, accessed in 2018).  
 
Supplier: Integral Electronic Inc.  
Integral Electronic Inc. (IE hereafter), established in 1990, is a Taiwan-based company that 
specialises in manufacturing high-end PCBs and offers entire integration from electrical 
specifications to production. IE provides a range of PCB products with various layers, 
functions, and materials. The quality standards of IE comply with ISO 9001, TS16949, and 
UL94V. It currently has 120 employees that generate a monthly capacity of over 28,000 square 
metres of PCB (IE Company Website accessed in 2018).  
 
4.2.2 Overview of the case 
This subsection provides an overview of the dynamics between competence and goodwill trust 











4.2.3 The pre-transgression stage  
The subsection describes the relationship characteristics between IE and HE prior to the trust 
violation (Table 4-5). HE’s perceived relationship dependence was moderate. Whilst its orders 
“[…] accounted for over 40 - 50% of IE’s total sales” and “HE had many models and 
corresponding tooling in our factory” (Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 2), it was not 
very difficult to replace IE, because “this [PCB] is a mature industry and no supplier is 
irreplaceable as long as tooling is available […] only accompanied by some operational 
hassles” (Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 2). Therefore, IE depended on HE 
significantly more than the other way around, thus creating unilateral dependence. The dyad 
relied on an invoice system in which “an invoice is our contract” that “[…] contains a unit 
price, delivery date, and quality standards” (Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 2).  
 HE perceived high competence trust in IE as it had consistently fulfilled HE’s 
expectations over 10 years. Prior to the trust violation, HE “[…] trusted IE’s ability and we 
actually visited their factory and conducted an audit of their manufacturing capacity to ensure 
that their manufacturing process was compliant with ROHS” (General Manager, buyer, case 
2). Additionally, HE also perceived high goodwill trust in IE, as it perceived that IE was 
concerned with HE’s opinions and demonstrated a positive and active problem-solving 
attitude. The two firms “[…] had engaged in open discussions with each other when one 
encountered any operational issues. […] the relationship was pretty good [as an overall 
assessment of goodwill]” (General Manager, buyer, case 2). Over 10 years of collaboration, 
not only had IE demonstrated a consistent quality, for it had also never engaged in any 
opportunistic acts. Specifically, IE “[…] had never stolen our materials. Many PCB 
manufacturers would steal materials to lower their cost, for this is hard to discover […] this 
good and consistent record somewhat indicates good intentions and the genuine care of IE” 
(Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 2).   
 This high perceived goodwill trust stemmed from the long prior relationship. 20 years 
previously, HE had replaced IE’s previous PCB supplier due to a severe technical failure. IE 
had helped HE overcome this difficult period. At that time, “IE came to our factory after work 
for mounting graphs and producing samples for manufacturing. […] it had taken 3 - 4 months 
to complete the replacement process successfully” (Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 
2). The perception of goodwill trust was mutually affirmed, as IE also perceived that, “HE had 
actually helped us to grow a lot through idea and knowledge exchanges” and “they had always 
been a very positive and active partner to work with in terms of problem-solving” (General 
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Manager, supplier, case 2). Hence, the dyad had developed a sense of identification-based 
trust, which relied on the identification with the other party’s intentions. HE and IE “[…] have 
regular communication with respect to technology, knowledge and business-related issues” 
(General Manager, buyer, case 2). In particular, “HE would send technical requirements and 
latest information of products under development, such as wattage and power to IE on a 
regular basis. So, we would be prepared when these products were ready to mass produce” 
(General Manager, supplier, case 2). Thus, IE was on HE’s technical roadmap.  
 





High “Almost 20 years ago, we switched the PCB supplier 
to IE. We have been working with them ever since” 




Low  “In the early ages, HE actually did account for over 
7 - 80% of our total sales” (Account Manager, 
Supplier, Case 2)  
“[IE] suffered a bit when one of our largest clients 
switched orders to another supplier. Orders placed 
by the client accounted for almost 50% of their total 
sales” (Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 2) 
Structural 
commitment 
High “[HE] had many models and corresponding tooling 
in our factory, not like a few, they had over hundreds 
of models with different specifications” (Account 
Manager, supplier, case 2) 
Competence trust High “We trusted their competence in PCB manufacturing 
pretty much” (Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, 
case 2) 
Goodwill trust High  “The cooperation was good in general. We would 
engage in open discussions with each other, if one 
encountered any operational issues. The relationship 
[back then] was pretty good” (General Manager, 
buyer, case 2) 
Prior relationship 10 years  
Table 4 - 5. Relationship characteristics (t0 - t1)  
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4.2.4. The characteristics of the negative turning point  
The initial transgression that triggered the negative turning point was product contamination 
on printed circuit boards (PCBs) manufactured by IE. This broke out after the introduction of 
the restriction of hazardous substances (RoHS) in 2006. This regulation started to be enforced 
in 2007 when most European and American customers agreed to comply with RoHS due to 
the pressure from their governments. These customers rigorously demanded their suppliers 
over the world to do so accordingly. However, during the initial RoHS transition, many, if not 
all, PCB manufacturers in Taiwan were technically unfamiliar with what this regulation really 
meant, so many firms encountered difficulties in the manufacturing process. The initial 
transition was characterised by an ambience of high uncertainty and insecurity.  
 During the early stage of the RoHS transition, a European customer of HE reported that 
heavy metal residues had been found in some of the server adapters from their element analysis 
in their lab. The customer filed a complaint to HE and wanted it to sort the issue out as soon 
as possible. Even so, the downstream customer in fact “understood the situation and the cause, 
as the contamination occurred in the very beginning of RoHS introduction” (Senior Purchasing 
Manager, buyer, case 1). HE sought IE’s explanation of the cause of the transgression. IE 
explained that “[…] some products were contaminated in the manufacturing process due to 
material mix-ups” (Senior Purchasing Manager, buy, case 1). So, IE promised to tighten their 
quality assurance (QA) through adopting “[…] a better labelling system to help identification 
of different product models and machineries” (Field Application Engineer, supplier, case 2). 
However, HE doubted the effectiveness of the promised reparative attempts, which were 
reactive rather than preventive in nature. It should be noted that, at the time, HE did not have 
the equipment necessary to conduct element analysis. After deliberation, HE purchased this 
(X-ray fluorescence) to carry out element analysis with IQC and also heightened the inspection 
criteria. 
 To summarise, the negative turning point triggered by the initial transgression, product 
contamination, was of an external locus and low severity, because the downstream customer 
took on a quite forgiving perspective due to the externally enforced regulation and hence, there 
were less severe consequences than there could have been (Table 4-6). The transgression was 
a competence-based violation at the operating level, with the full controllability of IE, which 
was caused by the lack of knowledge about RoHS and loose quality control. The proposed 




Violation characteristics Descriptions 
Locus  Partially external  The issue had affected the external party, HE’s 
European client.  
Severity Moderate to low The contaminated items were discovered by HE’s 
downstream customer, but it demonstrated certain 
tolerance due to it being the early phase of RoHS 
introduction. 
Type Competence  The event was caused by the lack of a quality control 
system.  
Controllability  High The event was within the full control of IE. 
Stability  High The event was perceived to be recurrent in nature. 
Hierarchy  Operating  The event was inherently caused by an operating 
level dysfunction.  
Table 4 - 6. Characteristics of the transgression   
 
4.2.5 The trust violation stage  
This subsection describes the dynamics of the violation of competence and goodwill trust 
following the negative turning point. There are two transgressions that occurred in this stage 
(Table 4-7). 
 Initial transgression  Transgression 2 
Description  Product contamination  Reoccurring by-products of product 
contamination (PCB delamination and 
failed deliveries) 
Type  Competence  Competence  
Locus  External  Internal  
Severity  Low   Moderate  
Table 4 - 7. An overview of multiple transgressions in trust violation 
 
Competence trust  
After the negative turning point, HE’s competence trust in IE was undermined, as they “[…] 
were cautious and concerned about their quality control and ability to comply with RoHS, 
since at the time RoHS was not completely understood by most PCB manufacturers” (Senior 
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Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 2). The suspicion was amplified, because HE placed great 
importance on this downstream customer in terms of strategic value.  
 It should be noted that “it was not rare to hear that PCB manufacturers were forced to 
shut down […] or engaged in opportunistic acts of dumping non-lead-free products on 
customers” (Account Manager, supplier, case 2). This external condition had constrained HE’s 
option to seek alternatives due to inherently high uncertainty across all PCB suppliers. Instead, 
they had to rely on IE’s demonstrated competence and, more importantly, goodwill. IE’s 
established and perceived goodwill, which remained unchanged, had buffered the dyad 
through the violation process, as HE “[…] did not think IE would engage in opportunistic 
behaviour to harm HE” (Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 2). This belief kept HE 
sticking with IE and solving RoHS-induced issues with it.  
 After the initial transgression, HE had not only caught the same transgression, product 
contamination, in “[…] over 20% of delivered batches” over 3 weeks (Account manager, 
Supplier, Case 2), but it also experienced some cases of “PCB delamination caused by 
increasingly complicated manufacturing procedures associated with RoHS” (General 
Manager, supplier, case 2). These RoHS-induced disruptions were caused by a lack of 
understanding of the directive, which not only “[…] required a complete repurchasing of 
RoHS-compliant materials from IE’s suppliers and their suppliers”, but also needed “[…] 
adjustments to the parameters and manufacturing process” (Field Application Engineer, 
supplier, case 2). The defective items were sent back to IE’s factory for further sorting and 
reworking to be redelivered as soon as possible. “[HE] became stricter about quality 
inspection. […] sometimes we did not have enough products ready for production” (General 
Manager, buyer, case 2). It caused HE to delay their delivery to their important customer in 
Europe. As a result, it claimed compensation accordingly, for the loss incurred to their 
production line.  
 The phenomenon had further violated HE’s competence trust in IE. At this point, “since 
HE had never experienced anything like that before [a series of RoHS-induced disruptions], 
its engineers, QAs, and the senior purchasing manager were cautious about the quality of our 
products and doubtful about our capability to overcome this” (General Manager, supplier, case 
2). This means that the situation had been exacerbated, because the transgressions had shifted 
from a quality control issue to deficiency of the supplier management and manufacturing 





IE did not “[…] dodge the responsibility with the intention of avoiding compensation or cost 
considerations” (General Manager, supplier, case 2). They carried out the necessary reworking 
and came up with the volume agreed in the following delivery. After a while, IE conducted 
root cause analysis and collected data from its factory and other PCB manufacturers. Then, IE 
arranged a meeting and explained why the former solutions could not solve the issue 
permanently and proposed other solutions. It suggested that, “if we needed to convert to lead-
free production permanently, we needed to adopt better materials in manufacturing […] would 
result in increased costs” (General Manager, supplier, case 2). However, this suggestion was 
turned down by HE.  
 From HE’s perspective, it was not willing to accept the cost increase associated with the 
new materials, arguing that “it had adopted the existing materials for a long time and was 
reluctant to change” (General Manager, supplier, case 2). Apart from the concern of technical 
familiarity, HE was also worried about its cost structure, because such additional cost would 
very likely be absorbed by it, rather than its downstream customer. 
 Despite the rejected proposal, IE had still kept open communication with HE, such that 
“IE was quite open to any enquiries raised by HE” (General Manager, supplier, case 2). 
However, after three meetings between corporate staff from the dyad, no breakthrough 
regarding the preventive solutions was achieved. At this point, not only had IE’s capability of 
quality control been called into doubt, but also, its control over “manufacturing, supplier 
management, and cost management” had also been questioned (Senior Purchasing Manager, 
buyer, case 2), resulting in a goodwill trust violation. IE admitted that “QC and QA between 
the buyer and the supplier are always going to be opposed to each other in any organisation. 
This opposition, which manifested itself in the insistence of standpoints and a reluctance to 
communicate, had gradually led to an accumulation of time and resources” (General Manager, 
supplier, case 2). “The discussion was concluded with HE providing a list of materials 
(including CAN1, FR1, and FR4) it wanted IE to stick with […] IE agreed to carry out further 
feasibility analysis before answering HE’s inquiry” (General Manager, supplier, case 2). The 
relationship had reached a deadlock, because HE had placed a significant emphasis on their 
cost structure, which IE was perceived to be undermining this.  
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 The following subsections identify some factors affecting the trust violation stage from 
case 2, including 1) domain specificity, 2) permanent solution unavailable, 3) shadow of the 
past, and 4) the locus of the cause.  
 
Domain specificity  
As the trust violation process progressed, HE had gradually come to doubt IE’s capabilities 
across several domains, including quality control, manufacturing, supplier quality 
management, and cost management. Such cross-domain failures had exacerbated the violation 
of competence trust. It should be noted that, the domain specificity had been contained in the 
early stage of trust violation, which was only reflected in the violation of competence trust. 
However, it had over time spilled over to HE’s goodwill trust, because it originally believed: 
“IE had what it took to comply with RoHS” (Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 2). 
However, not only did IE fail to contain the early transgressions, but it had also caused new 
transgressions (cross-domain failures). Thus, HE started to question IE’s intentions to solve 
the transgressions.   
 
Permanent solution unavailable 
Similar to case 1, it can be seen that both parties could not reach permanent solutions that 
effectively eliminated the metal contamination despite IE’s active reparative attempts. 
Moreover, the accumulation of ineffective reparative attempts had not only undermined the 
buyer’s interests (as the deteriorating situation manifested itself in more financial damage and 
operational challenges), but also impaired the supplier’s interests (as its costly effort was not 
only discounted, but also resulted in incremental losses, such as financial and operational 
burdens). This conflict of interest was an impetus for the supplier to come up with a proposal 
with a potential increase in material cost, thus transferring its losses to the buyer. 
 
The locus of the cause  
The transgression was perceived to be of a partial external locus by HE and their downstream 
customer, as RoHS had been enacted by the government and downstream customers. This 
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perception of external locus had buffered the violation of trust, because both parties tended to 
possess a forgiving attitude to IE. Initially, “the downstream customer was willing to forgive 
and tolerate the quality issue regarding occasional lead residue” (Senior Purchasing Manager, 
buyer, case 2). It should be noted that as the trust violation process progressed, the mitigating 
effect of the locus had gradually worn off, because “HE and their downstream customer had 
gradually lost patience” (Account Manager, supplier, case 2) and the cause was no longer a 
quality control issue, but a cross-domain one.  
 
The shadow of the past 
The shadow of the past seemed to mitigate the negative perceptions associated with the 
violation, whereby HE perceived that “we couldn’t just say that we wanted to quit and give up 
on the supplier, because it is very hard to cultivate a competent supplier, not to mention that 
we had much tooling in their factory” (General Manager, buyer, case 2). This contained HE’s 
intention to switch suppliers and motivated it to overcome RoHS transition with IE in spite of 
the occurrence of cross-domain failures.   
 
4.2.6 The characteristics of the positive turning point  
After the deadlock, both parties still maintained a strong intention for relationship continuity 
due to the shadow of the past and high relationship dependence. However, the trust violation 
stimulated a crisis mindset not only because IE relied heavily on HE’s orders (if HE withdrew 
orders, IE would be very likely to shut down), but also because some of their peer organisations 
had failed and gone out of business. IE noted that, “it was quite serious if we kept failing our 
customers by producing below-standard products […] it resulted in a cycle of sorting, caution, 
and compensation […] together with the stagnating or declining economy in the industry, 
many firms had no choice but to shut down” (General Manager, supplier, case 2).  
 In addition to this, IE seemed to hold a problem-solving orientation, viewing the tension 
stemming from the trust violation process as a trigger for finding out HE’s real requirements: 
“sometimes arguments would lead to a higher mutual understanding as well as self-
understanding. We began to understand what our counterpart was really concerned about” 
(Field Application Engineer, supplier, case 2). That is, through a series of arguments due to a 
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conflict of interests, “[IE] found out that the core consideration of HE in their sourcing 
strategy under RoHS was to ‘limit the direct increase to costs; make up through indirect 
procedures’” (General Manager, supplier, case 2). Both this crisis mindset and problem-
solving attitude motivated IE to repair the violated trust shortly after the deadlock.  
 
4.2.7 The trust repair stage  
IE had engaged in continuous communication with HE at both the corporate and operating 
levels, for which “[IE] responded to every concern and requirement raised by the buyer and 
offered solutions to fulfil their needs by clearly understanding their needs, communicating, 
and discussing possible arrangements both parties could make” (General Manager, supplier, 
case 2). After clearly informing HE regarding its proposed tasks, over the next two weeks, IE 
had conducted material analysis and performance evaluation with respect to the materials HE 
had proposed in a meeting. IE explained to HE that FR4 yielded the best performance in terms 
of stability under lead-free production. However, in order to apply this material successfully 
to production and at the same time maintain an acceptable cost, IE requested HE “[…] to 
modify their manufacturing process to accommodate the chosen material […] to carry out an 
extra process, baking, […] which might only lead to some indirect costs” (Field Application 
Engineer, supplier, case 2). HE was willing to accept the proposed solution as it would rather 
spend the indirect cost through additional adjustments to the manufacturing process.  
 A major breakthrough was made by IE’s tailored solution for HE. It put off the major 
concerns of HE, a potential increase to its cost structure and technical unfamiliarity. As a 
result, this solution was accepted by HE, because it believed IE was willing to tailor the 
reparative responses that would accommodate its needs. The two firms had “[…] reached a 
mutually acceptable solution in a timely manner” (General Manager, supplier, case 2). HE’s 
goodwill trust had been repaired quickly, because of IE having displayed genuine care about 
its interests.  
 Despite corporate arrangements made regarding the material, these required extensive 
operational collaboration across different domains to implement successfully. IE started to 
implement the agreed solutions, including material modification plus additional procedures. 
Consequently, the product contamination had been contained significantly and “[the 
improvement in product quality] was quite efficient on the whole, initially” (Senior Purchasing 
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Manager, buyer, case 2). However, during the process, HE was aware of that “[…] the quality 
specifications seemed to be rather ambiguous [with respect to IE’s outsourced 
manufacturing]” so it assigned its senior purchasing manager on site “[…] to help and 
facilitate operational difficulties and argumentation over quality specifications between the 
two companies’ QA” (General Manager, buyer, case 2). A joint decision was made on which 
additional verification should be conducted against IE’s upstream suppliers. The process 
involved close collaboration between R&D engineers from the two firms “[…] on getting a 
bill of materials [BOM] of the individual suppliers certified” (General Manager, supplier, case 
2).  
 As a result, “after two months, our [competence] had significantly recovered as defective 
items decreased significantly” (Account Manager, supplier, case 2). HE perceived that IE’s 
competence had increased, because it had gradually reduced the uncertainty associated with 
future reoccurrence, thus shifting from more reactive solutions to more permanent ones. In 
particular, with the firms having “[…] engaged in the repair through this cooperative way, 
this had actually enhanced the competence of both” (General Manager, buyer, case 2).  
 However, since HE had got over hundreds of product categories manufactured by IE, not 
every model underwent lead-free production simultaneously. The main difficulty faced by IE 
was that some of HE’s models were still manufactured non-lead-free. This had led to some 
compromises being made by IE and HE during the transitional stage, whereby they had to 
delay intentionally some production lines to accommodate lead-free manufacturing and thus, 
prevent the occurrence of product contamination. Nevertheless, these delays did not hinder the 
trust repair process, because IE always informed HE, if they “[…] could not deliver the agreed 
volume of particular models on the agreed time […] would contact them in advance so the 
impact could be minimised” (Account Manager, supplier, case 2). In addition, HE was willing 
to “[…] postpone certain advanced orders that IE was currently unable to fulfil” (General 
Manager, buyer, case 2). Thus, HE could better arrange its manufacturing process without 
much disturbance.  
 In parallel, IE felt that the quality and speed of information exchange regarding new 
technologies in the sector did not flow quickly enough to keep up with the pace in the south, 
Kaohsiung, where it was based, compared to cities in the north. Hence, it decided to relocate 
its manufacturing centre in the north (Taoyuan), where most hi-tech electronics companies are 
clustered. This was because economies of agglomeration, human resources, information 
exchange and knowledge transfer are more rapid in the north among PCB firms. Thus, IE “[…] 
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built a new factory in Taoyuan […] expanded the scale by recruiting more engineers in R&D 
and QA to improve product designs and conduct an audit” (General Manager, supplier, case 
2). Not only did IE set up a factory in the north, for this factory also passed the ISO 9001 
certification. Both of these were accomplished in the later trust repair stage. It reflected IE’s 
full commitment in improving its QA system, whereby IE “[…] has become stricter on OQC, 
with tighter standards and more quality tests as well as IPQC with more stops […] started to 
place more importance on the information and feedback provided by our customers” (General 
Manager, supplier, case 2). Apart from the improvement of manufacturing and control 
processes, RoHS had become a widespread standard over time and “most of our orders 
received had become complete lead-free products” (Account Manager, supplier, case 2). “It 
took almost six months to transform fully all HE’s models and machineries to comply with 
ROHS” (Field Application Engineer, supplier, case 2). As a result, HE’s competence trust in 
IE had “increased gradually over time”, with more reparative responses being initiated and 
substantiated (Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 2).  
 This was the most critical trust violation in the dyad, but it did not trigger much of a 
negative effect on HE’s goodwill trust, because the shadow of the past seemed to buffer the 
whole trust violation and repair process, which mitigated any suspicion about IE’s intentions. 
Without such strong relational ties, HE would have held IE’s goodwill accountable and 
safeguard potential opportunism induced by the supplier. Additionally, IE’s competence 
improvement “[…] has led them to receive many orders from big firms” (General Manager, 
buyer, case 2). But due to HE’s purchasing capacity, IE’s improved competence did not result 
in increased orders or more projects. Thus, “the relationship dependence has reduced as IE’s 
total sales have been growing” (Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 2). This, in fact, 
caused IE to prioritise its resources towards other firms, thus reducing its responsiveness to 
HE.  
 To summarise, over a six-month period, HE’s goodwill trust had been repaired by 
devising a mutually adaptable reparative response that eliminated its concern regarding a 
potential increase in cost and technical unfamiliarity. As the core concern was put off, HE had 
offered assistance to improve IE’s manufacturing process and quality control via on-site 
monitoring. Corporate involvement led to the discovery that a permanent resolution largely 
depended on IE’s upstream suppliers. Both firms engaged in a reverification of all IE’s 
suppliers. In parallel, IE reflected on the violation process, subsequently deciding to relocate 
its factory and to apply for ISO certification. That is, the reparative responses implemented 
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were targeted across different domains of competence, beyond RoHS compliance. It had 
turned into a full-range capability overhaul of the whole company, which further enhanced 
IE’s perceived competence.  
 
4.2.8 The post-repair stage                            
Competence trust: upward recalibration  
After the process of trust repair, HE’s perceived “competence trust [in IE] was actually 
higher” than during the pre-transgression stage (Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 2). 
Given that “many PCB manufacturers had failed to comply with RoHS” (Senior Purchasing 
Manager, buyer, case 2), HE’s perception of IE’s competence had been reinforced, as “they 
had become more important to us” (General Manager, buyer, case 2). Furthermore, as IE 
conducted an overhaul across multiple domains, its competence had improved significantly, 
because a lot of resources had been invested in the reparative efforts guided by the strategic 
decision. 
 
Goodwill trust: restoration (unchanged) 
Since the dyad was essentially identification-based in the pre-transgression stage, goodwill 
trust was only impaired after a conflict of interests occurred in the later trust violation stage. 
This meant that, “despite some ups and downs in the process, our relationship was not very 
much affected” (General Manager, buyer, case 2). Similarly, “it is not only about competence 
[…] there are still favoured among many alternatives […] we will always keep IE, especially 
for our most important customers and their projects, because they will never steal our 
materials as some of our PCB suppliers have done” (Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 
2). Notably, it is difficult and costly to verify PCBs piece by piece, so HE tended to give the 
more important projects to IE. This mutually cultivated goodwill trust, evidenced in: “we share 
a long history […] trust, support, and grow from each other […] a sense of revolutionary 
feelings between HE and IE” (Account Manager, supplier, case 2), seems to have been less 




4.3 CASE 3: BUYER (AC) – SUPPLIER (AE) 
4.3.1 Case background  
Buyer: Alpha Computer 
Alpha Computer (AC hereafter), founded in 1980, is a Taiwan-based original equipment 
manufacturer (OEM) that offers a range of electronic products, including personal computers 
(PCs), laptops, tablets, smartphones, LCD monitors, plasma TVs, projectors, and peripherals. 
The company operates in over 160 countries with over 8,000 employees. It yielded an annual 
revenue of $10 billion in 2017, which also ranks it in the top five branded PC vendors 
worldwide in 2018 (IDC). In terms of percentage of sales revenue per product category, 
laptops account for 60% of the total, followed by PCs, 15%, and monitors, 12% (AC quarterly 
report, 2018).  
 
Supplier: Advanced Electronics Inc.  
Advanced Electronics Inc. (AE hereafter), established in 1985, is a Taiwan-based original 
design manufacturer (ODM) that produces laptops, tablets, PCs, LCD monitors, LCD TVs, 
and peripherals. In 2017, laptop and smartphones/tablets accounted for 75% and 18%, 
respectively, of overall sales revenue, which amounted to over $24 billion. It is ranked as the 
world’s second-largest laptop manufacturer, with over 50,000 employees and has produced at 
least 40 million laptops annually since 2010 (AE Company Website, accessed in 2018). AE 
manufactures for world-class electronics brands, including Dell, HP, Lenovo, Acer, Apple, 
Sony, Nokia, and Toshiba.  
 
4.3.2 Overview of the case  
This subsection provides an overview of the dynamics between competence and goodwill trust 







Figure 4 - 3. A graphical illustration of the complete episodes of the trust repair process for case 3 (buyer’s perspective) 
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4.3.3 The pre-transgression phase  
This subsection describes the relationship characteristics between AC and AE prior to the trust 
violation (Table 4-8). The former’s perceived relationship dependence was somewhat high, 
because “in the pre-transgression stage, AC’s number one supplier was Mega Electronics (ME 
hereafter), followed by AE and Hitron Computer (HC). AE received the second largest orders 
from AC” (Executive Vice President, supplier, case 3). Since AC “[…] normally placed 200k 
– 300k orders on laptops with AE, on average, per month” (Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, 
case 3), not many suppliers could meet that manufacturing capacity in a calendar month.  
 In the pre-transgression phase, AC had moderate competence trust in AE, because “AE 
primarily offered assembly integration, where AC had to formulate the majority of routes on 
QC, IQC and OQC, technical improvement, and suggested solutions […] we needed a lot more 
effort to work with AE [compared to ME]” (Vice President, buyer, case 3). Based on the 
performance assessment report, “AE’s engineering dimension did not turn out to be very 
satisfactory [as compared with their main competitor]”. However, another domain of AE’s 
competence, cost-effectiveness, came to the fore: “[…] AE seemed to be the most supportive 
regarding the price offerings” (Senior R&D Engineer, buyer, case 3).  
 This consideration of cost signals goodwill trust rather than competence trust in the 
electronics industry, because “in the Taiwanese electronics industry, OEMs and ODMs are 
mostly cost-oriented […] the first key criterion is the intention to cooperate and collaborate 
[…] if their costs cannot meet our requirements, we will not proceed” (Vice President, buyer, 
case 3). Likewise, AE echoed that “the key of goodwill trust between two firms is essentially 
centred on cost” (Senior Project Manager, supplier, case 3). That is, goodwill trust is evaluated 
based upon how much the supplier is willing to give up on profits, which in turn, translates 
into the buyer’s welfare. Such willingness to forfeit certain profits can be promoted by both 
the shadow of the future (e.g. expected gains) and past (e.g. long-established relationship). 
Particularly, in this case, AC had placed a moderate to high goodwill trust in AE, not only 
because of its competitive price, but also owing to good interpersonal relationships between 
executive staff. In particular, “the bosses [from AE and AC] seemed to have a good 
interpersonal relationship […] had a great rapport and frequent interaction” (Senior Project 
Manager, supplier, case 3). With such high goodwill trust in place, “[AE] was always granted 
orders with the largest volume […] not necessarily indicating more projects” (Senior R&D 
Engineer, buyer, case 3), because AC might have felt obliged to order a certain volume from 
AE in each RFQ to reciprocate the goodwill. Moreover, the business relationship between AC 
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and AE had begun around 2005 and 2006, which was approximately five years before the 
violation. During the period of the pre-transgression phase, the two firms “[…] had not 
experienced any noticeable conflict” (Senior Project Manager, supplier, case 3).       
 







“This industry requires a lot of and frequent 
information/knowledge sharing” (Senior 




Low “[…] our first choice was Quanta Computer rather 
than AE, because the capability of Quanta 
Computer’s factory could actually achieve system 
integration instead of assembly integration” (Vice 




Competence trust Moderate  “[…] AE primarily offered assembly integration, 
which AC had to formulate the majority of routes 
from QC, IQC and OQC to improvement 
suggestions […] we needed a lot more effort to 
work with AE [compared to Quanta Computer, 
AE’s main competitor]” (Vice President, buyer, 
case 3) 
Goodwill trust Moderate 
to high 
“AE did have the best relationship with AC’s 
executive staff. Therefore, they were always 
granted with orders with the largest volume” 
(Senior R&D Engineer, buyer, case 3) 
Prior relationship Over five years  
Table 4 - 8. Relationship characteristics (t0 - t1)  
 
4.3.4 The characteristics of the negative turning point  
The initial transgression was an arbitrary shift of engineering resources. AC found out that 
their assigned engineers from AE, “who by contract shall only dedicate to their tasks”, had 
been shifted to work on different projects from other OEM manufacturers (Deputy Executive 
Officer, buyer, case 3). The configuration of human resources was specified on the bill of 
materials (BOM) from RFQ and carefully manoeuvred, whereby AC noted that “our projects 
need those specified staff and teams [to be fully committed to] for specific reasons” (Deputy 
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executive officer, Buyer, Case 3). The transgression was perceived to be opportunistic 
behaviour, because “[…] such conduct is strictly prohibited in the industry […] a taboo that 
violated the industrial norms” (Deputy Executive Officer, buyer, case 3) due to concerns about 
intellectual property. As a result, AC was very angry about it and complained rigorously.  
 AE, on the other hand, did not present a convincing explanation. In response, it attributed 
the issue to the prioritisation of resource allocation, explaining that: “[…] back then we had 
many other customers, including Dell, HP, and Toshiba […] they were relatively big at the 
time [as compared to AC] we only had limited resources […] we seemed to spare too many 
resources for other customers” (Executive Vice President, supplier, case 3).  
 To summarise, the negative turning point triggered by the initial transgression, an 
arbitrary shift of engineering resources, was of internal locus and high controllability, because 
it was completely the responsibility of the supplier, being voluntarily implemented by it (Table 
4-9). Despite the incident not causing severe financial consequences, it signalled an integrity-
based violation, which was perceived as opportunism. Such opportunism is regarded as a 
stable case, because impaired integrity indicates that the party would never be honest and 
ethical, which means similar conduct might reoccur in the future. Moreover, it should be noted 
that the allocation of critical resources can only be decided by senior management. 
 
Violation characteristics Descriptions 
Locus  Internal The issue had affected the dyad only.  
Severity Moderate to low The trigger event did not cause much financial 
damage.  
Type Integrity   “[…] they had always shifted their engineering 
resources from project to project. This is an absolute 
taboo in the industry” (Deputy Executive Officer, 
buyer, case 3)  
Controllability  High The event was within full control of AE. 
Stability  High The event was perceived to be recurrent in nature. 
Hierarchy  Between 
operating and 
corporate level 
The decision was perceived to be driven by staff 
higher than at the operating level.  




4.3.5 The trust violation stage  
Goodwill trust  
The transgression implied “goal incongruence [between the firms] signalled by the integrity-
based violation” (Deputy Executive Officer, buyer, case 3), which had eroded AC’s goodwill 
trust in AE. It had “[…] engendered conflict in business operations, the interaction and 
communication between sales teams in particular […] It was a bit serious” (Executive Vice 
President, supplier, case 3). Whilst the cause of this goodwill trust violation stemmed from 
corporate staff, it had caused high tension and operational conflict between operating staff in 
the buyer-supplier relationship.  
 
Competence trust 
The transgression gradually led to a series of competence-based violations, whereby limited 
resource prioritisation had caused constant delays in “[…] the timeline set by AE’s each 
production phase […] because of their [lacking] engineering capacity” (Senior Purchasing 
Manager, buyer, case 3). Specifically, because of the lowered priority for AC, AE admitted 
that “[…] for emails and other issues that we should have replied within three days, we might 
deal with those in a week or so […] with respect to operational issues, we should have resolved 
them with more solid actions, but we might think 70 – 80% efforts should be acceptable” 
(Executive Vice President, supplier, case 3).  
 During the trust violation process, AE had failed to fulfil AC’s expectations multiple 
times across different projects (i.e. commercial computers, consumer computers, laptops) and 
with different functional issues (e.g. IC, batteries, capacitors, PCBs, design, and 












































Integrity Integrity  
Locus Internal Internal External Partially 
external 
Internal  Internal 
Severity  Moderate 
to high 
High Low  Moderate High Moderate  
Table 4 - 10. An overview of the transgressions 
 
 The following paragraphs briefly elaborate upon the highlighted transgressions, which 
significantly violated competence trust. Initially, a laptop project of an expected monthly 
volume of 50,000 items was terminated prematurely after its mass production due to IC 
incompatibility. AC was furious and claimed compensation for the loss. AC’s perceived 
competence of AE had been eroded significantly, not only because “AE had failed to realise 
the project to the market […] damaged our reputation […]”, but also owing to AE’s poor 
problem handling ability and ineffective reparative attempts, as manifested in “[…] the project 
ended shortly after MP due to many unsolvable issues” (Deputy Executive Officer, buyer, case 
3). Likewise, AE admitted that “this could be seen as one of the most severe disruptions [in 
the relationship]” (Senior Project Manager, supplier, case 3), because both firms had invested 
a lot of resources in R&D and production, but the project had failed to deliver any laptops 
despite subsequent extensive engineering reworking, thus resulting in the early termination.  
 Because of the previous incident, AC had started to hold AE accountable for other minor 
defects, even with an external locus being the cause. These defects included incidents of 
battery and capacitor explosions reported by AC’s end users. Even though these transgressions 
were largely attributed to improper operations by the end users, AC constantly “[…] requested 
explanations […] challenged AE’s product design” (Senior Project Manager, supplier, case 
3). Despite AE’s “[…] provision of theoretical explanations and relevant reports […] 
formulation of preventive actions with respect to the design (e.g. widening the tolerance to 
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increase safety, additional fool-proof design) […] in an attempt to recover AC’s trust 
(competence) back” (Senior Project Manager, supplier, case 3), AC’s competence trust in AE 
had still been violated. This was because, AE’s “[…] problem-solving actions did not satisfy 
AC’s expectations […] not solid enough […] it was very hard to reach a balance […] there 
would always be a cognitive discrepancy [regarding the expected and actual outcomes 
regarding reparative attempts]” (Senior Project Manager, supplier, case 3).  
 
Goodwill trust 
Following that, one of the laptop projects experienced a significant yield loss. The cause, 
firstly reported by the AE, was due to inconsistent quality of chips manufactured by a supplier 
assigned by AC, Tsinghua Unigroup (TU). However, AC were always suspicious of AE’s 
proposed root cause, believing it was responsible for this failure owing to its design or 
manufacturing process. Thus, AC decided to involve a third-party, American Applied 
Materials (AAM), for further examination and analysis. AAM’s analysis report suggested that 
“a layer of PCB fabrication was stolen by AE” (Vice president, Buyer, Case 3). AC was 
furious, because it perceived that AE had engaged in opportunistic behaviour in the 
manufacturing process again, whereby “[…] the tin material was replaced [with other 
material] to save cost” (Deputy Executive Officer, buyer, case 3). Hence, this led to a 
significant reduction in AC’s goodwill trust, as AE clearly did not care about its interests, at 
least, as perceived by AC.   
 This transgression was very severe, as “the pure monetary loss was about $11 million 
[…] did not only reflect on product recall […] all the materials and components remained in 
the factory […] the total amount of compensation claimed with this disruption was about $18 
million” (Vice President, buyer, case 3). For this amount of compensation, there had not been 
a lengthy negotiation back and forth regarding it, because “[…] the penalty associated with 
PCB SMP fabrication was enacted by the court [as AC resorted to the court] […]” and “AE 
had compensated the loss incurred shortly after” (Deputy Executive Officer, buyer, case 3). 
The speed of compensation settling by AE did help the reconciliation of the violation, such 
that the relationship could continue to proceed, as the “two firms could only move on and carry 






Following the incident, in the upcoming quarterly supplier assessment, AC concluded that 
there were six major technical and managerial problems AE had had so far and presented this 
finding to AE’s corporate staff. These problems, as identified by AC’s vice president, are 
illustrated in the table below (Table 4-11).  
 
Problem Exemplar quote 
The incapability of 
technical problem handling 
“AE’s competence still remained on technical support, 
rather than technical solution provision” (Vice President, 
buyer, case 3) 
Passive procurement 
approach constrained by 
hierarchy 
“AE’s buying power was very passive and largely affected 
by their hierarchical power […] their procurement [team] 
would only act on their boss’ words or commands” (Vice 
President, buyer, case 3) 
Slow responsiveness  “[…] their response time was extremely slow [in terms of 
problem identification and solution provision]” (Vice 
President, buyer, case 3) 
Frequent cancellation of 
orders from their suppliers 
“[…] their relationship with their suppliers […] AE tended 
to cancel orders quite often [possibly due to forecasting 
incapability or inventory cost prevention]” (Vice President, 
buyer, case 3) 
Preference over their 
affiliated companies 
“[…] AE tended to place/shift orders actively to particular 
suppliers (e.g. connector and cable) that were actually 
invested by their bosses […] their affiliated firms had grown 
larger and larger [decreasing AC’s bargaining power]” 
(Vice President, buyer, case 3) 
Unreliable certification 
conducted by their affiliated 
firms 
“AE also used their affiliated firms to carry out technical 
certification. We hoped AE would use our lab instead of 
their affiliated companies’, so we could convey expected 
standards to them” (Vice President, buyer, case 3) 
Table 4 - 11. Six major issues identified by AC 
 
 AE had tried to implement reparative attempts to close the perceptual gaps by “[…] 
organising interlock meetings”, a weekly held face-to-face meeting between operating staff 
internal to AE and across organisational boundaries; agreeing to “[…] inform AC regarding 
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any modifications made to the manufacturing process, transportation, and packaging”; 
agreeing to “[…] conduct material verification at AC’s lab”; adding “[…] more checkpoints 
to internal control and agreeing to reverify their upstream suppliers according to AC’s audit 
report” (Senior Project Manager, supplier, case 3).  
 However, AC no longer had trust in AE’s competence anymore, so they had gradually 
“shifted their orders to alternative suppliers, Hitron Computer (HC) in particular, and 
reduced orders placed with AE” (Vice President, buyer, case 3). This was a behavioural 
outcome that resulted from deteriorating trust in both competence and goodwill trust. It should 
be noted that AC had an internal supplier governance system, for which AE had already 
received three red flags (three warnings). With one more disruption, AC would terminate the 
business relationship with AE.   
 
Goodwill trust 
As an outcome of the previous violating event (PCB fabrication issue), AC eliminated some 
of AE’s unqualified suppliers after conducting the reverification process. As a result, AE had 
experienced a shortage of supply, as “[…] our critical suppliers had been limited to only two 
or three for other projects […] for example, we place 50% orders with suppliers A and B. 
When supplier A was blacklisted […] we simply struggled to make up full orders […] placed 
rush orders on the remaining approved suppliers, which caused some delays” (Senior Project 
Manager, supplier, case 3). Consequently, AE had not been able to fulfil AC’s orders in a 
timely manner across projects.  
 From AC’s perspective, however, it perceived that “AE intentionally had pended our 
orders […] AE’s attitude towards AC started to show a neglectful manner” (Senior Purchasing 
Manager, buyer, case 3). This, in fact, caused a deterioration of AC’s goodwill trust in AE to 
the lowest point, which signalled a breach of the ultimatum. The production delay might not 
have been the most severe incident during the trust violation process, but “this was the last 
straw that broke the camel’s back” (Executive Vice President, supplier, case 3). At this point, 
AC felt that “we could not trust AE anymore […] cancelled all orders placed in AE […] held 
up AE’s payment […] gave up helping them to find solutions until AE figured it out” (Vice 
President, buyer, case 3). With those pending orders, AC had requested their backup supplier, 
Hitron Computer (HC), to make up some of AE’s production volume.  
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 The following subsection identifies some factors affecting the trust violation stage from 
case 3, including i) early integrity-based violation, ii) domain specificity, and iii) perceptual 
asymmetry. 
 
Early integrity-based violation 
The early occurrence of integrity-based violation acted as an anchor to the following 
competence-based violation. To be specific, after the integrity-based violation (i.e. the initial 
transgression), AC tended to attribute subsequent transgressions to AE’s lack of goodwill, 
rather than competence, whereby AC noted: “AE was not an incapable manufacturer, but they 
were just unwilling to fully devote their commitment to us” (Senior Vice President, buyer, case 
3). AC tended to attribute other unsatisfactory performance and operational glitches to the lack 
of resource allocation: “The driving force [of the erosion of trust] was at the strategic level 
manifested in the prioritisation of our [AE] resource allocation” (Executive Vice President, 
supplier, case 3). Hence, AC had always suspected that AE would deliberately hide critical 
information from them or engage in opportunistic acts in the trust violation stage. As a result, 
it had to spend extra effort assuring and verifying every detail on the reports, in R&D, and 
manufacturing. For example, “AC had been nit-picking at every possible thing that they felt 
unreasonable, such as designs and materials. AC had constantly challenged […] Their RDs 
reviewed the analytical report […] also raised concerns and doubts regarding our report” 
(Senior Project Manager, supplier, case 3).  
 
Domain specificity  
Cross-domain failures witnessed in case 3 had accelerated the violation of AE’s competence. 
Following that, the accumulation of different transgressions, over time, spilled over to violate 
goodwill trust. However, it should be noted that the scale of collaboration as well as 
relationship dependence buffered the effect of cross-domain failures.  
 First, there were many ongoing projects across the different product categories in the 
dyad. Such a scale would prolong the length of a trust violation, because of 1) low sensitivity 
to early violations; and 2) multiple organisational hierarchies. “Because this business was 
huge, it would not break after one or two small disruptions. It (the violation) was a trend in 
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which a series of disrupting events had accumulated over time and finally, a triggering event 
led to a breakdown of the relationship. The triggering event might not have been the most 
severe incident” (Executive Vice President, supplier, case 3). This means that, a failure in one 
project was initially regarded as a fraction of the whole inter-organisational exchange unless 
the severity was high. AC and AE started to treat the trust violation seriously when those 
transgressions occurred in several projects (i.e. cross-domain failures) and started to affect the 
business exchange as a whole. This implies that, multiple failures across products and domains 
are required to stimulate the crisis mindset for larger collaborations.  
 
Perceptual asymmetry – heightened conflict of interests 
The data show that the trust violation process of case 3 invariably was rooted in a perceptual 
gap regarding the strategic importance between AC and AE: “because AC had not been 
growing as fast as their competitors, we had no choice but to place a higher strategic 
importance on other OEMs, HP and Dell. in particular […] allocate resources dedicated to 
AC to other customers” (Senior Project Manager, supplier, case 3). Since the overall resources 
of the firm were limited, “We [AE] had to give discount selectively to our customers based on 
their volume” (Senior Project Manager, supplier, case 3). Furthermore, “AC wanted to cut our 
prices [due to their declining market share] […] AC wanted us to offer more cost reduction, 
yet we could not offer this to every customer” (Executive Vice President, supplier, case 3). 
Such an imbalanced perception towards the business relationship, as manifested in “lack of 
resource prioritisation, initiatives, and positivity”, seemed to grow naturally and exacerbate 
the trust violation (Executive Vice President, supplier, case 3). AE contended that trust 
violation would have inevitably occurred as “this led to conflicts in the business between the 
two firms […] yet it was a rational decision that had to be made” (Executive Vice President, 
supplier, case 3).  
 To summarise, within a six-month period, AC’s perceived goodwill trust had been 
violated, because AC believed that AE had violated its integrity over some transgressions. 
These integrity-based violations were believed to be implemented by AE’s corporate staff with 
high controllability. In addition, AC’s perceived competence trust had been violated, because 
of a series of transgressions occurring across multiple domains, from design and 
manufacturing to problem handling and supplier management. Notably, most of the 
transgressions did not reoccur on a regular basis, yet they were of high magnitude per each 
142 
 
transgression. Some of them had influenced external parties, including end users and AC’s 
downstream customers. On the whole, the trust violation was of very high severity.  
 
4.3.6 The characteristics of the positive turning point  
After the relationship hit a deadlock, no official contact had been made. The relationship and 
ambience between corporate and operating staff between the two firms “[…] had been very 
tense […] even in AC’s internal meetings, no corporate and operating staff dared to mention 
the relationship with AE” (Vice President, buyer, case 3). Shortly after this event, AC placed 
its latest netbook orders with Mega Electronics (ME), which was AE’s major competitor. “[…] 
by that time, it [netbook] had started to grow a momentum […] this was an important project 
[…] not given to AE but our competitor ME. This was when we [AE] perceived the relationship 
was at its lowest” (Executive Vice President, supplier, case 3).  
 The 1st generation netbook product from AC and manufactured by ME resulted in great 
success in terms of its market performance. It had triggered a radical reaction in AE (a crisis 
mindset), corporate staff in particular. “At this point, the difference between AE and ME was 
very huge. The proportion of our orders only accounted for less than 30%, while ME occupied 
over 60% of their total volume” (Executive Vice President, supplier, case 3). As a result, “we 
[AE] were very nervous about that” (Senior Project Manager, supplier, case 3) and started to 
treat it seriously.  
 AE had reassessed the cost-and-benefit of this inter-organisational relationship. “Since 
the relationship had dropped to its lowest point, we [AE] actually had engaged in deep 
reflection internal to the firm. […] what issues did our team really have? Why were we charged 
so many penalties by AC” (Executive Vice President, supplier, case 3). More importantly, AE 
noted that “market and marketing had affected the cost and delivery of AE’s offering to AC, 
so the relationship had deteriorated […] whereas, if the exchange or the market was growing, 
the issues would not have been a problem” (Purchasing Agent, supplier, case 3). This implies 
that AE had regained the motivation to repair the violated trust from the deadlock, because of 




4.3.7 The trust repair stage  
 AE’s general manager had engaged in unofficial meetings with AC’s general manager 
“[…] since AC and AE’s general managers played golf together on a regular basis […] they 
had a good interpersonal relationship […] it was likely that some under table agreements had 
been made” (Senior Project Manager, supplier, case 3). After two weeks, AC’s CEO initiated 
a discussion in a meeting on “how AC should manage the inter-organisational relationship 
with AE?”, thus implying that “the general managers had come to certain agreement […] 
very probable that AE did commit to provide AC with more favourable support in terms of 
long-term demand planning and other offerings” (Senior R&D Engineer, buyer, case 3). As a 
result, AC’s perceived goodwill trust from their general manager had been somewhat repaired, 
because “AE’s general manager leveraged his interpersonal relationship with AC’s to some 
extent and signalled his willingness to continue collaborating with AC” (Senior Project 
Manager, supplier, case 3).  
 It should be noted that the repair of goodwill trust manifested itself in a radical change 
of operational and strategic arrangements (Table 4-12). Goodwill trust, in this case, resembled 
a ‘pie sharing’ process, one where AE was willing to give up its profits and to increase the 
investment dedicated to AC. In other words, AE transferred its profits/interests to AC and 
expected that these financial sacrifices would pay off in the future in securing the order of the 
2nd generation netbooks. These reparative responses encompassing favourable financial terms 
“[…] had actually worked pretty well with our corporate staff in terms of recovering the 










Description Exemplary quote  Nature 
Extension of 
payment terms from 
120 to 180 days. 
“[…] in our initial agreement, once the issue 
associated with the project exceeds 20 items, our 
payment term would need to change from 120 to 180 
days” (Deputy Executive Officer, buyer, case 3). 
Operational  




“AE also agreed to pay testing, transportation, and 
insurance fees and exempted 30% prepayment for 
AC. These miscellaneous expenses were pretty 
significant in total” (Vice President, buyer, case 3) 
Operational  
The revelation of 
cost structures 
“AE voluntarily gave us the authority to review and 
modify their first, second, and third-tier suppliers. 
This indicates that we had more power to control 
their cost structure and they became more 




service centres for 
AC’s downstream 
customers  
“AE agreed to set up after-sales service centres 
close to our international customers, as this was 
requested by our GM […] AE set up service centres, 
in Poland, Mexico and Brazil” (Vice President, 
buyer, case 3) 
Operational  
Confirmation of 
investing in the new 
factory  
“We used to have a manufacturing base in Suzhou 
Kunshan […] we then built up a factory in 
Chongqing only for AC […] hoped to expand 
business scale together with AC […] the factory in 
Chongqing had been dedicated solely to AC’s 




of teams devoted to 
AC’s projects 
“AE had also regrouped our teams collaborating 
with AC by replacing them with much operating staff 
from the production line to R&D” (Executive vice 
president, Supplier, Case 3)  
“AE built a specialised team devoted to customising 
and fulfilling our [business and operational] needs” 
(Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 3)  
Operational  
Table 4 - 12. The proposals made by AE’s general manager 
 
 It should be noted that the initial reparative responses had been completely driven by the 
top-down approach, for “if the corporate staff [VPs, CEOs, and general managers] could not 
regain trust in each other […] did not maintain a good [interpersonal] relationship […] how 
hard operating staff tried to recover would not have really mattered” (Senior Project Manager, 
supplier, case 3).  
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 Such realignment of expectations between the executive staff “[…] set the tone for the 
following trust repair [competence]” (Vice president, Buyer, Case 3). To begin with, “AE had 
replaced many staff from their production lines […] also changed a lot of R&D engineers […] 
AE recruited a specialised team just for AC” (Deputy Executive Officer, buyer, case 3). The 
removal of boundary spanners facilitated the transition phase, because this required frequent 
communication and interaction between operating staff in the dyad. The former boundary 
spanners would have borne the shadow of the past and possibly obstructed the coordination 
and collaboration with their counterparts.  
 With the foundation of the repaired goodwill trust between executive staff, other 
corporate (VPs and directors in different departments) and operating staff from both AE and 
AC began to finalise terms and conditions agreed as well as implement necessary tasks. In this 
phase, AE aimed to overtake ME’s order regarding AC’s netbook in the next RFQ. Hence, AE 
had started building and sending mock-up samples (MUS hereafter) to AC to showcase that 
they could match and exceed the quality of the competitor at a cheaper cost. Over time, “AE 
had made some MUS for AC’s reference […] persuaded AC that the MUS could leverage the 
current product offerings, because the cost was, in fact, lower with a reasonable performance” 
(Senior Project Manager, supplier, case 3). AE was willing to invest resources in 
manufacturing multiple MUS at their own cost that did not guarantee any future orders (the 
cost of MUS development was paid by AC in the past). Hence, “in order to recover the 
relationship, showcase our competence, and snatch orders from ME, we had invested a lot of 
resources to build these MUS with the corporate staff’s approval” (Senior Project Manager, 
supplier, case 3). In response to this, AC, however, did not believe that AE’s competence could 
be improved rapidly due to the failures across various domains: “[MUS provision] did not 
change our perception on their competence. We assessed the competence based on the whole 
system, not samples. These samples did not mean that you could mass produce them” (Deputy 
Executive Officer, buyer, case 3). 
 Alongside the MUS development, AE had “engaged in a full-range reflection on our 
service provision and product offerings […] we came up with a so-called strategic 
improvement direction” (Executive Vice President, supplier, case 3), which was driven by its 
R&D department. Then, “[AE] came up with action plans with detailed solutions to each issue. 
After we had managed to solve those issues within R&D […] we then leveraged the change to 
other departments” (Senior Project Manager, supplier, case 3). AE had striven to recover the 
perception of incompetence across departments within six months. In particular, AE knew that 
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AC’s upcoming RFQ on their netbook would emphasise the cost very much due to the success 
of the 1st generation. Whilst AE finally “developed a model that AC found attractive in terms 
of the performance and cost” (Executive Vice President, supplier, case 3), the latter was still 
in doubt about the former’s competence in manufacturing netbooks.  
 AE had continuously been sending new MUS to AC with a performance benchmark 
(targeted at their key competitor, ME). Thus, AC decided to place a small number of trial 
orders with AE initially and gradually increased the volume, as “AC was satisfied with the 
quality of the products. […] they first placed 10 more tooling units before proceeding to the 
MP stage. One or two months after MP, AC found that those models had demonstrated a great 
market penetration. They had then kept adding the volume gradually” (Executive Vice 
President, supplier, case 3). In addition to this, at that time, AC had already fallen behind its 
competitor, ASUS, regarding the development of a new netbook. With AE’s full support, AC 
had caught up with the competition, for “AE had managed to recover the progress and delivery 
schedule for AC […] within a very short timeframe. […] allowed AC to catch up in terms of 
the volume” (Field Application Engineer, supplier, case 3). 
 Then, AC’s perceived that the competence in AE, on the whole, had been repaired to 
some extent. Specifically, the strong comeback of the netbook business unit had leveraged 
AE’s laptop business unit in terms of technical capabilities. In other words, “[…] the 
competence trust repair had been driven by the great performance of netbooks, which seemed 
to overshadow the previous violations that occurred in our laptop business unit” (Executive 
Vice President, supplier, case 3). This effect of competence leverage was, in fact, closely 
associated with the growing market, for “[…] since the market was still there, it all came down 
to the product design and quality. You could still regain the lead […] by presenting competitive 
offerings […] if you did not have new products to compete with or to secure the share of the 
market, it would not be possible” (Executive Vice President, supplier, case 3).  
 This leveraging effect had not only had an effect on competence trust, but also, goodwill 
trust, as perceived by AC, because AC it felt that “[…] AE had been very sincere and bona 
fide in terms of the reparative efforts and they had also demonstrated willingness to receive 
future orders from us. [..] AE did make some commitment. During the repair process, their 
GM was so focused and concentrated” (Vice President, buyer, case 3). Similarly, this was 
reflected in the increase of the exchange volume, for which “AC became our largest customer, 
while we were AC’s largest supplier […] the relationship [goodwill in particular] had 
gradually been repaired as the business had already expanded” (Executive Vice President, 
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supplier, case 3). That is, as the output of the zero-sum game increased and ‘the sharing of 
goodwill’ also did so. 
 AC concurred that “we witnessed that AE had gone through a huge transformation. This 
full-scale improvement in the product, manufacturing procedures, and management, had led 
to their receiving subsequent orders from Apple regarding panel manufacturing” (Vice 
President, buyer, case 3). Together with the success of the netbook in the market, AC’s 
competence and goodwill trust in AE had been noticeably repaired. The repair of AC’s 
competence trust in AE led to a receipt of orders of its 2nd generation netbooks. The resulting 
strong market performance, in turn, fostered the repair of AC’s goodwill trust. This upward 
spiral continued as the both parties intended to catch up with the market, whereby “AC’s boss 
thought we could place more orders with AE [to strike while the iron is hot]” (Deputy 
Executive Officer, buyer, case 3). Thus, AC had given AE more profitable orders including 
15” laptops and projects with a large volume. Likewise, AE concurred that “the both parties 
wanted to catch up with the market […] both parties had in fact taken a lot of risks, a lot of 
risks” (Executive Vice President, supplier, case 3). In fact, the risk-taking behaviour had 
finally paid off as “AE had successfully fulfilled all of AC’s business goals and recovered the 
relationship in 2010-2011. […] it was the first and only time AE exceeded QT in terms of the 
market share. Because of the success of the netbooks, AC had gained significant global 
recognition […] ranked as the second top laptop manufacturer worldwide. The relationship 
had reached a peak, rising from the bottom” (Executive Vice President, supplier, case 3). 
 To summarise, AC’s perceived goodwill trust, by the general manager and CEO, in 
particular, had been repaired initially, because of significant operational and strategic 
arrangements being agreed by AE’s general manager. The financial sacrifice directly 
transferred AE’s profits to AC’s, which signalled the former’s goodwill to the latter. The 
financial sacrifice made by AE was perceived by AC to be a sign of concern and care towards 
their interests. After the expectation between AC and AE was realigned, corporate and 
operating staff had begun to finalise the terms and conditions and implement the agreed tasks. 
In parallel, not only had AE engaged in full-scale internal quality overhaul, for they had also 
constantly sent improved mock-up samples at their own cost to AC in an attempt to showcase 
its competence over its competitor, ME. Approximately six months later, AC was finally 
willing to adopt AE’s sample experimentally. The trial run was successful and AC’s perceived 
competence trust in AE had been recovered. Thus, AC had been officially awarded the RFQ 
of the 2nd generation netbook to AE. This project had yielded exceptional market performance, 
148 
 
which had leveraged to AC and AE’s other business units (e.g. laptop business unit), resulting 
in a positive spiral. The joint success had, in turn, elevated AC’s perceived goodwill trust in 
AE. It manifested itself in the exchange volume between AC and AE, for which “AC accounted 
for over 70 to 80% of AE’s overall volume” (Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 3). AE 
concurred that “the exchange volume exceeded $5.6 billion per quarter. At the peak, the total 
sales had reached up to $11 – 14 billion per quarter” (Executive Vice President, supplier, case 
3).   
 
4.3.8 The post-repair stage  
Competence trust: downward recalibration  
After the process of trust repair, AC’s perceived competence trust in AE was not as high as in 
the pre-transgression stage, because it admitted that “[…] we cannot judge technical 
improvement from a single angle, but through a multidimensional lens […] AE had still 
behaved reactively rather than proactively. […] we still needed to instruct and command them 
before they would respond” (Vice President, buyer, case 3). This means that despite AE’s 
reparative efforts that signalled capability overhaul, AC did not perceive AE’s reparative 
responses fully addressed the multifaceted violated domains. Likewise, there had been a 
mismatch between AC’s operating and corporate staff regarding AE’s competence: “Our 
corporate staff might view AE as all-encompassing and could solve their important demands 
[price and time to market in particular] […] from the engineering and operating perspective, 
but we felt that whatever and whenever we asked them to review, they did not give us 
satisfactory results” (Senior R&D Engineer, buyer, case 3). AE had only demonstrated 
competence in particular domains, but not all. For instance, AE only displayed their full 
competence in the most lucrative projects in RFQs to secure new orders. Thus, the prolonged 
exchange in the repair process taught AC one thing that, “we [AC] should not give too many 
projects to AE (after the success of netbooks). If we gave them too many, their manpower and 
capabilities were just not ready […] could not coordinate effectively and internally” (Deputy 






Goodwill trust: upward recalibration  
Throughout the repair process, AC’s perceived goodwill trust in AE was slightly higher than 
during the pre-transgression phase. This could be attributed to the joint success in the market, 
the expansion of the total, as well as the significant compromise AE made to demonstrate the 
concern for AC under the shadow of the future, i.e. increasing the ratio AC had of that total. 
Thus, AC perceived that “[…] the relationship was better in the post-repair stage than the 
pre-transgression stage. […] goodwill trust seemed to be fully repaired” (Vice President, 
buyer, case 3). This means that not only had AC enjoyed an expansion of profits, for it had 
also appropriated a greater share from the business growth. The trust violation and repair 
process had radically changed the buyer-supplier relationship in terms of profit distribution, 
additional contractual terms as well as conditions that constrained AE’s future profitability 
and operations. Thus, as AE became more dependent on and vulnerable to AC, the latter’s 
goodwill trust in the former inherently increased. Apart from the narrative data collected from 
both parties, the secondary data below can clearly substantiate the effect of trust violation and 
repair experienced by AC (Figure 4-4).  
 
 




4.4 CASE 4: BUYER (SC) – SUPPLIER (SM)  
4.4.1 Case background  
Buyer: SemiCon Inc. 
SemiCon Inc. (SC hereafter), established in 1998, is a Taiwan-based company that primarily 
engages in integrated circuit (IC) packaging and testing (mostly dynamic random-access 
memory) as well as turn-key services (modular production). The demand for memory chips is 
largely driven by four major products, namely smartphones, tablets, PCs, and servers. SC has 
over 3,000 employees with nearly $370 million in sales generated in 2014 (SC’s annual report, 
2014). SC is ranked the top three largest memory backend provider in the world (SC Company 
Website, accessed in 2018). 
 As an assembly and testing plant, SC relies heavily on orders from downstream 
companies, including Taiwan-based (Winbond, Nanya Technology), US-based (Micron 
Technology and SanDisk) and Japan-based companies (Toshiba). SC generated 29% of sales 
from the domestic market and 71% from overseas in 2014. In 2014 (when the first reported 
trust violation broke out), the former oligopoly firm, Elpida, claimed bankruptcy and was later 
acquired by Micron Technology. Since then, the market has been dominated by three mega-
first-tier memory companies worldwide, namely Samsung Electronics, Hynix, and Micron 
Technology (Chinatimes.com, 2015). Micron Technology (MT hereafter) has maintained 
close cooperation with Taiwan-based assembly firms (i.e. PTI, SC, and ChipMOS) since 2014 
to compete with Korea-based memory providers in terms of orders from Apple and other 
consumer electronics providers. In fact, most, if not all, assembly plants in Taiwan depend on 
MT’s orders to sustain growth.  
 
Supplier: SemiElectro Materials  
SemiElectro Materials Co., Ltd. (SM hereafter), established in 1970, is headquartered in Japan, 
with over 6,500 employees worldwide. It supplies a range of chemical- and electronic-related 
materials for the semiconductor industry, such as adhesives, epoxy molding compounds, 
wires, and substrates (SM Company Website). In 2004, SM realised the fastest growth rate of 
the Taiwanese semiconductor and electronics industry. It set up a subsidiary in Taiwan to take 
advantage of geographical proximity and thus, fulfil regional demand more efficiently. 
Notably, Taiwan has become the world’s largest market for semiconductor materials, 
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generating over $10 billion in sales in 2012 (Semi.org). The Taiwanese subsidiary is 
responsible for sales, import-and-export, production (a few product categories with small 
batch), and immediate customer support services. On the other hand, SM’s headquarters 
operates mass production for almost all product categories, conducts R&D and lab analysis as 
well as arranges deliveries. That is to say, the Taiwanese subsidiary handles regional financial 
exchanges and some front-line issues, while the Japanese headquarters supplies physical 
products and offers technical support (SM Company Website, accessed in 2018). 
 
Distributor: SS Holdings 
SS Holdings Co., Ltd (SH hereafter), established in 2007, is a Taiwan-based distributor that 
principally operates in franchising materials, components, and equipment (e.g. epoxy molding 
compounds, substrates, films, glues, lead frames, and wires) around the world (mostly 
Japanese and Korean suppliers) for the IC assembly and testing sector. SH, with about 40 
employees, manages to offer a competitive price, on-time delivery, and robust after-sales 
services (SH Company Website, assessed in 2018). “In 2012, SH was appointed [by SM] as 
an official agent to manage product exchanges with SC” (Associate Vice President, distributor, 
case 4). Notably, several corporate staff from SH used to hold VP positions with various well-
known IC assembly firms. Thus, some of “the corporate staff still maintain a good personal 
relationship with industrial partners, especially at the corporate level” (Sales Engineer 2, 
distributor, case 4).  
 This is a triadic relationship involving a supplier (SM), distributor (SH), and a buyer 
(SC) in terms of the supply chain configuration. Yet, this relationship can be ultimately seen 
as a buyer-supplier one, because “SC places its orders and negotiates its prices directly with 
SM rather than through SH” and “SM also arranges its shipment deliveries directly to SC’s 
warehouses” (Sales Engineer 1, distributor, case 4). In this relationship, SH solely serves as a 
bridge to facilitate communication between SM and SC (e.g. updating SM’s R&D progress, 
conveying the yield rate of SC’s production lines regarding particular materials, and presenting 
a regular technical roadmap) as well as providing after-sales support (e.g. carrying out initial 
problem diagnosis, explaining the cause of operational difficulties, and conveying 
improvement action plans). That is, “SH can be seen as the extension of SM’s sales team and 
the extension of SC’s procurement division” (Associate Vice President, distributor, case 4). 
SH, in this particular case, is regarded as a knowledgeable observer and a reliable source that 
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witnesses the trust repair process between SM and SC. SH’s opinions in this buyer-supplier 
relationship are significantly valued.  
 Regarding the dyadic relationship, SC is situated downstream of the IC supply chain 
(Figure 4-5). The owner of a wafer (i.e. integrated device manufacturer and IC design house) 
entrusts SC to assemble and test it or sometimes package it into finished goods. Then, SC 
returns the processed wafer back to its owner. Wafer outputs and dies per wafer are key 
performance indicators (Semi.org). In the packaging sector where SC operates, the three most 
critical components (i.e. die attached film, substrate, and epoxy molding compound) are 
mainly supplied by SM as it is considered to be the leading supplier for semiconductor-use 
materials (slightly ahead of Sumitomo Bakelite and Nitto Denko) (Semi.org). Hence, SM is 
viewed as a very critical supplier to SC. This case centres on the exchange of die attached 
films between SC and SM.  
 
 
Figure 4 - 5. The supply chain for the semiconductor sector (Source: the researcher) 
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4.4.2 Overview of the case  
This subsection provides an overview of the dynamics between competence and goodwill trust in the trust violation and repair stages (Figure 4-6).  
 
Figure 4 - 6. A graphical illustration of the complete episodes of the trust and repair process for case 4 (buyer’s perspective) 
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4.4.3 The pre-transgression stage  
The subsection describes the relationship characteristics between SM and SC before the trust 
violation (Table 4-13). Relationship dependence, as perceived by the buyer, was high on the 
whole, because “[…] SM is the top 1 raw material supplier for die bonding tapes and related 
chemicals […] we depend on them more than they do on us” (Senior Purchasing Manager, 
buyer, case 4). Another industry-specific characteristic is that “[…] in the IC industry, films 
are binding materials. Once the parameters are set for a material, it is kind of impossible to 
change the material [over the product lifetime]” (R&D Engineer, buyer, case 4).  
 The inter-organisational relationship was characterised by high competence trust, 
because “[performance indicators] consist of different scores with respect to quality, delivery, 
cost, and service. […] SM is ranked as a grade A vendor [the best category among 
alternatives]” (R&D Engineer, buyer, case 4). Conversely, SM was perceived to possess 
moderate goodwill trust, because “over a decade of cooperation without any bad record, SM 
had demonstrated good credibility” (Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 4). Yet, such 
consistency of intention to collaborate was based upon good organisational integrity, rather 
than benevolence between the partners (Table 4-13). Last, SM and SC had been collaborating 


















High  “In the initial phase of our R&D, we have to carry 
out evaluation and trials of the first, second, third, 
and all other alternatives simultaneously. […] once 
you pick one that outperforms other materials, 
you’d just stick to it until MP. It is unlikely to change 
after the choice” (Senior Purchasing Manager, 




Low “Since SM is an international organisation, they 
mainly sell to Japanese buyers, followed by 
Taiwanese plants. […] SM approximately accounts 
for over 50% of SC’s EMC and DAF purchases” 
(Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 4) 
Structural 
commitment 
High  “…even if we wanted to change the material, we still 
need to report to our client. Our client may hold 
some concerns over the reliability and impact on the 
performance of the new material” (R&D Engineer, 
buyer, case 4) 
Competence trust High  “Their [SM] competence was well recognised. This 
belief had been enhanced over time as new products 
were developed and the manufacturing process was 




“To a certain extent, we have a cooperative 
relationship. Yet, I personally think this is just a 
normal relationship between a buyer and a supplier. 
That is it” (Production engineer, supplier, case 4) 
Prior relationship Long 12 years  
Table 4 - 13. Relationship characteristics (t0 - t1) 
 
4.4.4 The characteristics of the negative turning point  
The initial transgression that triggered the negative turning point was a functional failure 
relating to chip pickup. A newly developed die attached film (DAF) (M3) aiming to replace 
the existing DAF (M2) was applied on chips from SC’s downstream customer, Micron 
Technology (MT), after the specification presentation conducted by SM. After a few 
production runs, “[M3] had failed […] to solve issues from M2 […] caused a significant 
reduction in yield rate (40%) on the production line” (Sales Engineer 1, distributor, case 4). 
SC had to notify and compensate MT regarding the damage inflicted by its yield loss, 
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according to the contract. “The products in that batch […] had a very high unit price, over $20 
per die. That probably added up to $54,000” (Sales Engineer 2, distributor, case 4). Whilst 
SC’s senior purchasing manager claimed that “it was not a great loss because of the small 
volume. It was within our tolerable range”, SH’s Sales Engineer 2 suggested that “this issue 
required director-level staff to attend to it, which was considered to be quite senior for SC 
[indicating high severity]”.  
 SC intended to pass on the compensation charge to SM, because it held the latter fully 
accountable for the transgression. However, SM refused to pay regardless of multiple meetings 
and explained: “I told you that the batch was only a working sample. […] free samples (M3) 
rather than real purchases from you […] you should at least do some tests in-house. Your 
losses are not our business” (Associate Vice President, distributor, case 4). SM also added that 
“[…] we did mention to SC that the usage of the parameter (M3) should not be so different 
compared to the original one (M2) […] yet, I would suggest you not to apply it on your 
customers’ dies” (Sales Engineer 2, distributor, case 4).  
 SC did not accept this explanation and they felt that SM’s engineers had withheld 
information about the specifications and parameters in the presentation, whereby “SM did not 
explicitly highlight this change in the presentation […] we were unaware of this condition and 
supporting evidence about it” (Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 4). It was corroborated 
by SH that, “the engineer [SM] did not actively compare and contrast the detail and difference 
between the two datasheets [final version of M2 and M3]. That was where and why the 
misunderstanding occurred” (Sales Engineer 2, Distributor, Case 4). During the investigation, 
SC found that SM had actually modified the product formula without SC’s authorisation “[in 
an attempt] to solve our competitor’s problem simultaneously by applying an antistatic 
solution on the product SM agreed to offer us” (Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 4). 
 To summarise, the negative turning point triggered by the initial transgression, functional 
failure (that caused chips to crack when picked up), was of an internal locus and high 
controllability (Table 4-14). It was fundamentally caused by a mix of operating and corporate 
staff. The former were held accountable for a less than thorough spec presentation, while the 
latter were deemed responsible for SM’s attempt to solve SC and their competitor’s different 
technical issues at once (but it withheld such information in the presentation). Moreover, the 
transgression was first perceived as a competence-based violation, but with more information 
being acquired, SC attributed it to SM’s integrity. The severity of the transgression was 
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moderate, because it affected an important customer, despite there being tolerable financial 
compensation.  
 
Violation characteristics Descriptions 
Locus  Internal  1) SM did not explicitly and fully communicate M3’s 
technical specifications in the presentation.  
2) SM attempted to solve SC’s issue and that of their 
competitor in one run.  
Controllability  High The incident could have been controlled, if they [SM’s 
engineer and production manager] had strictly followed 
the protocol.  
Stability  Low “In the material modification process, the quality and 
parameters of DAF tended to improve over time” (General 
Manager, distributor, case 4)  
Severity Moderate  1) The pure financial loss of MT’s chips was over $54,000 
plus SC’s resources (e.g. equipment, people, time, and 
other materials).  
2) Director-level staff got involved, potentially because of 
the importance of the customer [MT].  
Hierarchy  Operating/ 
corporate 
level 
“[SM] engineer did not clarify the detail of the material. 
Their sales manager also thought this material might not 
be an issue, so he did not raise this specific detail the, 
considering the level of adjustments as not being 
significant” (Sales Engineer, distributor, case 4) 
Type Integrity  Initially thought as competence-based violation, but as 
more information became available, the cause shifted to 
being an integrity-based one. 
Table 4 - 14. Characteristics of the initial transgression 
 
4.4.5 The trust violation stage                  
This subsection describes the dynamics of the violation of competence and goodwill trust 
following the negative turning point. There were multiple transgressions that occurred in this 










Transgression 3 Transgression 
4 
Description  Functional 
failure that 
caused chips to 








M3b) offered by 





M3c) offered by 




Type Integrity  Competence  Competence Integrity  
Locus  Internal  Internal Internal Internal  
Severity  Moderate  Low  Moderate  High  
Table 4 - 15. An overview of the multiple transgressions in trust violation  
 
Goodwill trust 
When SC investigated the transgression, they then attributed the transgression to an integrity-
based violation, as “SM cannot change anything on the promised product, because it is 
regarded as a major change to us, rather than minor. […] would have a great impact on our 
parameter settings” (Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 4). The erosion of goodwill trust 
was not only caused by the broken promise of the specific product, but also, by a lack of 
concern over SC’s interests. As a result, SC’s goodwill trust in SM had been violated: “[…] 
SM failed to fulfil our expectation of informing and communicating product phenomena 
candidly and completely. This kind of behaviour was totally unacceptable” (Senior Purchasing 
Manager, buyer, case 4).  
 
Competence trust 
Following the transgression, SM promised to work on an improvement action plan to solve 
the chip pick-up issue. However, it failed to deliver the solution after three consecutive updates 
(M3a, M3b, and M3c) of the DAF formula. Not only did “every update lead to different 
technical issues” (R&D Engineer, buyer, case 4), for these unsuccessful reparative attempts 
spanned from the operating level to corporate level in that it “[…] had involved many mistakes 
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and errors, not just technical but also managerial, thus many senior staff were involved […] 
in solving the issue” (Sales Engineer 2, distributor, case 4).  
 
Goodwill trust 
These unsuccessful updates came with a cost. “[SC] had wasted a lot of resources, including 
human, materials, time, and equipment” (Senior R&D Engineer, buyer, case 4). SC’s goodwill 
trust had been eroded, because it perceived that SM was capable of solving the issue quickly, 
but had chosen not to. SC realised that “SM is not nobody, they are almost the largest IC 
material supplier in the world. If they cannot solve your problem, how can you expect this 
from other smaller firms” (General Manager, distributor, case 4). Such reputational status 
posed a constraint for further competence trust erosion. That is, SC’s doubting SM’s 
competence had gradually shifted to their goodwill, for it perceived that “[SM’s] support was 
not active and doubted [SM’s] sincerity in solving the issue” (Production Engineer, supplier, 
case 4). SC knew SM was more than capable and resourceful enough to solve the issue in a 
short period of time.  
 The tension had escalated from the operating level to the corporate level, for “both 
parties’ operating staff had continuously engaged in discussions, but no substantive progress 
was made [because they did not have the authority required to drive compromises or 
breakthroughs]. The situation had rather amplified” (Sales Engineer 1, distributor, case 4). As 
a result, SC had become increasingly frustrated, as illustrated by: “With SM’s multiple updated 
samples, many of those just didn’t work. […] would you be upset?” (Senior R&D Engineer, 
Buyer, Case 4). SC’s goodwill trust in SM had been further eroded, because the trust violation 
had caused a significant damage to its reputation in the eyes of MT. It should be noted that the 
compensation claim from MT regarding the initial transgression, $54,000 direct financial loss, 
was in no way comparable to the reputational damage to SC and subsequent immeasurable 
loss with respect to its strategic arrangements, as “[…] It had delayed our production […] we 
could not meet MT’s delivery time” (Senior R&D Engineer, buyer, case 4).  
 The following subsection identifies some factors affecting the trust violation stage from 






Domain specificity  
With case 4, the violation of competence trust had been contained, because these failed updates 
were perceived to fall within a single domain of competence (the same product category). 
Specifically, SC perceived that “[…] the issue was not about our distrust in SH or SM [as a 
whole], this distrust was in fact placed on the R&D and manufacturing process of making/ 
updating this material. […] the process of devising the material was sloppy” (Senior 
Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 4). Hence, domain-specific transgressions seemed to 
constrain the erosion of competence trust.  
 
Market dominance 
SC’s reputational status posed a constraint for further competence trust erosion. That is, SC’s 
doubting SM’s perceived competence had gradually shifted to its perceived goodwill, whereby 
the former believed that “[SM’s] support was not active and doubted [SM’s] sincerity in 
solving the issue” (Production Engineer, supplier, case 4). 
 
Perceptual asymmetry: conflict of interests 
It can be seen that not only did SC doubt SM’s competence and goodwill trust, but “[SM’s] 
R&D also suspected the quality and condition of SC’s evaluation […] because the engineering 
capability for [SC] belongs to a slightly below average band” (Production Engineer, supplier, 
case 4). The engineer continued that “[…] even if we offer them better products, these products 
may still fall short of their expectation. […] Assume you are in a kitchen, if your chef is lacking 
the capabilities required, even if I offer you the best ingredients, you cannot produce any 
decent dishes”. The perceptual divergence of each party’s competence and goodwill in the 




4.4.6 The characteristics of the positive turning point  
At this moment, the distributor SH took a very active role in aligning SM and SC’s 
expectations. Considering SC’s dependence structure and the shadow of the future, “[…] there 
is a huge difference between SC and PTI [1st tier packaging firm] since SC is a firm with fewer 
and limited resources […] if by chance SC offends a major material supplier, like SM, they 
may not receive any materials in the future” (General Manager, distributor, case 4). SC 
immediately removed the director in charge of the R&D department due to his lack of 
execution: “the former R&D director did not have good interpersonal connection with 
corporate staff in SM nor SH […] he could not motivate SM to solve SC’s issues effectively” 
(Sales Engineer, distributor, case 4). The newly appointed director intended to drive SM’s 
initiatives for continuous and efficient problem solving, so “[SC] drove the distributor SH to 
push SM since their corporate staff have a better interpersonal relationship with SM’s. […] 
we had to seek SH’s assistance to drive SM’s cooperation” (Senior R&D Engineer, buyer, case 
4). Such cost-benefit analysis was momentary, because SC clearly understood that they had 
not got many options. They could not stall (as the downstream customer was waiting) or exert 
their buying power due to the relationship dependence.  
 
4.4.7 The trust repair stage  
SH played a critical role in realigning the expectations (goodwill trust) between SM and SC 
by facilitating information sharing and operational arrangements. SC wanted to change SM’s 
perception that “[…] SM might think that we chose not to do anything because we did not want 
to change” (Senior R&D Engineer, buyer, case 4), thus signalling their intention to continue 
the collaboration. SH’s corporate staff conveyed SC’s positive intention to SM’s corporate 
staff as “they have pretty good personal bonds” (Production Engineer, supplier, case 4).  
 To SM, SH “[…] discussed possible consequences of the issue [not being solved 
quickly]” (General Manager, distributor, case 4), with a particular emphasis on the perception 
of MT. The general manager continued that, “since SM and SC still had to solve this, [they] 
cannot say that [they] want to give up unless they do not want to receive future orders [from 
MT]”. SH strived to convince SM and drove their motivation to repair, because it required SM 
to devote more engineering and managerial resources. “While this event [the violation] might 
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be 10-15 in order of organisational priority, far from the top of their tasks, our role is to 
change this priority” (General Manager, distributor, case 4).  
 To SC, “[SH] convinced SC with a range of benefits it might bring about […] the 
consequences of not complying with this update […] in a timely manner”. Moreover, SH also 
“[…] suggested SC should admit that they had failed MT’s products and just treat the 
compensation as a part of its learning costs” (General Manager, distributor, case 4). This 
action served as a sign of goodwill as perceived by SM. In addition, at this point when MT 
had doubts about SC and SM, “[SC and SM] didn’t want to highlight this issue at this critical 
moment, because none of the parties wanted MT to perceive them as being incapable 
suppliers” (General Manager, distributor, case 4). Hence, SH helped to channel the 
competitive ambience towards a more cooperative one through directing towards a common 
goal (to satisfy MT’s requirements). SC stated that, “‘it is harder to be cold and detached when 
you look someone in the eye’. No matter how frustrated and angry you are, you would still sit 
down and talk it over in a face-to-face situation. We had to find common ground before 
communicating the specifics based upon mutual cognitions and requirements” (R&D 
Engineer, buyer, case 4).  
 SM and SC both recognised that, “the situation could not get any better if the end 
customer [MT] is informed because they would, firstly, challenge SC’s manufacturing 
capabilities and secondly, suspect SM’s technical ability” (General Manager, distributor, case 
4). Thus, this direct and indirect pressure from MT had facilitated the trust repair process, 
which was reflected in a changing perception from the specific, the violation per se, to the 
general, the broader common goal of fulfilling MT’s requirements. That is, the ambience of 
competition had then shifted to cooperation, because “SM and SC were in the same boat and 
both agreed to improve the product with a joint effort for the successful MP” (Production 
Engineer, supplier, case 4). 
 In addition, during the repair process, SC “[…] had to ask the supplier [SM] to conduct 
analysis that they couldn’t carry out in their plant [because]. MT would definitely ask us to 
supply an experimental report of the phenomenon. At this point, the supplier and we were on 
the same team (interests were aligned), rather than opposing parties” (Senior R&D Engineer, 
buyer, case 4). This indicates that SC’s goodwill trust in SM had started to return, not only 
because SH had persuaded SM to work towards a common goal, but SH also guaranteed to SC 
that SM had good intentions. “SM had become more responsive” (R&D Engineer, buyer, case 
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4) and they promised that “[we] would carry out as many assessments as we can or anything 
that can be done [to fix the issue]” (Production Engineer, supplier, case 4). 
 After aligning expectations between corporate staff from SC and SM, these two parties 
reached a consensus of specific terms and conditions in which “the development process of the 
next sample (e.g. conditions and following tests) [should be conducted] in SM’s lab in Japan. 
[…] conducted experiments under tougher conditions. […] delivered the sample to SC for 
further tests in SC’s lab” (Sales Engineer 2, distributor, case 4). Meanwhile, SH played a 
technical assisting role to both parties. To SM, SH had collected the feedback of the parameters 
adopted by other packaging firms as a benchmark. Together with SH’s expertise in the IC 
assembly process, SH had facilitated the troubleshooting and provided possible solutions for 
SM’s R&D team.  
 To SC, SH had assisted SC in adapting to the material by communicating “critical 
technical transformations in the industry”; suggesting “[relevant] parameter modifications 
from other packaging firms”; and advising “SC to change resource allocation to speed the 
problem solving” (General Manager, distributor, case 4). Off the record, SH’s associate vice 
president had approached the engineers responsible for the case and “[took] those engineers 
in charge for dinner and [diverted] their attention away from focusing on this matter” during 
the development of the updated version of M3 (Associate Vice President, distributor, case 4). 
Eventually, “[…] the working sample was developed in Japan and passed all the tests in SC’s 
lab” (Sales Engineer 2, distributor, case 4). “After the proposal, M3d, the whole production 
was smooth and running. This material was completely useable […] and of better 
performance” (Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 4). Thus, SC’s competence trust in 
SM “[…] had started to recover at a faster pace” (Sales Engineer 2, distributor, case 4).  
 As the workable sample was developed, SH corporate staff advised SC’s R&D director 
to introduce M3 (the model of DAF) on new product lines from the R&D department to speed 
up the rate of adaption. After a few batches of trial runs, it had gradually officially been 
adopted by SC’s production lines. “The performance of M3 had shown an all-around 
improvement. The result was definitely better than M2” (Sales Engineer 1, distributor, case 4). 
Such effectiveness seemed to drive “[SC] to regain trust (goodwill) in SM […] since we had 
cooperated for long enough […] demonstrated good intention to solve the problem […] 
actually delivered the product” (Production Engineer, supplier, case 4). 
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 After a series of stable deliveries of M3 lasting almost a month, production was halted, 
because a defective appearance of the product [i.e. black lines on the surface of DAF] was 
discovered by SC. “[SC] were very worried about that […] wanted to shift back to M2. After 
the first incident, they were very afraid of any issues […] could not tolerate any more defects, 
especially before the MP phase” (Sales Engineer 2, distributor, case 4). The growing suspicion 
over the quality of DAF by SM also halted the repair of competence trust. In response to this, 
SM worked closely with its subcontractor and corrected the formula over a short period. After 
that, SM was able to restore consistent supply. At this point, SH “[…] suggested SM to tighten 
their quality assurance and quality control […] to look into details […] to prevent any 
recurrence” (General Manager, distributor, case 4). SH also urged SC to speed up the 
replacement process. As a result, SC’s director of R&D department had begun close 
collaboration with the production department to speed up the process of product replacement 
after this minor disruption. In concert with the production department, M3 was gradually 
introduced to replace all of SC’s existing product categories on the production lines. “The 
competence was somewhat recovered, which manifested itself in an increasing exchange 
volume [of M3]” (Sales Engineer 1, distributor, case 4). In particular, “SM had become our 
major supplier with respect to the DAF product category” (Senior Purchasing Manager, 
Distributor, Case 4). 
 Over a series of constant communication and operational adjustments of the trust repair 
process, SC perceived that “the material modification is unlikely to be achieved in one step, 
but rather, is an iterative process of trial-and-error between the two parties” (Senior R&D 
Engineer, buyer, case 4). He continued that, “the overall trust was 80 initially after SM 
successfully devised M3d. Following that, the quality had been quite stable [except the 
appearance issue, which fortunately was proven to be harmless to the yield]. They had been 
very supportive and responsive in terms of subsequent problem solving and interaction […] 
with a positive attitude”. Furthermore, “the yield rate did improve a lot, so the relationship [a 
mix of competence and goodwill trust] could be recovered efficiently” (Sales Engineer 2, 
distributor, case 4). It can be seen that competence and goodwill had been reinforcing each 
other (positive spiral) in this phase. 
 It should be noted that the shadow of the past buffered the dyad, as SC perceived that 
after “more than 10 years of collaboration, we could not just replace them because ‘far water 
does not put out a near fire’. A new partner may not work/match better than SM. You still have 
to experience another unknown phase-in period” (Purchasing Agent, buyer, case 4). In 
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addition to this, SC proposed that “since you had experienced a setback, you’d expect that the 
worst thing that could happen is just like this” (R&D Engineer, buyer, case 4). The trust repair 
process alleviated the magnitude of negative expectancy in the future.  
 To summarise, competence trust had been repaired, because SM initiated reparative 
responses, according to the prior agreements and eventually, developed a workable solution 
(M3). SH advised SC to incorporate M3 into new products. The enhanced performance not 
only boosted competence trust, but it also showed that the good intentions of SM had finally 
paid off, thereby repairing goodwill trust. Despite a short halt in production due to the 
abnormal appearance, SC’s competence had been further repaired by the facilitation of SH, 
cross-functional collaboration within SC, and an increased volume of quality materials.  
 
4.4.8 The post-repair stage  
Competence trust: near restoration  
After the trust repair process, whilst competence seemed to have been repaired significantly 
due to the consistent supply of quality products and the subsequent strong technical support 
from SM, SC still possessed some doubts about SM’s ability regarding new product 
development and reliability (of new products). That is, “competence trust was not completely 
repaired (at least slightly lower than the pre-transgression phase), because SC had been 
harmed” (Sales Engineer 1, distributor, case 4). Further observations regarding SC’s post-
repair competence trust in SM revealed that it had become more “alert and vigilant to any 
variations in the yield rate of their production lines” (Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 
4). In particular, “such vigilance is reflected in potential increases in the number of verification 
tests conducted and the criteria involved” (Senior R&D Engineer, buyer, case 4).  
 
Goodwill trust: downward recalibration 
SC’s goodwill trust in SM “[…] had only repaired up to 70 – 80%” (Senior R&D Engineer, 
buyer, case 4). One factor could be that the trust violation and repair had reinforced the belief 
that a concern over DAF reliability was not entirely attributed to SM’s competence, for it was 
partly deemed to be due to the limited capabilities and resources SM spared to fulfil SC’s 
requirements. Thus, “SC became more cautious and careful. They would not trust SM’s 
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products unconditionally” (Sales Engineer 1, distributor, case 4). Another important 
explanation is that “SM’s technical capability might have improved, but their goodwill was 
only recovered by 80%, since it did harm SC’s financial welfare across the year 2015” (Sales 
Engineer 2, distributor, case 4). The whole trust repair process indirectly affected the trust 
(competence) MT placed in SC. After the incident, “[…] many product categories running 
between MT and SC […] that could originally be produced had been pended” (Sales Engineer 
1, distributor, case 4). He continued that “it had been a tough year for SC. This disruption was, 
in fact, the most severe error between SC and SM” (Table 4-16). Hence, “the mode of 
collaboration might have been somewhat adjusted. It required some time to recover the inter-
organisational relationship. It was unlikely that we would ‘hold hands and continue like 
nothing happened’” (Purchasing Agent, buyer, case 4). 
 
 2017 2016 2015 2014 
Sales/Revenue  $337 mil $313 mil $283 mil $358 mil 
Net Income $24 mil $15.7 mil $5.1 mil $31.3 mil 
Net Income Growth 52.27% 206.80% -83.61% 171.71% 




CHAPTER FIVE: CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS 
 
INTRODUCTION TO THE CHAPTER  
This chapter presents the cross-case analysis that identifies similarities and differences drawn 
from the within-case analysis. The chapter is structured into three sections with respect to 
different temporal orientation. That is, section 5.1 addresses the dynamics of trust violation 
and factors affecting the process. Next, section 5.2 elaborates upon the characteristics of the 
positive turning point. Last, section 5.3 explains the dynamics of trust repair in relation to 
goodwill and competence trust with corresponding factors identified from the case findings.   
 
5.1 THE DYNAMICS OF TRUST VIOLATION  
To address research question 1, the temporal orientation of the emergence, development, and 
escalation of a transgression(s) is unpacked with respect to the effect of violating competence 
and goodwill trust. The findings (Table 5-1, p. 174) have shown that a trust violation consists 
of multiple transgressions and corresponding ineffective reparative attempts. Specifically, 
trust violation from both cases 1 and 4 entailed four transgressions each, while that from case 
3 consisted of six, with case 2 involving two. More transgressions implied a longer trust 
violation stage, because each typically progressed through four phases identified in the within-
case analysis, namely discovery, resistance, intervention, and escalation.  
In the discovery phase, in order for an incident to be perceived as a transgression, it 
should be firstly detected by the buyer that an incident has signalled unmet expectations. The 
data have shown that transgressions tended to be discovered by operating staff from the 
production line and quality control units: “GN’s [the buyer] found defective items when 
conducting sampling inspection from our incoming quality control” (Project Manager, buyer, 
case 2). Similarly, “our engineers reported a low yield rate from the production line and 
temporarily halted the production” (Senior R&D Engineer, buyer, case 4). As objective and 
measurable specifications become available from operational and functional levels, the buyer 
then forms a tentative attribution of the cause of the transgression to the supplier. 
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 In the resistance phase, the buyer reports the transgression to the supplier and demands 
an explanation, solution, and penalties. Accordingly, “the buyer [SC] reached out to the 
supplier [SM] trying to understand what was going on […] SC also requested compensation 
from the supplier for the loss incurred” (Sales Engineer, distributor, case 4). However, the 
supplier did not simply accept what the buyer asked for, but rather, tended to gather 
information to reduce their culpability in an attempt to shift the root cause on to the buyer 
and/or external factors, at least partially. For example, in case 2, the supplier “explained that 
not only had IE experienced difficulties in the RoHS transition […] other PCB manufacturers 
were also struggling […] two peer firms shut down […] high uncertainty and limited 
knowledge about RoHS in the industry” (General Manager, supplier, case 2). Similarly, in case 
4, the supplier told the buyer that “we did mention that the parameter for M3 (die attached 
film material version 3) should be very similar to the previous version (M2). But we did clarify 
that this material was still in the trial run and I suggested for them to apply it on dummies 
first” (Sales Engineer 2, distributor, case 4). The disagreements caused resistance from the 
buyer and the supplier to verify and counter-verify the cause of the transgressions during the 
dyadic negotiation and interaction. The buyer then downgraded the supplier’s trustworthiness 
having now acquired the evidence substantiating the transgression. For example, in case 4, the 
buyer found out that the root cause was the unauthorised change made to the specification of 
the final product, because the supplier had “attempted to solve other customers’ technical 
issues together in one go without explicitly informing the buyer […] it is unacceptable” (Senior 
Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 4). 
 In the intervention phase, once the buyer and the supplier have agreed upon the cause of 
transgressions, the buyer and/or the supplier could intervene and obstruct the trust violation 
by initiating reparative attempts to contain and even repair the violated trust. The supplier may 
offer explanations and commit to paying compensation to demonstrate its trustworthiness and 
repentance. Besides which, the supplier could also deter future occurrences by strengthening 
its quality control and incorporating operational adjustments. For instance, “we [the supplier] 
had tried our best to match their [the supplier] requirements by tightening OQC and 
conducting post-production manual adjustments” (Sales Manager, supplier, case 1). 
 The case findings have revealed that there was always a ‘gap’ after each transgression 
between the dyad. To elaborate upon this, this finding suggests that there was inevitably a 
discrepancy between what the buyer expected regarding reparative attempts signalled by the 
supplier (the expected outcome) and what it actually received (the perceived outcome). For 
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example, Table 5-1 (p. 174) shows that most of the early transgressions were not effectively 
dealt with, because they were treated as day-to-day tasks, by which firms “handle many supply 
chain glitches and conflicts regarding delivery, quality, and price on a regular basis” (General 
Manager, buyer, case 2). This means, insufficient resources were invested in resolving early 
transgressions by both parties, for they tended to address these with standard responses (e.g. 
standard operating procedures specified in the contract).  
 As a result, across all cases, these standard responses could only effectively contain or 
eliminate the cause of the transgression (e.g. tightened QA/QC, the provision of compensation, 
and manual calibrations). Moreover, those ineffective and unsatisfied reparative attempts 
increased the probability of subsequent transgressions, because the causes remained latent (due 
to failed reparative responses), which could be reactivated by other transgressions in the future, 
thus resulting in severe complications. In addition, the increasing number of ineffective 
reparative attempts also “resulted in incremental time and resources over time” (General 
Manager, supplier, case 2), which led to “impatience and upset [of the buyer] about the 
supplier’s lack of initiatives” (Senior R&D Engineer, buyer, case 4).  
 In the escalation phase, after a series of transgressions with ineffective reparative 
attempts, this gradually resulted in the buyer’s goodwill and competence trust ebbing away, 
whilst the supplier became increasingly reticent to the demands put on it. Not only did the 
buyer increase its defensive mechanisms by, over time, applying stricter quality, delivery 
requirements and increasing penalties on the supplier, for the supplier also felt that the former 
was unreasonably exploiting their interests, which was putting a greater burden on its 
operations. For example, in case 1, the buyer adopted stricter inspection criteria and 
“demanded the supplier’s FAEs and QA staff come along with the delivery to the buyer’s 
factory, so that their staff could carry out on-site sorting and reworking, if any defect was 
spotted at IQC” (Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1), which significantly 
increased the supplier’s costs. That is to say, as the perceived gap became larger through a 
series of transgressions and reparative failures, this, over time, created a negative spiral that 
violated trust at a faster pace and eventually led to a deadlock.  
 Notably, the findings have shown that the transgression that causes a deadlock between 
the buyer and the supplier may well not be the most severe one, but “it served as the final 
straw that broke the camel’s back” (Senior Vice President, buyer, case 2). This implies that 
the process of how both parties managed the previous transgressions was to blame. In case 3, 
the final transgression, intentional order pending, was in fact caused by the buyer’s decision 
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to blacklist one of the supplier’s major suppliers from the previous transgression. Hence, the 
supplier’s production capacity was significantly lowered, thereby affecting subsequent 
deliveries. In cases 1 and 2, the supplier’s reparative attempts only partially constrained the 
root causes of transgressions through stricter QC and clear classification. Such reactive rather 
than prevention actions were not sufficiently robust to deter future transgressions and also, not 
sustainable due to unbearable cost. So, the supplier eventually caused idleness to the buyer’s 
production line, which resulted in delays to the downstream customers later on in the trust 
violation stage.  
 This subsection has elucidated upon the cumulative effect of transgressions and 
ineffective reparative attempts on trust violation. The following one explains the factors that 
affect the severity of trust violation. 
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 Case 1 (GT – GN)  Case 2 (IE – HE) Case 3 (AE – AC) Case 4 (SM – SC) 
Initial 
transgression  
Cause: missing tapping along with workstations that was 
discovered by the buyer’s IQC.  
Type: competence  
Locus: internal  
Severity: moderate  
Cause: a series of product contaminations on IE’s 
PCBs was reported by HE’s a downstream customer.  
Type: competence  
Locus: external  
Severity: low to moderate  
Cause: AE arbitrarily shifted engineering resources for AC to other AC 
competitors without authorisation. 
Type: integrity 
Locus: internal  
Severity: moderate 
Cause: SM made changes to the product without authorisation, which caused 
IC breakage to a whole batch of chips from SC’s downstream customer (MT).  
Type: integrity  
Locus: internal  




Response: GT tightened their OQC and IPQC; GT 
conducted manual adjustment after production.  
Outcomes: buyer’s expectation was not fully met, because 
the transgression had still reoccurred occasionally (non-
preventive).  
Response: IE explained the root cause; IE tightened up 
their quality control by adopting a new labelling 
system 
Outcome: HE’s expectation was not effectively 
fulfilled, because the responses were not preventive.  
Response: AE did not clearly explain and address the transgression.  
Outcome: AC did not accept the responses and complained vigorously.  
Response: SM refused to take the blame, but rather, accused SC of reckless 
adoption of the samples (as SM did recommend SC to test on dummies first); 
SM conducted root cause analysis; SM agreed to conduct an improvement 
action plan.  
Outcome: SC had argued constantly over compensation but did not get it. 
Transgression 
2 
Cause: the presence of iron filings on the surface of 
stamping components was discovered and cautioned by 
GN.  
Type: competence  
Locus: internal  
Severity: low  
Cause: incidents of PCB delamination and resulting 
delays caused to HE’s production.  
Type: competence  
Locus: internal  
Severity: moderate to high  
Cause: AC’s project was terminated prematurely after the mass production 
phase due to AE’s technical incapability of solving IC incompatibility.  
Type: competence  
Locus: internal  
Severity: high  
Cause: an updated material (M3a) was developed, which not only failed to 
solve the original issue, but also caused new issues. 
Type: competence  
Locus: internal  




Response: GT tightened their OQC by allocating more QA 
and QC staff at the end of the production process. 
Outcome: GT did not eliminate the cause but did 
effectively contain the issue. 
Response: compensation offered; root cause 
explained; proposal of permanent solutions offered.  
Outcome: HE turned down IE’s proposal, because of 
the concerns over costs and technical unfamiliarity  
Response: AE allocated 30% extra manpower to conduct technical support 
(root cause investigation), sorting, rework, and production; AE paid a large 
amount of compensation after a lengthy negotiation. 
Outcome: AC’s expectation was not met. 
Response: SM explained the root cause; SM agreed to develop a new sample 
shortly; SM suggested new parameters for SC to try. 
Outcome: SC thought that SM was not responsive and thought their 
development process was sloppy.  
Transgression 
3 
Cause: incidents of different surface issues (unevenness, 
bumping, and scratches) were discovered by GN.  
Type: competence  
Locus: internal  
Severity: low to moderate  
 Cause: incidents of battery explosion were reported by the user.  
Type: competence  
Locus: external  
Severity: low  
Cause: the updated material (M3b) was developed, which not only failed to 
solve the original issue, but also caused new ones. 
Type: competence  
Locus: internal 




Response: GT tightened their OQC by allocating more QA 
and QC staff at the end of the production process; GT put 
extra care into transportation and changed the carrier; GT 
attempted to adjust the tooling. 
Outcome: GN was not satisfied with the responses, because 
the issues still reoccurred. 
Response: AE explained with evidence that the issue was caused by 
misbehaviour of the end user. 
Outcome: AC’s expectation was not fulfilled, because it was not satisfied. 
And AC wanted to hold AE accountable.  
Response: SM showed technical reports and analysis to justify the 
manufacturing process; SM agreed to develop a new sample soon.  
Outcome: SC started to become impatient about SM’s solutions. 
Transgression 
4 
A request to terminate the exchange after all the tooling 
was invested at GN’s expense 
Type: integrity  
Locus: internal  
Severity: moderate  
Cause: incidents of capacitor explosion were reported by the user. AC 
accused AE of withholding a critical technical report from it.   
Type: competence and integrity  
Locus: internal  
Severity: moderate  
Cause: the updated material (M3c) was developed, which still did not fix the 
issue. At the same time, SC’s downstream customer (MT) was affected. 
Type: integrity  
Locus: internal  




 Response: AE explained that their capacitor supplier reported that the 
defective sample went missing; AE offered an extensive technical report 
and analysis to convince AC; AE widened the tolerance of its design; AE 
incorporated multiple foolproof stops in the production.  
Outcome: AC’s expectation was not fulfilled, because it was not willing to 




Cause: AC discovered that an agreed material applied on AE’s PCB 
fabrication was stolen  
Type: integrity  
Locus: internal  




Response: AE agreed to accept compensation of $20 million; AE set up 
interlock meeting; contractual terms and conditions were changed such that 
stricter requirements on AE’s transportation, packaging, and manufacturing 
process were imposed; AE added more checkpoints to design and 
production. 
Outcome: AC’s expectation was only partially fulfilled and it warned AE 




Cause: AC believed that AE had intentionally pended their orders  
Type: integrity  
Locus: internal  
Severity: moderate  
Table 5 - 1. A cross-case comparison of multiple transgressions and corresponding reparative attempts
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5.1.1 Factors driving the severity of trust violation 
From the data, four major factors that drive the severity of trust violation, namely supplier 
reactions, cross-domain failure, types of transgression, and their locus, have been identified 
(Table 5-2). The former two pertain to the overall transgressions in the trust violation stage, 
while the latter two refer to the initial transgression. The findings have also shown that the 
initial transgressions had a bearing on the overall dynamics of trust violation.  
 
Supplier reactions  
As elaborated upon in the previous subsection, a trust violation is inherently a process of 
multiple transgression and reparative attempts. Hence, the reactions signalled by the supplier 
largely determined the effect of reparative attempts. Whilst the findings have revealed that 
these attempts were often ineffective in nature, the suppliers from cases 1 and 2 demonstrated 
more proportionate reactions to resolve transgressions. For example, in case 2, the respondents 
noted that IE (the supplier) “had communicated fully with the buyer regarding any issues that 
HE was experiencing and would be experiencing […] IE discussed the disruptions openly with 
the buyer regarding what both parties should do about it” (General Manager, supplier, case 
2). Similarly, in case 1, the supplier “[…] spent more resources on fixing the issues […] but 
did not add any more costs to the buyer’s total manufacturing expenses” (General Manager, 
supplier, case 1).  
 In contrast, both cases 3 and 4 showed less proportionate reactions in the event of 
transgressions. That is, the suppliers did not invest similar effort in solving the transgressions, 
like with cases 1 and 2. For example, from case 3, a respondent noted: “we should have 
resolved transgressions with solid execution and actions, but we thought 70 – 80% efforts 
should be acceptable […] with our resource prioritisation” (Executive Vice President, 
supplier, case 3). Thus, the supplier had not satisfactorily met the buyer’s expectations, 
transgression after transgression. As the trust violation progressed, such ineffective reparative 






The severity of trust 
violation 
Transgression-specific factors Relationship-specific factors 




















Type of the 
initial 
transgression 
Locus of the 
initial 
transgression  






















1  Competence  External  Unilateral  4 Low 4 Low to 
moderate   
4 Growth 1 4 4 Low  4 
2 Low   4 High   2 Yes 1 2  
(competence, 
competence) 
1.5 Competence  External  Bilateral  1 Moderate  3 High   1 Static    2 1 2 Moderate  3 









6  Integrity Internal Bilateral  2 High 2 Moderat
e to high     
2 Decline 3 2 3 High  1 





2  Integrity Internal Unilateral  3 High 1 Low    3 Decline 4 3 1 Moderate 
to high  
2 
Table 5 - 2. A cross-case comparison of the effect of transgression- and relationship-specific factors on the severity of trust violation
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 It should be noted that the supplier reactions would not always be active and positive. In 
particular, they tended to wear off over time as the number of transgressions increased. As 
mentioned previously, there was always a gap between expected and received reparative 
attempts, which would accumulate and widen after each transgression and each ineffective 
reparative attempt. The buyer had gradually lost its positive perception of the supplier’s 
competence and goodwill, which translated into more restrictive and punitive clauses being 
imposed on it to protect its interests. As a result, the supplier tended to experience additional 
difficulties when striving to fulfil the buyer’s requirements. For example, in case 1, the 
supplier had eventually become overwhelmed by the buyer’s continually increasing quality 
requirements, which significantly drained its financial and operational resources: “over time 
this had become a huge burden to our operations and costs” (General Manager, supplier, case 
1). At a certain threshold, the relationship shifted from cooperative to competitive, because of 
perceptual asymmetry in which the buyer expected more and at the same time the supplier 
started to feel pain. This further exacerbated the supplier’s resistance.  
 In both cases 3 and 4, the supplier’s resistance to the buyer’s requirements was higher 
due to relationship dependence. For instance, in case 4, the supplier did not want to invest 
more resources to improve, because it suspected that the buyer did not spend the resources 
required to collaborate with the new formula. The supplier even suspected that the buyer was 
engaging in opportunism, as a respondent from SM noted: “[…] even if we offered them better 
products, these products may still fall short of their expectation. […] Assuming you are in a 
kitchen, if your chef is lacking capabilities required, even if I offer you the best ingredients, 
you cannot produce any decent dishes […] was it because of their lack of manufacturing 
capability, modifications to the parameters, or engagement of certain opportunism related to 
cost reduction? We were not sure” (Product Engineer, supplier, case 4). Hence, if the supplier 
reacted in a resistant manner, this was directly reflected in the quality of its following 
reparative attempts and exacerbated the severity of trust violation, thus pushing the 
relationship towards deadlock.  
 
Cross-domain failure  
With respect to the evidence of multiple transgressions, if these broke out across relatively 
different functions and departments, it could cause cross-domain failures. For example, in case 
2, the buyer had gradually come to doubt the supplier’s QC, QA, manufacturing process, 
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knowledge about RoHS, cost management, and supplier management in the trust violation 
stage. Likewise, case 3 displayed a similar pattern in which the buyer had, over time, 
discounted the supplier’s expertise in multiple domains, including procurement, technical 
design, the manufacturing process, lab certification as well as essential knowledge about ICs 
and frequency interference. The buyer escalated the trust violation after the affected domains 
had spread across different functions and business units (e.g. from commercial PCs to 
consumer laptops). In contrast to case 3, in case 1, transgressions were characterised by the 
homogenous nature in which most of them fell within product appearance issues, such as 
excessive iron filings, missing tapping, and surface deformation. In case 4, in spite of the 
occurrence of multiple transgressions, they took place for a single product category with a 
specific function (i.e. the development of die attached films).  
 The effect of cross-domain failures fundamentally threatened the value of buyer-supplier 
relationships, because they inherently indicate that the supplier is perceived to lack the ability 
to fulfil the buyer’s expectations across multiple operational functions. For example, in case 
3, the respondents noted: “AE [the supplier] had been shown to be incapable in the 
collaboration between R&D and production […] cost management and procurement issues” 
(Deputy Executive Officer, buyer, case 3) and “over six months from the initial transgression 
to the point that we had no reason to trust them and were about to quit” (Senior Vice President, 
buyer, case 3). Thus, the domain of the transgressions significantly predicted the severity of 
the trust violation.   
 
The type of the initial transgression 
The findings have shown that the type of the initial transgression had an effect on the dynamics 
of trust violation. Those from cases 1 and 2 were characterised by pure competence-based 
transgressions (i.e. missing tapping over workstations in the manufacturing process and 
product contamination caused by incomplete RoHS adaption), while those from cases 3 and 4 
were perceived to be largely integrity-based ones (i.e. unauthorised shift of engineering 
resources to other projects of the buyer’s competitors and unauthorised change to the 
specification of the agreed material) (Table 5-1).  
The data showed that transgressions tended to be initially attributed as competence-
based, because they needed to be discovered to have exerted a negative effect on performance 
through objective measures (e.g. yield rate, quality standard, and on time delivery). However, 
176 
 
some initially perceived competence-based transgressions were, over time, revised as being 
integrity-based ones, because more information became available when the buyer began to 
investigate the cause of the transgressions. That is, the findings revealed that integrity-based 
transgressions generally took more time to discover than competence-based ones, because 
those objective measures specified on the contract did not reveal anything about the supplier’s 
intentions, thereby making it more ambiguous and difficult to verify. When the buyer 
continued to investigate the cause further after the discovery phase, the supplier that engaged 
in integrity-based transgressions tended to withhold relevant information in the resistance 
phase to avoid being accused of acting opportunistically or deliberately wishing to harm the 
buyer.  
It should be noted that the supplier tended to justify the transgressions induced by it as 
being less severe and based on strategic arrangements. In case 3, the supplier claimed that the 
shift of engineering resources was a reasonable move, because the buyer had not been 
performing as well as other competitors in terms of order volume at the time. Hence, it thought 
that the reallocation of resources was a justifiable strategic decision even it meant certain 
compromises on the efficiency to fulfil the buyer’s needs. The Executive Vice President of the 
supplier argued that: “the total resources of a firm were limited […] AE [the supplier] could 
only optimise it in accordance with the buyer’s strategic importance”. Similar explanations 
can be drawn from case 4. In terms of the priority of conducting the material change, the 1st 
tier plant requirements took precedence over 2nd tier buyers. The purchasing volume 
determined why the supplier only allocated limited resources to the buyer, as one respondent 
noted: “the buyer had to find a way to adapt to the new material in the future no matter what 
[…] the supplier would not particularly care about the ‘feelings’ of a 2nd tier buyer [due to 
interdependence]” (Associate Vice President, distributor, case 4). The supplier and the 
distributor both agreed that the decision was made based purely on economies of scale to 
purposefully lower the supplier’s R&D and production costs. Thus, this calculative thinking 
seems to have prevailed regarding the supplier’s decision making, which overshadowed its 
concerns for the buyer’s interests. Consequently, the supplier’s strategic considerations and 
the resulting reduced resource allocation were held accountable as the causes of the integrity-
based transgressions that undermined the goodwill trust, as perceived by the buyer.  
 In terms of the severity of the type of transgressions, competence-based ones were 
perceived to be less severe compared to integrity-based ones, because initial competence-
based transgressions were likely to be treated as regular operational issues, which did not 
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engender intense perceptual distress. This is not only because the buyer encountered and dealt 
with supply chain disruptions on a regular basis, but also, because the buyer tended to be quite 
confident about its assessment of the supplier’s technical capabilities (via ex-ante and periodic 
surveys). Regarding which, the buyer tended not to question the fundamental ability of the 
supplier to fulfil the expected tasks: “we [the buyer] believed that the supplier had what it took 
to pass the transition from lead to lead-free production successfully based on the audit 
conducted prior to the transgression” (Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 2). This 
perception was reinforced, because the competence assessment on approving the supplier was 
so comprehensive: “it is quite difficult to be certified as our approved vendor […] need to pass 
12 operational dimensions […] generally took more than six months to audit” (Senior 
Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 3). This means that early transgressions associated with 
competence did not challenge the fundamental capability of the supplier as perceived by the 
buyer. The buyer tended to be more forgiving towards the transgressions and believed that the 
supplier would be capable enough to handle them (reparative attempts) efficiently and 
effectively.  
 In contrast, integrity-based transgressions were perceived to be an unwelcome surprise 
from the buyer’s perspective, whereby their unprecedented nature really shocked the buyer and it 
was unprepared for the more severe financial losses that accompanied the transgression. For 
example, in case 4, “SC [the buyer] at the time placed high trust in SH [the distributor] and 
SM [the supplier]” (Associated Vice President, distributor, case 4). As a consequence, the 
buyer demonstrated significant distress by expressing: “SM did not fulfil our expectation to 
inform and communicate technical specifications and the product phenomena candidly and 
fully. This kind of behaviour was totally unacceptable for a supplier in any business model” 
(Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 4). In addition, integrity-based transgressions are 
particularly more damaging to relationships with higher prior trust. They tended to exert more 
severe reactions: “you said that this sample would fix the issue and we trusted in you […] why 
did it fail after we applied it to the production?” (Sales Engineer 2, distributor, case 4) and 
“We were wondering why SM would make something that was totally not applicable to us […] 






The locus of the initial transgression 
The locus of transgressions essentially indicates which party is to blame for the negative 
outcome resulting from the transgression. Transgressions with an internal locus appear to be 
more severe than those with an external one. Across the four cases, the initial transgressions 
in both cases 1 and 2 were perceived to be of an external locus (Table 5-1). In case 1, the buyer 
admitted that the cause of the transgression was partially attributable to the early development 
of the product category. That is, since GPS navigators for automotive OEM had been in their 
burgeoning stage, not only did the buyer adopt a ‘learning by doing’ approach at that time, for 
it also wanted to reduce time-to-market, which resulted in several revisions and adjustments 
to the design specifications. Whilst in case 2, the cause of the initial transgression was 
attributed to the introduction of RoHS enacted by both downstream customers and the 
government, which was perceived as being somewhat external to the supplier. In contrast, in 
both cases 3 and 4, the cause of the initial transgressions was mainly perceived to be internal 
to the supplier. In case 3, the initial transgression was primarily induced by the supplier’s 
arbitrary shift of committed engineering resources. In case 4, the initial transgression was 
caused by the unauthorised technical changes made to the product, which were different from 
the specifications the supplier presented. 
The four factors identified above have been shown to affect the severity of the trust 
violation differentially. Specifically, these factors do not have an identical influence on 
competence and goodwill trust. In the next subsection, the differential effects of these factors 
on the two trust dimensions are presented.  
 
5.1.2 Factors driving differential effects of competence and goodwill trust violation  
The data suggest that the four transgression-specific factors (i.e. supplier reactions, cross-
domain failure, the type and the locus of the initial transgressions) violate/buffer competence 
or goodwill trust in specific ways. This subsection describes how these four factors affect the 











Relationship expectation  
Scale of collaboration 
Shadow of the past  
Supplier reaction     
Interdependence  Cross-domain failure    
Shadow of the past  The type of the initial 
transgression 
   
 The locus of the initial 
transgression 
   
Table 5 - 3. An overview of the factors that exert differential effects on competence and 
goodwill trust  
 
Supplier reactions  
Supplier reactions, manifesting themselves in the proportionality of reparative attempts during 
the trust violation, were found to affect the violation of goodwill trust. With less proportional 
reactions being afforded to reparative attempts, the gap tended to widen over time after every 
transgression and the corresponding unsatisfactory reparative attempt. This created a negative 
spiral, which increased costs and resources to both the buyer and the supplier as well as 
expanding operational loopholes due to ineffective and non-preventive reparative attempts. 
The negative spiral gradually reached a threshold, where the buyer and/or the supplier 
perceived ‘enough is enough’, when one or both parties were likely to give ‘last chance’ 
signals. This threshold is characterised by i) the intolerable operational difficulties faced by 
the supplier, where the buyer’s progressively heightened restrictive and punitive clauses (e.g. 
stricter delivery and quality criteria, constraints over the supplier’s suppliers, and increased 
penalties) posed a heavy burden to the supplier’s manufacturing and production, thus 
impairing its ability continuously to deliver at a satisfactory level; and ii) the losses 
experienced by the buyer after a series of transgressions and unsuccessful reparative attempts 
caused more rigorous reactions (e.g. reduced orders and switching suppliers). 
The perceived discrepancy is mutual, because the buyer expects the supplier to do more 
while the supplier starts to feel pain. As a result, the supplier began to discount and dispel the 
perceived value of the relationship by filing a request to quit (case 1), claim the need for 
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changes of materials to reduce its manufacturing burden (case 2), or reduce the capacity 
dedicated to the buyer (cases 3 and 4). Such counterbalancing reactions were perceived to 
harm the buyer’s goodwill trust, because they were targeted at transferring the buyer’s interests 
to the supplier (Table 5-4).  
 
Case Supplier reactions  Exemplary quote 
1 The supplier 
signalled intentions 
to quit  
“After the relationship had further deteriorated, GT 
suggested that if this was to be the case for future business, 
they would like to quit” (Director of Supplier Management, 
buyer, case 1) 
2  The supplier decided 
to transfer the costs 
to the buyer by filing 
a request of a 
material change  
“If we need to convert to lead-free production permanently, 
we simply need to adopt better materials in manufacturing 
[that would accommodate tougher manufacturing 
processes]. This means that it would be reflected in an 
increase in costs [the buyer had to bear]” (General 
Manager, supplier, case 2) 
3 The supplier became 
less responsive 
“[…] AE had been unresponsive and unwilling to make 
sacrifices compared to our other ODMs. […] after we 
imposed some punitive measures and raised stricter 
requirements on AE, their position was a bit tough. In fact, 
they were still unable to achieve our expected standards for 
guaranteeing future orders. But, compared with other 
ODMs, our bargaining power was relatively small with AE 
(due to dependence), so they continued to receive sizeable 
orders” (Senior R&D Engineer, buyer, case 3)  
4 The supplier 
gradually reduced 
resources allocated 
on the buyer 
“We [SM] believed SC might have engaged in opportunism, 
such as cost reduction or simply did not have the 
engineering capabilities necessary for the adaptation” 
(Product Engineer, supplier, case 4)  
“The supplier [SM] thought that the distributor [SH] should 
have stepped in, clarified the situation, and coordinated 
with the buyer [SC], because SM believed that SH should 
have maintained a good relationship with SC. SH should not 
have let SC constantly claim for a compensation and argue 
with SM. They were fed up with that” (General Manager, 
distributor, case 4)  







Cross-domain failures had an effect on competence trust violation. The findings suggest that 
transgressions that occurred in a single-domain were perceived to be less impactful on the 
buyer’s competence trust in the supplier. Such domain failures tended not to threaten the 
fundamental value of buyer-supplier relationships, which refers to the expectation of the 
supplier’s ability to fulfil the buyer’s requirements. This is because the supplier had other 
domains of competence to leverage the affected one. Thus, the buyer tended to be more 
forgiving, offering the supplier an opportunity to improve. For example, the buyer from case 
1 noted: “We reckoned that this supplier did have great technical know-how. The only doubt 
we had was in their process management and quality control […] if they were willing to do 
something, such as investment or improvement […] they’d really got what it takes to 
manufacture for us without any problems” (Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). 
Likewise, a respondent from case 4 suggested: “SM is, in fact, the number one supplier for 
semiconductor materials […] if they could not solve the technical issue [related to DAF], it 
was most likely other firms could not too” (General Manager, distributor, case 4). This could 
mean that the buyer had still exchanged many unaffected products and projects with the 
supplier, which significantly buffered the supplier’s overall competence.  
 In contrast, if transgressions had gradually extended from one domain to multiple ones, 
the buyer would seriously question the supplier’s overall competence and vacillate between 
keeping or quitting the relationship. For example, in case 2, the buyer “[…] was getting very 
nervous about whether the supplier could pull it off [RoHS] successfully” (General Manager, 
buyer, case 2) after multiple domains were affected and the buyer started to benchmark the 
performance of other alternatives available. Similarly, in case 3, the buyer “[…] spared some 
orders [that originally were given to AE] to their affiliated company, HC. […] because we 
could not trust [AE’s inability to fulfil AC’s expectations] them anymore and were about to 
quit” (Senior Vice President, buyer, case 3). 
 
The type of the initial transgressions 
The findings reveal that the type of the initial transgression had an effect on goodwill trust. 
Competence-based transgressions did not significantly affect it, because the transgressions 
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were attributed to the supplier’s capability rather than intentions to fulfil the buyer’s 
expectations. In contrast, integrity-based transgressions resulted in a significant goodwill trust 
violation, because these directly implied deficiencies in the supplier’s motives, characters, and 
intentions, thereby signalling that the supplier was not demonstrating genuine care for the 
buyer’s interests. In fact, it is more complicated than this given the different perspectives held 
by the buyer and the supplier.  
The data revealed that integrity-based transgressions are generally associated with higher 
severity (e.g. larger financial losses and reputational damages) and ambiguous evidence than 
competence-based ones. The suppliers tended to try their best to shift the blame to external 
actors (e.g. the buyer, upstream suppliers, or downstream customers) in order to avoid any 
penalties. Hence, the supplier intentionally brought ambiguity to the cause of transgressions. 
For example, in case 4, a respondent mentioned: “when engineers conducted failure modes 
and effects analysis, they would sometimes emphasise things that were not the root causes in 
an attempt to divert the buyer’s attention at certain critical moments […] it depends on how 
engineers presented and interpreted the analysis and how much the buyer would like to believe 
it. The engineering department sometimes does that” (General Manager, distributor, case 4). 
Likewise, in case 3, “the supplier [AE] shifted the blame of the cause [of the transgression] to 
their IC supplier, Tsinghua Unigroup, because ICs manufactured by it had been less stable 
[under-specification]” (Senior Vice President, buyer, case 3). 
From the buyer’s perspective, the buyer firmly believed that the existing contract would 
correctly identify competence-based violations, but not integrity-based ones and contained the 
losses within an acceptable level of severity. Thus, if a transgression caused significant 
reputational and financial damage, the buyer tended to hold the supplier’s goodwill 
accountable in the first place rather than purely doubting its competence (i.e. assumed 
integrity-based transgressions). For instance, in case 4, the buyer attributed the initial 
transgression to being integrity-based, because it believed that with the supplier’s competence 
(as being a market leader) such a sudden reduction to the yield rate caused by a product would 
be very rare. So, the buyer perceived that the fundamental cause of the violation should be 
with the supplier’s intentions. In sum, because of the ambiguous and high severity nature of 
integrity-based violations, the buyer is more likely to attribute the cause to the supplier’s 
goodwill.  
When the initial transgression was verified as an integrity-based transgression, the 
buyer’s suspicion regarding the supplier’s intentions tended to last and overshadow the 
183 
 
subsequent trust violation process. For instance, in case 3, after the initial integrity-based 
transgression, “we felt that the supplier had a tendency to shift engineering resources across 
projects, especially those competent engineers […] at the same time they seemed to perform 
quite well with our competitors, in terms of quality and costs […] so we knew that the supplier 
was not incompetent, but they were just not willing to place importance on our projects” 
(Senior Vice President, buyer, case 3). This meant that integrity-based transgressions 
convinced the buyer that the supplier might not be as willing to take care of its interests. Such 
blame of the supplier’s goodwill tended to have a lasting effect, as the buyer tended to attribute 
later competence-based transgressions to the supplier’s goodwill. This undermined goodwill 
trust, which in turn, mitigated the severity of competence trust violation.  
The reason why the type of the initial transgression did not have an obvious effect on 
competence trust is because this type is more sensitive than goodwill trust. That is, it is affected 
by any emerging disconfirming evidence of the supplier’s performance. This suggests that, 
integrity- and competence-based transgressions both lead to the violation of the competence 
trust of the buyer, while only integrity-based transgressions contribute to the violation of its 
goodwill trust.  
 
The locus of the initial transgressions 
The buyer tended not to hold the supplier’s intention accountable, if the initial transgressions 
were with an external locus. One with an external locus appeared to limit the buyer’s tendency 
to hold the supplier’s goodwill accountable during the trust violation stage, as happened in 
cases 1 and 2. In contrast, the buyers from cases 3 and 4 significantly lowered their goodwill 
trust placed on the supplier, because they attributed full culpability to the supplier. In case 2, 
the buyer’s “downstream customer actually understood the cause [of the transgression] when 
RoHS was firstly introduced” (Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 2). The external locus 
of the transgression not only avoided any concern about the supplier’s goodwill, but it also 
minimised the damage perceived by the buyer. Whereas in case 4, the buyer perceived that 
“SM did not fulfil our expectation of them to inform and communicate product phenomena 
candidly and fully. This kind of behaviour is totally unacceptable for a supplier in any business 
model” (Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 4). The internal locus of the transgression 
affected the supplier’s goodwill, whilst also engendering emotional distress.  
184 
 
It should be noted that the mitigating effect of the external locus tended to wear off over 
time, because the cause of transgressions could gradually change from the initial transgression 
per se to multiple ineffective reparative attempts. For example, in case 2, the buyer had still 
encountered related RoHS-induced transgressions (e.g. reduced yield rate and product 
contamination) as the enforcement of RoHS progressed and began to treat those transgressions 
as being of the internal locus (e.g. a lack of effort in devising effective reparative attempts by 
the supplier). 
 
A brief summary of this section 
Thus far, this section has delineated the process of how a series of transgressions and their 
corresponding reparative attempts construct the overall dynamics of a trust violation. The four 
factors that specifically shape the violation of competence and goodwill trust, respectively, 
have also been explained. The outcome of trust violation is deadlock of the inter-organisational 
relationship. The next section describes how the deadlock is resolved (i.e. the positive turning 
point) by prompting the initiation of effective reparative responses.  
  
5.2 POSITIVE TURNING POINT  
The case findings revealed that a positive turning point is actually a phase, rather than a point, 
starting from a deadlock resulting from a trust violation to the point where the buyer and/or 
supplier initiated reparative responses. For the sake of simplicity and coherence, the term, 
positive turning point, is still used in the following.  
 At the positive turning point, trust remained latent and constant at its lowest, because 
misaligned expectations and increased conflict of interests from the deadlock created both 
physical and mental separation between the buyer and the supplier. For instance, in case 3, the 
buyer “[…] cancelled all of the orders placed with AE, because it had accumulated three red 
flags [after causing a series of disruptions]. The buyer gave up assistance and guidance on 
devising solutions together with AE […] AE had to figure the issue(s) out itself […] the 
business was on the fringe” (Senior Vice President, buyer, case 3). Whilst such separation 
constrained both parties from engaging in any actions across organisational boundaries, it also 
allowed them to ‘cool down’ and to reconsider the value of the buyer-supplier relationship.   
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Case Buyer  Supplier Initiation 
1  Requirements from the downstream customer were yet to be fulfilled, 
because the product (automotive OEM) was still in its introduction phase. 
 The tooling created on an expense that the buyer had yet to pay back.  
 Other potent alternatives available would not be as cooperative as the 
current supplier. 
 The supplier wanted to leverage the buyer’s reputation to 
other customers (strategic value). 
Buyer led  
2  The buyer intended to seek other alternatives as backups, but many PCB 
manufacturers also struggled to comply with RoHS production and some 
were reported to engage in opportunism. 
 The supplier was afraid that they would go out of business 
owing to slow and failed technical adaptation.  
 The supplier could not let the buyer down because the 
latter accounted for over 70% of its overall sales.  
Supplier 
led  
3  The buyer transferred orders to its affiliated manufacturer, HC, but it did 
not have the capacity that the supplier did have.  
 The buyer decided to place orders for the new netbook with Quanta 
Computer, the supplier’s major competitor. 
 The supplier was really concerned that their major 
competitor took the new important project that should 
have been given to the supplier. This triggered business 
threatening mindset.  
Supplier 
led  
4  The buyer was under pressure from its downstream customer, Micron 
Technology. The downstream customer had gradually lost their patience.  
 The buyer was afraid that if it offended the supplier, it might not receive 
materials in the future.  
 The supplier took a ‘leave it or take it’ stance. Buyer led  
Table 5 - 5. An overview of the cost-benefit analysis 
186 
 
The findings suggested that this phase generally took between one to four weeks, during 
which both parties in the relationship undertook rational cost-benefit analysis (Table 5-5). The 
outcome of this would determine the level of motivation to repair the relationship or not. For 
example, in case 1, the buyer perceived that the multiple tooling created had not covered the 
manufacturing cost. The automotive OEM product was still in its introduction phase, such that 
the project was perceived as being less attractive to other alternative suppliers. This means 
that, even if the buyer acquired alternative suppliers, they would still not allocate the desired 
level of resources to the project. Thus, they might also encounter the same technical issues as 
the current supplier had. So, if the buyer had pursued this route it would probably have put in 
jeopardy its interests more than those of the supplier. Consequently, the buyer decided to 
initiate the contact with the supplier that signalled the beginning of the trust repair process. 
Similarly, in case 4, the supplier was the market leader, which accounted for a third of the 
overall market share in semiconductor materials and chemicals. The supplier was relatively 
passive in this phase, because “when the new material has been successfully implemented 
across other large IC assembly plants (e.g. PTI) […] while the buyer [SC] still has not 
successfully adapted to it. The downstream customer [MT] would just inform SC that, ‘well 
SC doesn’t want to cooperate, let’s just place its orders with PTI’” (General Manager, 
distributor, case 4). Thus, the buyer would have been affected more than the supplier, if the 
deadlock continued.  
In contrast, the deadlock threatened the survival of the business in both cases 2 and 3. 
Regarding which, in case 3, the supplier was extremely concerned about its diminishing 
market share that had been engulfed by its competitor. “At this point, the difference between 
AE and Mega Computer [ME] was huge in terms of market share. The proportion of our 
orders only accounted for less than 30% of AC’s total volume, while ME occupied over 60%” 
(Executive Vice President, supplier, case 3). A crisis mentality sprouted from the supplier, 
which in turn, reunited the interests from different departments. Thus, the supplier 
demonstrated a high degree of motivation to repair the buyer’s trust by engaging in exchanges.  
It should be noted that future gains (the shadow of the future) were weighed more heavily 
than the deterrence of past losses (e.g. relational investment) in the dyad’s cost-benefit 
analysis. For example, in case 4, despite experiencing a significant financial loss caused by 
the supplier, the buyer had still been motivated to initiate the contact with the supplier, because 
it perceived that it still expected to engage in frequent exchanges with the supplier, given it 
was the market leader. In case 3, it is evident that the supplier was more concerned about 
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possible future gains, because the buyer had successfully expanded into a new market segment 
(netbooks) with the help of the supplier’s major competitor. Thus, the past penalties and 
perceived exploitation were overshadowed by the buyer’s promising prospects. Similarly, in 
case 1, both the buyer and supplier emphasised the potential future gains. The buyer wanted 
to diversify its market portfolio into the automotive OEM market, while the supplier took the 
buyer’s project characterised by small-volume-large-variation only because of the latter’s 
future prospects.  
In addition to this, the case findings reveal that the severity of goodwill trust violation 
determined the length of the positive turning point. That is, this severity invariably implied 
how competitive the deadlock was characterised. The more interests being harmed by the trust 
violation, the more time the buyer and/or the supplier could rationally spend conducting a cost-
benefit analysis, because the parties were still caught up by those transgressions and attempted 
to get each and every account squared. For instance, in cases 3, at this point, there were still 
some penalties unresolved, because “we [the buyer] could not fulfil our agreed orders to our 
downstream customers. The incurred penalties would be passed onto AE […] so we withheld 
AE’s payment” (R&D Engineer, buyer, case 3). Such arguments and tension that arose through 
previous transgressions took time to cool down.  
During the positive turning point, the buyer and/or supplier had gradually shifted their 
focus from specific transgressions that occurred in the trust violation stage to the broader 
relationship. They began to revisit the reasons for and fundamental values of the relationship. 
It generated the momentum for the buyer and/or supplier to redirect the negative trajectory to 
a positive one, thus initiating the process of trust repair.   
 
 
5.3 THE DYNAMICS OF TRUST REPAIR  
This section elaborates upon the overall trajectory of the trust repair process across the four 
cases. It begins with basic descriptions of the trust repair stage, including the length and 
outcomes in comparison with trust violation stage (Table 5-6), followed by the general 
characteristics of the trust repair patterns identified in the within-case analysis.  
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Generally speaking, the data revealed that trust repair took longer than trust violation. 
That is, it took between four to twelve months to repair violated trust. In particular, the more 
severe the competence trust violation was (e.g. cross-domain failures), the longer period the 
dyad required to repair trust. The findings suggest that competence trust seemed to be more 
difficult to repair than goodwill trust. Moreover, the severity of a goodwill trust violation 
seemed not to have any connection to the length of trust repair. In fact, the length of trust repair 
was at least twice as long as the trust violation phase. As illustrated in the table below, cases 
1 and 2 took over four times longer for trust to repair than to violate, while for cases 3 and 4, 
this was two times. This provides clear evidence that inter-organisational trust is easier to 
violate than to repair.  
The data also showed that the two trust dimensions were repaired independently (and 
also interactively), with different reparative responses being enacted by the buyer and supplier. 
This means that competence and goodwill trust were repaired at a differential rate and across 
different time trajectories. For instance, in case 3, competence trust showed downward 
recalibration, while goodwill trust signalled upward recalibration. The findings reveal that in 
all cases, apart from case 1, competence and goodwill trust were repaired dissimilarly, 
resulting in differential outcomes of post-repair trust. According to the graphical illustration 
from the within-case analysis (Figures 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4), competence trust tended to be 
repaired steadily (less sensitive to reparative responses), while goodwill trust seems to have 
been repaired responsively (more sensitive to reparative responses). In addition to this, the 
data revealed that the trust repair process normally began with goodwill trust and then, 
competence trust. The next section explains the dynamics of goodwill trust repair.  
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trust repair (in 
months) 
The severity of 
competence trust 
violation   
Post-repair competence 
trust   
The severity of 
goodwill trust 
violation  
Post-repair goodwill trust 
1 1  1 5  2 Moderate 2 Upward 
recalibration  
2 Low  2 Upward recalibration 2 
2 1.5  2 6  3 High  3 Upward 
recalibration  
1 Low  1 Restoration   3 
3 6 4 12  4 High  4 Downward 
recalibration  
4 High  4 Upward recalibration   1 
4 2 3 4  1 Moderate  1 Restoration   3 High  3 Downward 
recalibration  
4 
Table 5 - 6. An overview of the trust repair outcomes [the figures in the right cells represent the relative position across the four cases; upward (or 
downward) recalibration indicates that post-repair trust was higher (or lower) than pre-transgression trust; restoration indicates that post-repair and 
pre-transgression trust remained the same]  
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The repair of goodwill trust  
As both parties overcame the burden of past transgressions and refocused on the relationship 
itself at the positive turning point, at this phase it was still characterised by a heightened 
conflict of interests and impaired profitability. Hence, the first step was to resolve the 
perceived deficiency of the relationship value. The case findings show that corporate staff 
from both parties expressed and clarified each other’s intentions and commitment, especially 
between senior staff. Then, the supplier tended to increase relationship-specific investment, in 
the forms of financial sacrifice and external investment. These reparative responses are 
explained in the following subsections.  
Why competence trust was not considered to be the focal repair object is for two reasons. 
First, the accumulation of the past transgressions and ineffective reparative attempts in the 
trust violation stage were gradually perceived as shifting from competence- to integrity-based 
transgressions by the buyer. This means that the buyer’s suspicion tended to emphasise the 
supplier’s willingness/intention to fulfil the buyer’s expectations rather than its capabilities to 
do so. Over time, the buyer was convinced that those transgressions and reparative attempts 
were in fact guided by corporate decisions by the supplier. Hence, without knowing the 
supplier’s intentions about future collaboration, the buyer did not stress the repair of the 
supplier’s competence, because “any improvement of the supplier’s competence was elusive 
and of short-term effect, which could not be sustained” (Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, 
case 3). Similarly, a respondent from case 1 mentioned that “if the supplier’s competence could 
be repaired all of the sudden, we would not be in this situation” (Project Manager, buyer, case 
1).  
Second, the data have shown that the repair of competence trust was inherently driven 
by the repair of goodwill trust, to a certain extent. It is evident that competence trust was 
captured based on objective measures from different domains and activities managed and 
conducted by the operating staff. That is, competence trust is associated with the performance 
of operation- and execution-oriented tasks. From the buyer’s perspective, reparative responses 
would not be effective in restoring the supplier’s competence unless they were driven by 
corporate staff: “[…] operating staff always need to be pushed by their corporate staff […] 
the implementation of improvement actions [targeting at competence] is driven by a top-down 




5.3.1 Reparative responses and factors driving goodwill trust repair 
The case findings revealed two reparative responses and two critical factors. Those responses 
were the expression of commitment and relationship-specific investment, while the factors 
pertained to senior management involvement and economic performance (Table 5-7).  
 
Expression of commitment  
The case findings showed that the buyer and the supplier’s corporate staff re-familiarised 
themselves with a few face-to-face meetings and expressed their intentions towards future 
collaboration. The buyer could also reiterate the potential advantages of overcoming the trust 
violation and/or threats of not repairing it in a timely manner with the supplier to motivate its 
reparative efforts. For instance, in case 1, the buyer clarified the supplier’s intentions of 
relationship continuity: “dear general manager Chen, what is your attitude towards GN? Do 
you value us very much? […] if you think GN is indispensable, we could just depart as early 
as possible […] if you think that we are an important customer of yours, you should 
demonstrate some initiatives” (Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). In addition, 
the buyer also reminded the supplier that “if you [GT] try harder to improve your quality and 
manufacturing process […] if you hang in there, even if you do not get it right in the beginning, 
you have still got the opportunity” (Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). The 
supplier’s general manager expressed how they viewed the buyer as an important customer 
and were willing to continue the relationship: “the request to quit was sent by our operating 
staff […] not a corporate decision […] promised to drive the operating staff’s cooperation” 
(General Manager, supplier, case 1). Both parties came to realise that there was a 
misunderstanding about the causes of the trust violation.  
In case 3, “the supplier’s general manager engaged in an under-table negotiation with 
the buyer’s general manager, because they were friends and they played golf occasionally” 
(Senior Vice President, buyer, case 3). The owner of the supplier leveraged the interpersonal 
relationship with the buyer to reinitiate negotiations, because it had halted all the orders placed 
with the supplier at the end of trust violation stage. The supplier demonstrated its sincerity and 
commitment to make up for the buyer’s losses. While in case 4, the expression of commitment 
was facilitated by the distributor, where the executive/corporate staff had a good interpersonal 
relationship with both the buyer and the supplier. The distributor helped the supplier to signal 
a willingness to prioritise R&D and to guarantee the supplier’s schedule. Conversely, the 
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distributor also convinced the buyer to absorb the losses and the compensation claim as 
learning costs to alleviate the tension. A respondent from the distributor noted: “if the buyer 
and the supplier terminated the relationship or reduced the purchasing volume, we 
[distributor] also would have lost our commissions from the business exchange […] did I have 
to be worried about this? Of course!” (General Manager, distributor, case 4). That is, the 
distributor was concerned about the potential and long-term losses to the dyad, if the deadlock 
continued. Both parties re-established a common goal that alleviated previously incompatible 
intentions and promoted collaborative effort to recover the downstream customer’s needs 





Case Buyer Supplier  Reparative responses Factors 
1  The buyer’s corporate staff contacted the supplier’s general 
manager to clarify directly the supplier’s intentions as to whether 
the supplier wanted to work together in the future.  
 The buyer encouraged the supplier to hold on and pictured the 
potential benefits, if the supplier overcame the quality issues.  
 The buyer placed new projects during the repair process owing to 
the market expansion.  
 The supplier’s general manager clarified that the request to quit was the decision of their 
senior operating staff, not a corporate one. 
 The supplier’s general manager signalled his goodwill and continuity intent.  
 The general manager promised to continue improving the quality as well as to motivate 
and drive their operating level collaboration.  
 The supplier transferred the VP from their more successful plant in China to conduct 
training on quality control and manufacturing processes.   
Expression of commitment; 
Relationship-specific 
investment (financial 






performance    
  
 
2  The buyer accepted incorporating an additional manufacturing 
procedure to accommodate the supplier’s adjustments. 
 The buyer maintained a positive and constructive attitude. 
 The supplier’s general manager arranged several meetings with the buyer’s general 
manager. 
 The supplier was willing to absorb the costs of material change and additional 
manufacturing procedures, if the buyer accepted incorporating one additional 
manufacturing procedure.   
 The supplier tailored the solution for the buyer. 
 The supplier constantly signalled care and encouraged the buyer to voice any concerns.   
 The supplier decided to relocate the factory and to recruit more QA engineers.  
Expression of commitment; 
Relationship specific 
investment (financial 




3  The buyer accepted the terms and conditions offered by the 
supplier. 
 The general manager passed the information to the CEO to 
announce the deal in a corporate meeting.  
 The buyer placed more orders across different products of the 
supplier during the repair process due to a significant growth in 
business.  
 The general manager of the supplier engaged in under-table arrangements with the general 
manager of the buyer in private and utilised the interpersonal attachment as leverage.  
 The supplier proposed financially favourable terms and conditions to the buyer (e.g. 
extended the payment days from 120 to 180; agreed to absorb transportation and insurance 
fees) 
 The supplier committed to establishing a factory in China and creating a service centre in 
Poland.  
Expression of commitment; 
Relationship specific 
investment (financial 




economic performance   
4  The buyer asked the distributor to clarify the supplier’s intentions 
and drive the latter’s collaboration. 
 The buyer decided to absorb the compensation claim.  
 The supplier signalled its willingness to allocate more resources to solve the issue as soon 
as possible. 





Table 5 - 7. An overview of the reparative responses and factors affecting the repair of goodwill trust 
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Relationship-specific investment  
The data revealed that relationship-specific investment entailed financial sacrifice and external 
investment. In terms of the financial aspect, for instance, in case 2, the supplier presented the 
buyer with a permanent solution, based on extensive lab testing, which could work without 
directly increasing its material cost; only requiring an indirect additional manufacturing 
procedure. The supplier was willing to “[…] absorb the cost associated with the material and 
additional manufacturing procedures” (General Manager, supplier, case 2). The proposal, in 
fact, dispelled the buyer’s initial concern regarding the potential increase to the direct cost. 
This act not only signalled the supplier’s commitment, for it also corroborated the buyer’s 
acceptable cost. Likewise, in case 4, the supplier provided a specific timeline, resources being 
committed, and also, detailed conditions for experimentation. The supplier’s willingness to 
prioritise resources for the smaller buyer was perceived to be an expression of its goodwill. 
Case 3, however, experienced a larger relationship-specific investment, which involved 
significant financial sacrifices and external investments. That is, the supplier’s general 
manager agreed to accept financially unfavourable terms and conditions on the firm in favour 
of the buyer (e.g. payment from 120 to 180 days) and promised to increase investment 
dedicated for it (e.g. building a new manufacturing centre and local service centres for the 
buyer). This essentially transferred the supplier’s interests to the buyer. Thus, the buyer’s 
goodwill trust was greatly repaired, in particular, because those sacrifices would come to 
restrict the supplier’s operational flexibility: “the supplier’s general manager came up with 
very financially attractive terms and conditions for us” (Senior Vice President, buyer, case 3). 
Hence, the buyer would have more control over the supplier in the future: “in the past, the 
supplier had more bargaining power […] now we have imposed stricter requirements and 
control on the supplier” (Deputy Executive Officer, buyer, case 3). This then convinced the 
buyer that the supplier would require putting more effort into fulfilling the former’s 
requirements in order to make up for the losses.  
 The two factors affecting the effect of goodwill trust repair were senior management 
involvement and economic performance. The former was particularly effective in the early 
phase of the goodwill trust repair, while the latter tended to repair goodwill trust further in the 





Senior management involvement  
Senior management involvement was key to the repair of goodwill trust. A respondent from 
case 1 mentioned: “[…] their boss has to express this kind of attitude to their staff [regardless 
of the customer’s size, volume, and importance, customers are customers. They are all 
important to us] through a top-down approach onto their operating staff. To be frank, their 
operating staff always need to be pushed by their corporate staff” (Director of Supplier 
Management, buyer, case 1). 
 It is critical to realign the expectations of the corporate level staff between the buyer and 
the supplier to set the tone for the follow-up repair of competence trust. Across all cases (case 
4 being facilitated by the third-party distributor), it emerged that the higher up the hierarchy, 
the more powerful the corporate staff to deploy resources. Specifically, senior management 
intervention from the dyad not only resulted in a more effective socialising process, but also, 
led to more solution-focused outcomes. The effectiveness of senior management intervention 
matters, especially to the supplier, because it can mitigate the inter-organisational tension 
internal to it, which will then pave the way for a smoother implementation. Moreover, the 
operating level staff will receive a clearer direction for pursuing collaboration. Amongst the 
four cases, the suppliers’ CEOs or general managers from cases 1, 2, and 3 got involved in this 
phase. The higher the hierarchy of the staff involved was perceived as being more sincere and 
potentially point to efficiency in the following phases. Accordingly, the buyer and the supplier 
re-established a communication platform, reinforced their interpersonal relationships as well 
as clarifying and realigning future expectations.  
 
Economic performance  
Another critical factor relates to economic performance. This factor was found to play out in 
the later phase of goodwill trust repair, when the supplier had somewhat repaired its 
competence. This effect was particularly pronounced in cases 1 and 3, in that both resulted in 
more positive economic performance compared to the pre-transgression stage. In case 1, the 
ongoing projects in the new segment, automotive OEM, had yielded good market penetration 
with downstream customers. A respondent noted: “Until the later period of the trust repair 
[…] while we reviewed the quarterly report of the supplier performance, we found that this 
supplier was currently performing well with a lot of improvement […] the downstream 
customer was satisfied with the result [regarding the growth of the OEM automotive market] 
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we started to award them with some new projects” (Director of Supplier Management, buyer, 
case 1).  
Likewise, in case 3, the supplier had helped the buyer to catch up with its netbook 
competitor with respect to market share through large scale production within a short period 
of time. Such a strong comeback for the netbook unit had provided leverage to the repair of 
the previously declining laptop unit. It generated a positive spiral, where the new and more 
successful projects, in fact, overshadowed the losses caused by the transgressions in the trust 
violation stage: “AC was our largest customer while we were AC’s largest supplier. The 
relationship had gradually been repaired as the business had significantly expanded, because 
of the excellence of operational execution and business performance” (Executive Vice 
President, supplier, case 3). This somewhat resembles the reverse reaction in the trust 
violation, in which the accumulation of competence-based transgression was gradually 
perceived as an integrity-based transgression. That is, the supplier’s demonstration of 
consistent fulfilment of the buyer’s expectations also boosted the goodwill trust, “because 
their corporate staff managed to repair the relationship properly with our corporate staff via 
solid operational performance” (Senior R&D Engineer, buyer, case 3). As a result, the buyer 
had become the second largest global computer manufacturer, with its market share expanding 
massively owing to the supplier’s full support. Such unprecedented success witnessed in the 
enlarged pie, was perceived as a big reward for risk-taking behaviour by the dyad: “both 
parties had in fact taken on a lot of risks […] it had all paid off” (Senior Vice President, buyer, 
case 3).  
However, this only applies under a critical condition, the presence of a growing market. 
More importantly, the presence of a prospective market facilitated the dyad to make 
compromises and to take the risk because of the potential reward in the future. For example, 
in case 3, the buyer and the supplier decided to ‘strike while the iron was hot’, in the form of 
accelerated production and rapidly expanded projects. If the market is not growing, such risk-
taking behaviour will not take place.   
 
5.3.2 Reparative responses and factors driving competence trust repair  
Partly repaired goodwill trust signalled the realigned expectations to relationship continuity at 
the corporate level, which in turn, facilitated operational arrangements, for “corporate staff 
between the buyer and the supplier only outlined overarching goals and rules, which should 
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be followed up by operating staff between the dyad” (Senior Vice President, buyer, case 3). 
The buyer and the supplier then began to implement the promised and negotiated terms, 
conditions, and solutions in which boundary spanners at the operating level coordinated the 
tasks between functional departments within and across organisational boundaries: “the goal 
could not be attained by individuals, but rather, required extensive inter-team collaboration” 
(Senior Project Manager, supplier, case 3). As a result, communication and collaboration 
between operating staff across the functional and organisational boundaries had intensified. 
“Success or failure depended on how effective and efficient those operating staff were in 
operational execution” (General Manager, distributor, case 4). Those operating staff were 
expected to follow the guidelines and instructions identified after the consensus was reached 
by corporate staff. For most of the cases, the supplier prioritised its resources dedicated 
effectively and efficiently to solve the disruptions at hand, thus eliminating the causes of 
transgressions.  
As the competence trust repair process progressed, the buyer’s operating staff would 
gather evidence (e.g. periodic audit and survey) and feedback for the corporate staff to review 
and assess whether such repair was effective and could be deemed normative. To achieve this, 
the supplier had to demonstrate that it could consistently deliver products to a satisfactory 
level. For instance, in case 1, the supplier had demonstrated a consistent delivery of qualified 
products under tightened IQC over an extended period of time: “for ten continuous deliveries 
without being given any correction action report [CAR], we then considered releasing them 
from the observation list” (Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 1). Hence, this explains 
the reason why competence trust generally takes more time to substantiate after reparative 
responses were enacted. There are three main reparative responses identified from the case 
findings, including replacement of boundary spanners, buyer’s assistance, and buyer’s 
perception of supplier’s reparative efforts.  
 
Replacement of boundary spanners  
The first factor refers to the replacement of boundary spanners at the operating level. These 
include engineers on the production lines, those in R&D and project managers. The repair of 
competence trust required frequent cross-functional and organisational interaction among 
middle to high level operating staff, especially for those in charge of information facilitation 
and resource coordination from the buyer and the supplier. If these boundary spanners still 
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carried the shadow of the past in the trust violation stage, their biased attitude and perceptions 
would undermine the extensive operational coordination and performance. That is, some of 
them might still have held grudges and engaged in stereotyping regarding the counterpart since 
those boundary spanners (operating staff) had observed the whole process of trust violation 
and potentially carried the weight of the past.  
It should be noted that boundary spanners in the larger scale collaborations (i.e. cases 3 
and 4) were more likely to suffer from the shadow of the past, because they had to suffer from 
a series of transgressions for a longer period before these became escalated, thus having to 
receive corporate attention. Hence, the operating boundary spanners would have experienced 
longer and deeper technical and relational difficulties than those in the dyads with smaller 
scale collaborations, where corporate staff tended to intervene quickly. To address the bad 
blood, in case 3, “the supplier replaced a significant number of engineers from its production 
lines. Also, the supplier changed many of its R&D engineers” (Deputy Executive Officer, 
buyer, case 3). Moreover, “we [the supplier] shifted many teams that were previously 
dedicated to the buyer to other projects and replaced them with new members […] some of 
the operating staff were upset with the buyer’s operating staff […] while other staff felt a sense 
of defeat, because of the multiple transgressions that occurred beforehand” (Senior Project 
Manager, supplier, case 3). The newly brought in boundary spanners could concentrate on the 
specified tasks without being overshadowed by the transgressions of the past. In addition, a 
respondent noted: “Normally best teams would be responsible for the most difficult projects 
or projects with the largest volume. Moderate teams might be assigned to regular projects” 
(Senior Project Manager, supplier, case 3). The supplier also replaced existing teams with the 
best teams to guarantee excellent performance. Similarly, in case 4, the buyer also replaced its 
R&D director with a former senior R&D engineer, who was familiar with the distributor, in 
an attempt to facilitate the repair progress by driving the distributor. In sum, boundary spanners 
were replaced with staff responsible for critical operational purposes.  
 
Buyer’s assistance  
The presence of the buyer’s assistance appears to be a critical factor for the repairing of 
competence trust. It always involves some technical and operational challenges embedded in 
the process that prevent those early technical issues to be resolved before the deadlock. The 
active help provided by the buyer essentially accelerated this aspect of trust of the supplier. 
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Amongst the four cases, the buyers in cases 1, 2, and 3 assisted the suppliers to some extent. 
In case 1, the buyer explained the specifications of the quality requirements to the supplier to 
eliminate completely any technical and contractual ambiguities: “we emphasised and clarified 
the specs and quality required from the contract and confirmed these specs individually with 
the supplier” (Director of Supplier Management, buyer, case 1). Moreover, the buyer “sent a 
quality improvement team to educate and advise the supplier, because the buyer still had hope 
in the supplier and still thought they had got the potential” (Director of Supplier Management, 
buyer, case 1). When providing technical assistance, this also allowed the buyer to monitor the 
supplier’s performance. Such monitoring “[…] was not just observing or supervision […] the 
main task for monitoring was to help them discover their potential negligence or unaware 
practices in their management and manufacturing that led to quality issues” (Project Manager, 
buyer, case 1). As a result, the buyer identified several loopholes in the supplier’s production 
line and in turn, requested it to outline a step-by-step repair schedule for subsequent audits. 
Likewise, in case 2, the buyer appointed staff to help the supplier to troubleshoot and 
provide improvement instructions on-site. The buyer also sent staff to monitor closely the 
performance of the supplier over a period of time to stabilise its competence. A respondent 
mentioned: “the standpoint we took was from the assistance perspective. Since quality 
specifications seemed to be rather ambiguous […] our QA and their QA tended to experience 
some arguments in the early phase of competence trust repair. Our senior purchasing manager 
was there to coordinate and deal with disagreements” (General Manager, buyer, case 2). With 
the buyer’s on-site assistance, the root causes of transgressions had gradually been minimised 
for the supplier’s upstream suppliers. As a result, the buyer’s senior purchasing manager “[…] 
facilitated the process of re-certification of the upstream suppliers to ensure RoHS lead-free 
production across the supply chain” (Senior Purchasing Manager, buyer, case 2).  
On the other hand, in case 3, the buyer had given up on helping the supplier at the end of 
the trust violation stage, so it decided not to commit too many resources to help the supplier. 
The buyer principally relied on control provision by “appointing some hardware and software 
specialists to control and manage their operations […] without our consent, the supplier could 
not adopt alternative components and materials” (Deputy Executive Officer, buyer, case 3). 
Whereas in case 4, the third party, the distributor played the main role regarding assistance 
provision. It helped to collect parameters adopted with this material from other assembly plants 
to generate possible lessons learnt for the buyer’s reference. Meanwhile, the distributor 
assisted the supplier by getting involved in the troubleshooting process and providing 
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suggestions on potential errors in the semiconductor manufacturing process as well as 
corresponding solutions.   
Overall, the findings illustrate that buyer assistance could not just directly boost the 
effectiveness of actualising the proposed tasks and solutions, but more importantly, it served 
as a less intrusive and less adverse way to monitor and control the supplier’s operations. This 
lowered the supplier’s resistance and correspondingly, reduced the buyer’s uncertainty 
towards the supplier’s intentions as well as the capabilities of fulfilling the agreed tasks.  
 
Buyer’s perceptions of supplier’s reparative efforts 
The effect of competence trust repair was also determined by the buyer’s perceptions of the 
supplier’s overall reparative efforts. One critical factor was how effective those reparative 
responses could eliminate and prevent the causes of the previous transgressions. Regarding 
which, in case 1, the dyad had reached a consensus on the standardisation of inspection gauges 
that essentially lowered the variations between the supplier’s OQC and the buyer’s IQC. The 
supplier also made adjustments to the tooling to minimise the need for manual recalibration 
after production as much as possible. Similarly, in case 2, the dyad had re-certified the 
supplier’s upstream suppliers to ensure their RoHS compliance in terms of raw materials 
procurement and manufacturing processes. This effectively controlled the possibility of lead 
contamination from the upstream suppliers. In case 3, the supplier added more checkpoints 
from the design to the mass production processes, for which the supervisor’s approval was 
needed from one stage to the next. In addition, the supplier set up a system that demanded 
operating staff constantly compare the project at hand with the log file that recorded all 
previous technical and functional failures associated with a product category. This would 
significantly avoid any reoccurrence.  
Apart from the perceived prevention of the causes of the past transgressions, the buyer’s 
opinion regarding the supplier’s competence was also assessed according to the general 
improvement in capabilities. This means that, the supplier could treat trust repair as 
opportunities to implement a quality overhaul and other relationship-specific investments (e.g. 
new plants and new quality certification) targeted at elevating the supplier’s overall 
competence. For instance, the supplier from case 1 transferred a VP from its more technology-
sophisticated plant in China to conduct intensive training with its staff from Taiwan, quality 
control in particular, and to refine the current manufacturing process. In three months, this 
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helped the supplier to overcome the technical threshold and significantly elevate the quality 
performance. Similarly, the supplier in case 2 decided to invest in building a new plant in the 
north for higher circulation of information, knowledge, and talent as well as applying for 
quality certification (ISO 9000), as “we felt the urge to invest in our QA system and improve 
knowledge exchange with other companies” (General Manager, supplier, case 2). In case 3, 
not only did the supplier engage in a full-range of capability improvements led by its R&D 
and quality assurance teams, for it also actualised the commitment made beforehand regarding 
the establishment of a manufacturing centre and service centres devoted to the buyer’s 
production. These reparative responses were targeted at enhancing the supplier’s overall 
competence, rather than recouping the competence domains affected by the previous 
transgressions.   
 
A brief summary of this section 
The dynamics of trust repair began with a period of a positive turning point, where the buyer 
and the supplier engaged in rational cost-benefit analysis, assessing the potential losses and 
future gains of the relationship, which helped shift the dyad’s focus from the past transgression 
to preserving the fundamental value of the relationship. This determined the level of the 
motivation to repair violated trust. During the trust repair process, goodwill trust appeared to 
be repaired prior to competence trust due to the primacy of relationship outcomes.  
Under the repair of goodwill trust, the buyer and supplier first expressed their 
commitment and continuity intentions, which realigned expectations. Then, the supplier 
agreed to make relationship-specific investment that reallocated the interests through financial 
sacrifices and external investment. Moreover, senior management involvement and economic 
performance appeared to have a temporal impact, whereby the former facilitated in the early 
phase of goodwill trust repair, while the latter only became relevant in the later phase. Senior 
management involvement allowed corporate staff between the dyad to come together and 
agree on general arrangements that set the tone for specific tasks for operating staff to 
implement. On the other hand, whilst not every case experienced improved economic 
performance in the later phase, it provided a condition that further aligns the future interests 
between the partners and encourages them to overlook the violation and capitalise on the 
expanding business.   
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The repair of competence took place when the buyer and the supplier realigned their 
expectations. During this phase, the focus was on the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
operational execution of previously agreed terms and conditions. With the replacement of 
boundary spanners and buyer’s assistance, the repair of competence trust was facilitated. 
Notably, the buyer assessed the supplier’s competence based on two aspects, namely, the 
perceived prevention of the causes of the past transgressions and overall competence 
improvement in other capability domains.  
  
CHAPTER SUMMARY  
This chapter has presented the cross-case analysis for the four cases under investigation, 
thereby addressing the two research questions. The dynamics of trust violation has been 
elaborated upon through consideration of the overall trajectory of the violation of competence 
and goodwill trust. Moreover, factors shaping the severity of the violation of the two trust 
dimensions have been identified. With respect to the dynamics of trust repair, the reparative 
responses across the four case studies have been presented regarding their effects on repairing 
goodwill and competence trust. In addition, the factors affecting the repair of the two trust 
dimensions have been explained, respectively.  
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CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter compares the within-case and cross-case analysis findings with the extant 
literature, and in doing so, addresses the overarching research questions of the thesis. Section 
6.1 considers the dynamics of competence and goodwill trust in the violation stage. The 
following subsections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 elaborate upon the factors affecting the severity of trust 
violation and their differential effects on competence and goodwill trust. Next, section 6.2 
examines the dynamics of the trust repair stage, whilst subsection 6.2.1 discusses the positive 
turning point. Finally, subsections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 address the repair of goodwill and 
competence trust, respectively, involving reparative responses and the factors affecting the 
effectiveness of trust repair.   
 
6.1 TRUST VIOLATION 
The analysis has revealed a set of answers to the research questions by compiling evidence 
from within-case and cross-case analysis. Research question one is:  
What are the dynamics of competence and goodwill trust in the trust violation stage? 
 In response to RQ1, the findings show that the dynamics of the two trust dimensions are 
triggered by multiple transgressions. Each goes through the phases of discovery, resistance, 
and intervention, with the final transgression eventually leading to the escalation phase. Thus, 
how multiple transgressions develop and progress is critical to understanding changes in 
competence and goodwill trust in the trust violation stage.   
 
6.1.1 Multiple transgressions 
The case findings have shown that a trust violation in an inter-organisational relationship 
involves a series of multiple transgressions and reparative attempts by the supplier and/or 
buyer. These reparative attempts are targeted at countering the negative effects of those 
transgressions on the buyer’s operations and perceptions. In contrast to the extant literature, 
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the findings illustrate that trust violation is not a one-off phenomenon consisting of only a 
single transgression and one assessment (e.g. Bell et al., 2002; Wang and Huff, 2007; Weber, 
2017), but is instead best characterised by multiple transgression and repair attempts. 
Following the call by Dirks et al. (2009) and adopting a longitudinal approach recommended 
by Stevens et al. (2015), the outcomes of the thesis have helped to unpack further the trust 
violation stage in inter-organisational relationships. 
The analysis has shown that trust violation in inter-organisational relationships is 
characterised by multiple loops of discovery, resistance, intervention and finally, escalation. 
This means that trust violation is a process rather than a one-off event (as initially proposed 
by Grover et al., 2014). The loops are repeated until trust violation reaches a deadlock, which 
represents the end of it and the beginning of trust repair. Consistent with the literature (e.g. 
Kim et al., 2004; 2006), it has emerged that a trust violation process begins with the discovery 
phase, because a transgression must be perceived to have occurred before triggering a trust 
violation. The findings empirically confirm Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan’s (2009) 
proposition that competence-based transgressions are more easily identified than integrity-
based ones at the inter-organisational level. The findings also show that competence-based 
transgressions are discovered based on objective information (mainly reporting from the 
production line and quality control) that drives the buyer’s awareness of the issue, whilst 
integrity-based violations are associated with higher causal ambiguity (Tomlinson, 2011), 
where data are usually absent or sparse and attributions of blameless certain (Ferrin et al., 
2007). For example, the buyer from case 4 substantiated the cause of the supplier’s integrity-
based transgression via the assistance of the distributor, which collected data from their other 
customers. 
Once a transgression is identified by the buyer, it and the supplier enter the resistance 
phase. The case findings are consistent with Kim et al.’s (2009) conceptualisation regarding 
the bilateral dynamics engaged in by both parties. This suggests that the trustor (the buyer) 
plays an active role in resisting the trustee’s (the supplier) responses. The strength of such 
resistance depends on the buyer’s perceived culpability attributed to the supplier. However, 
Kim et al. (2009) mainly focused on the trustor’s perspective and assumed that the trustee is 
willing to repair. In contrast to their study, the case findings illustrate that both buyer and 
supplier demonstrate resistance to each other. Specifically, the buyer wants to hold the supplier 
accountable for the transgression, because the latter has already caused it a loss (operational, 
financial, and reputational). Whilst the supplier is not willing to take full responsibility, 
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because it feels that the buyer should also be responsible. Thus, the supplier attempts to shift 
the blame to external causes (Tomlinson and Mayer, 2009). For example, in case 1, the 
continuous underperformance on quality was partially caused by additional requirements 
imposed on the supplier’s over specifications. This means that, a trust violation may have 
different meanings depending on whose perspective is taken in the situation, because the 
attribution is unilateral and fundamentally “a subjective perception about what the offence 
symbolises and what is required to address it” (Okimoto and Wenzel, 2014, p. 446). Such 
disagreement prompts further investigation by both parties to verify and substantiate the causes 
and responsibility for a specific transgression. As more information becomes available, the 
buyer verifies the type of the transgression and reacts accordingly. The findings of this study 
empirically verify Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan’s (2009) claim that the buyer reacts more 
intensely to integrity-based transgressions than competence-based ones.  
After mutually agreed responsibility is reached, both parties move on to the intervention 
phase, in which initial reparative attempts are adopted to counteract the negative effect of the 
initial transgression. It should be noted that reparative attempts represent actions buyers and 
suppliers adopt in the trust violation stage, while reparative responses refer to actions the dyad 
enact in the trust repair stage. Such periodic intervention in the trust violation stage has never 
been explored (Gillespie, 2017). Those reparative attempts appear to be standard responses 
generally specified on the contract and initiated by the operating staff. For instance, the 
supplier across the cases decided to heighten their IPQC and OQC and agreed to pay 
compensation, while the buyer placed a stricter IQC to deter reoccurrence for an extended 
period of time until the supplier’s quality became stabilised. Such reparative attempts lead to 
reconciliation between the dyad, which indicates that the buyer and the supplier have decided 
to settle with the transgression and move on (Tomlinson et al., 2004). However, researchers 
have yet to explore the notion that the buyer may reconcile with the supplier’s reparative 
attempts, with every reconciliation made being one step closer to the trust threshold. This 
means that reparative attempts are not preventive in nature, for both parties decide to settle 
because both parties tend not to allocate too much attention on resolving early transgressions. 
However, the findings suggest that the accumulation of ineffective reparative attempts 
gradually challenges the buyer’s tolerance and eventually backfires as those less effectively 
recouped domains create operational loopholes that make future disruptions more likely. For 
instance, the supplier from case 1 incorporated extensive manual adjustments into its products 
after manufacturing process: “products that were adjusted manually by our labour did not end 
up with good quality in terms of consistency. The stability was not high” (General Manager, 
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supplier, case 1). As a result, despite significant resources being invested by the supplier, the 
consistency of manual adjustments could not be sustained, especially in the event of a high 
volume of orders.  
It should be noted that the initial transgression serves as the turning point that initiates a 
trust violation process, but it is not necessarily the reason that brings trust to a deadlock in the 
presence of multiple transgressions. Instead, the initial transgression plants the seed for the 
following ones and the corresponding ineffective reparative attempts. As multiple loops 
continue, this gradually widens the perceived gap of the buyer’s expectations, because 
reparative attempts provided by the supplier have been perceived to be ineffective and non-
preventive, thereby resulting in increasing levels of operational loopholes and dissatisfaction 
(as aforementioned). Moreover, the buyer’s focus will change from transgressions induced by 
the supplier per se to the overall reparative attempts enacted by the latter that have failed to 
resolve the transgressions effectively (Salo et al., 2009). When the relationship passes a trust 
threshold, where the situation is out of the operating staff’s control, it proceeds to the escalation 
phase. In the intervention phase, structural responses targeted at radical changes to the contract 
and permanent operational overhaul are unlikely to be implemented due to the involvement of 
middle to low hierarchy staff (Dirks et al., 2009). Those operating staff are reluctant to report 
to the senior level management unless the loss is very high (Laeequddin and Sardana, 2010). 
This is because, if they constantly reported to corporate staff, they would be seen as 
incompetent. Thus, operational staff try their best to contain transgressions even if the supplier 
offers ineffective reparative responses. The findings are consistent with Whipple and Roh’s 
(2010) argument from agency theory. As a result, a lack of senior-level intervention prevents 
transgressions from being dealt with completely and effectively, which in turn, creates a 
negative spiral. 
The accumulation of transgressions depletes each party’s resources and consequently, 
undermines their profitability. It threatens the continuation of the inter-organisational 
relationship as perceived by the buyer and/or the supplier (Lewis and Weigert, 1985). Hence, 
both firms strive to protect their own interests against each other. The situation is no longer 
under operating and middle hierarchy staff’s control, but rather, has escalated to senior level 
management due to the significance of the trust violation. In this vein, the outcomes of this 
thesis add to Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan (2009) by delineating how operating level 
violations can gradually develop into corporate level ones through the accumulation of 
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ineffective reparative attempts and increasing severity of trust violation. Then, the result of the 
escalation phase is deadlock. 
The extant literature has not specifically examined the characteristics of the deadlock. 
The findings show that the relationship becomes competitive, with one or both parties showing 
no desire to continue dealing with the other (Gedeon et al., 2009). For instance, the buyer in 
case 2 ended a meeting with a set of requirements regarding the preferred materials and costs. 
In addition, the buyer could halt its purchases from the supplier or start to test the adaptability 
and capability of alternative ones (Harris et al., 2003). Regarding which, the buyers from cases 
1, 2, and 3 attempted to evaluate alternative suppliers. The buyer from case 3 actually shifted 
some orders from the supplier to an alternative, but it did not have enough production capacity 
when compared to their existing supplier.  
This subsection has discussed the main findings regarding the general process of a trust 
violation in terms of different temporal phases and transgressions. The next subsection 
considers the factors that affect the severity of this violation. 
 
6.1.2 Factors affecting the severity of trust violation  
This subsection covers four main factors, dyadic interaction, cross-domain failures as well as 




Previous inter-organisational trust violation studies have neglected to capture the detailed 
actions and reactions between both the buyer and supplier throughout the process of trust 
violation (please see calls by, for instance, Dirks et al., 2009; Gillespie, 2017). Despite one 
paper having identified at the interpersonal trust level that the trustor plays an active role in 
facilitating or hindering the trustee’s reparative efforts (Kim et al., 2009), it was assumed that 
suppliers are willing and able to offer reparative responses that will either repair the trust 
violation or not (e.g. Crossley, 2015; Wang et al., 2014). Instead, this processual case study 
has led to the identification of dynamics that have hitherto been unexplored: supplier 





The first dynamic throws light on the supplier’s motivation to react to the initial transgression. 
Whereas prior literature has generally assumed that the supplier is always motivated to offer 
reparative attempts to the buyer (e.g. Li et al., 2013; Yu et al., 2017), the findings of the current 
work have shown that the level of supplier motivation to repair is not constant. It gradually 
decreases with the buyer’s heightening requirements and restrictive measures imposed on the 
supplier. Kim et al. (2009) conceptualised that the trustor plays an active role in resisting the 
trustee’s responses (e.g. adding time constraints to the supplier and expressing stronger 
emotions) at the interpersonal level. From the data, after the initial transgression, it can be seen 
that the supplier is generally motivated to offer reparative attempts to the buyer. However, the 
level of motivation is inherently driven by the supplier’s level of dependence, which is 
consistent with Tomlinson and Mayer (2009). In addition, a higher level of supplier motivation 
will directly inform the quality that the reparative attempts can provide (i.e. proportionate 
reactions) in the buyer’s eyes.   
 
Proportionate reactions  
The second dynamic highlights the need for a proportionate reaction. This indicates the 
supplier’s reparative attempts measured against the buyer’s expected responses; the smaller 
the discrepancies of reparative attempts induced by the supplier to the buyer’s expectation, the 
more proportionate those attempts are perceived to be. For example, in case 2, the supplier 
resolved the compensation issue quickly and explained the causes and solutions thoroughly to 
the buyer. The findings reveal that proportionate reactions by the supplier can mitigate the 
violation of trust after transgressions. This means that, if the supplier puts more effort into 
resolving transgressions, the severity of trust violation can be reduced, especially regarding 
goodwill trust (Wang et al., 2014), because the buyer perceives that the supplier is still 
demonstrating concerns about its interests and is willing to fulfil its expectations. However, 
despite proportionate reactions, the perceived gap is still present, because the cause of the 
transgression(s) has not been eliminated. In addition, it is unlikely that the supplier will 
continue delivering proportionate reactions to the buyer throughout the trust violation stage, 
because of changes to its motivation over time. Hence, this leads to the final dynamic of the 




Buyer’s escalating expectations 
The final dynamic clearly highlights the changing expectations that buyers have throughout 
the violation process. The findings show that the buyer, over time, increases its level of 
resistance, by exercising more punitive clauses (e.g. stringent control and monitoring) against 
the supplier in order to prevent further harmful consequences. This gradually widens the 
buyer’s perceived gap over multiple transgressions (Bachmann et al., 2015). That is, the buyer 
believes that the supplier should be capable enough to fulfil the tasks, but is choosing not to 
allocate sufficient resources to do so. Hence, the buyer increases the penalties, not only to 
secure its own interests, for it also expects the supplier to treat the transgressions with a higher 
level of priority. For example, the buyer in case 3 began to countervail information provided 
by the supplier by repeatedly challenging different technical aspects and quality control 
processes of a product or a particular reparative attempt initiated by the supplier. By adding 
more barriers, the buyer can be certain that the supplier allocates more resources to fulfil the 
subsequent tasks and thus, prevent the reoccurrence of transgressions. 
 However, increasingly stringent terms and conditions imposed by the buyer do not meet 
the intended purposes. They not only create operational difficulties that undermine the ability 
of the supplier to continue fulfilling the buyer’s expectations, for those clauses also lead to 
increased financial and operational burdens (e.g. frequent charges of compensation, reworks, 
and extra manufacturing processes). This means it becomes more difficult for the supplier to 
offer proportionate reactions due to the limited resources available and increased expectations 
from the buyer. Consistent with Malhotra and Lumineau (2011), with stricter control signified 
by the buyer, the supplier will exhaust its resources to maintain its competence to meet the 
buyer’s requirements, which it can in the short term (with proportionate reactions). However, 
this situation gradually impairs the supplier’s interests, which is reflected in reduced goodwill 
trust in the relationship (based on symmetrical trust assumed by Malhotra and Lumineau, 
2011). The authors investigated the effect of different means of dispute resolution on 
competence and goodwill trust, but they did not trace relationships where this resolution was 
ineffective (manifested in competence and goodwill trust) longitudinally. This study not only 
offers rich qualitative extensions to their work, but the findings also show how the use of 
intensive control exacerbates the relationship over the longer term.   
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 As the supplier needs to invest more resources with the buyer, this gradually reduces its 
profitability and in turn, affects its motivation to sustain proportionate reactions. Moreover, 
the supplier becomes less able to sustain the competence displayed initially, because of higher 
operational and financial difficulties. As a result, the buyer becomes increasingly dissatisfied 
with the supplier’s reparative attempts, thereby creating a negative spiral. That is, the buyer’s 
expectations are escalating due to the perceived supplier underperformance, while the latter 
becomes less motivated to offer reparative attempts owing to impaired interests. This is 
consistent with Nyaga et al. (2010), whereby the buyer emphasises the outcome of the 
relationship, while the supplier focuses on securing its transaction-specific investment. 
Consequently, the heightening conflict of interests prompts the supplier eventually to halt 
further reparative attempts by signalling its uncooperativeness (e.g. intention to quit and 
reduction of resource allocation) or taking control by counterbalancing its interests (e.g. 
transferring costs to the buyer).  
 This subsection has discussed how dyadic interaction, constituted by the dynamics of 
supplier motivation, proportionate reactions, and the buyer’s escalating expectations, 
exacerbate the trust violation. The next subsection explains the effect of cross-domain failure 
on the severity of the trust violation.     
 
Cross-domain failure 
Based on the processual nature of the study, the findings first reveal that trust violation consists 
of multiple transgressions. Following this, the data show that these transgressions, although 
related, can spread across domains, which refers to aspects the supplier demonstrates particular 
expertise and knowledge of (Mayer et al., 1995). For example, in case 3, multiple 
transgressions led to the buyer gradually discounting the supplier’s competence in 
procurement, technical design, the manufacturing process, lab certification as well as essential 
knowledge about ICs and frequency interference.  
The extant literature generally acknowledges that competence trust is domain-specific 
(Connelly et al., 2018; Lewicki et al., 1998), but this has never been investigated in the trust 
violation and repair context, possibly due to the lack of longitudinal research. According to 
the literature, competence trust can be attributable to multiple operational and exchange 
aspects of inter-organisational relationships (e.g. manufacturing, R&D, and cost management) 
(Connelly et al., 2018). This indicates that, the buyer places different emphasis on the 
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supplier’s displayed functions. For example, in case 1, the buyer particularly emphasised the 
supplier’s quality, because this was what led to it being selected initially from the requirement 
for a quotation for automotive OEMs (99% yield rate required). Likewise, in case 3, the buyer 
placed a significant focus on the supplier’s cost and production capacity, which meant that 
transgressions that occurred across the different domains led to differential levels of severity 
of trust violation. Thus, a transgression that happens on the supplier’s production capacity may 
be perceived to be more severe than one occurring in respect of R&D capability, as in case 3. 
Thus, the findings add to the literature by showing that competence is more resilient than its 
goodwill counterpart, because of its domain-specific characteristics. That is, if the supplier’s 
most valuable domains of expertise remain unviolated, the severity of competence trust 
violation can be contained (i.e. case 4). However, if cross-domain failures occur, this indicates 
that multiple domains of the supplier’s ability are being questioned by the buyer, which will 
gradually heighten the severity of competence trust violation. As a result, this will threaten the 
continuation of the buyer-supplier relationship (Wang et al., 2014).   
 
The type of initial transgression 
The extant literature has rarely examined the impact of competence- and integrity-based 
transgressions empirically (a notable exception is Wang and Huff, 2007). This literature has 
also treated both types of transgression independently and as being mutually exclusive 
(Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan, 2009), but the case findings suggest that competence- and 
integrity-based transgressions are interrelated. A competence-based transgression refers to an 
incident caused by a supplier willing to fulfil the buyer’s expectations, but failing to do so, 
while an integrity-based one pertains to an incident caused by the supplier that is capable of 
fulfilling the buyer’s expectations, but the former is unwilling to do so (ibid). For instance, in 
case 2, a series of product contaminations (lead residues) on supplier’s products due to less 
strict quality control was perceived to be a competence-based transgression. In contrast, in 
case 4, changes were made to the supplier’s product without authorisation, which caused IC 
breakage to the buyer’s chips and this is regarded as an integrity-based transgression, because 
the buyer perceived that the supplier had engaged in opportunism.  
 From the data, competence-based transgressions are easier to discover and substantiate, 
because these are directly reported by operating staff based on objective measures (e.g. yield 
loss, lot reject rate, and capability process index). As a result, a substantiated competence-
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based transgression directly violates the competence trust. This is consistent with Janowicz-
Panjaitan and Krishnan (2009). Conversely, integrity-based transgressions are more difficult 
to discover, because they require more information to substantiate them. The findings reveal 
that an integrity-based transgression begins with the discovery of objective evidence like with 
competence-based transgressions. However, because of the relative severity or criticality of 
the transgression, the buyer will tend to allocate more resources in investigating the cause in 
order to substantiate the supplier’s responsibility and claim compensation accordingly. For 
instance, in case 4, the buyer suffered a great yield loss on its downstream customer’s chips 
after applying the supplier’s material. Whilst the supplier shirked responsibility, arguing that 
they had urged the buyer to conduct a pre-test on dummies, the latter still suspected that the 
former might be withholding critical information from them. As more information was 
acquired, the buyer’s distributor suggested that the supplier make some changes to the agreed 
specifications in an attempt to solve the buyer’s and one of their competitors’ issues 
simultaneously (different technical issues) without authorisation. The findings are consistent 
with Tomlinson (2011) that the buyer is more likely to suspect transgressions with higher 
causal ambiguity and more severe transgressions. It has emerged that, integrity-based 
transgressions are more severe due to their unexpectedness in nature and higher emotional 
distress (Wang and Huff, 2007). When an integrity-based transgression is verified, it 
engenders more severe reactions from the buyer (e.g. emotional distress and heightened 
resisting responses) and significantly impairs goodwill trust, which is consistent with Wang 
and Huff (2007). This is the first study to investigate empirically and qualitatively the outcome 
of different types of transgressions. It realistically captures the emotions and behaviour of the 
buyer after integrity-based transgressions, which adds to the vividness, as opposed to scenario-
based experiments conducted by Wang and Huff (2007). 
 It should be noted that the data suggest that a goodwill trust violation resulting from 
integrity-based transgressions has an overshadowing effect on the subsequent competence-
based transgressions. This means that, the buyer tends to attribute the causes of these 
subsequent transgressions to the supplier’s unwillingness to fulfil the expectations rather than 
its incapability. Such a negative perception of the supplier’s goodwill takes a precedent role 
that overshadows the violation of competence trust, because of the one with a lack of goodwill 
being less likely to change under any circumstances and thus, its bad intentions will always be 
taken into account during subsequent transgressions (i.e. a stable cause suggested by 
Tomlinson and Mayer, 2009). However, the findings suggest such an overshadowing effect 
does not last forever until deadlock, but rather, gradually wears out as the buyer comes to 
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perceive that a lack of goodwill trust results in the same outcomes as a lack of competence 
trust. The case findings are consistent with Ferrin et al.’s (2007) restrictive schema perspective 
from the interpersonal trust violation literature. These authors argued that negative information 
regarding a partner’s goodwill tends to persist, because only individuals with low goodwill 
would engage in opportunistic behaviour, while negative information regarding a partner’s 
competence tends to be discounted as people believe that a competent person can occasionally 
make mistakes (ibid). The next subsection discusses the effect of the locus of the initial 
transgression on the severity of trust violation.  
 
The locus of the initial transgression  
This study is the first to involve empirically examination of the locus of transgressions in the 
inter-organisational trust violation context. The locus refers to the party responsible for the 
cause of a transgression, which can be internal (i.e. by the supplier) or external (i.e. by the 
buyer or by the situation). The findings show that the locus of the initial transgression has a 
differential effect on competence and goodwill trust.  
With respect to the internal locus, the data suggest that such transgressions do not have 
any effect on the two trust dimensions (Tomlinson and Mayer, 2009). Conversely, regarding 
transgressions with an external locus, the data infer that a trust violation triggering 
transgression cannot be completely external to the supplier, as perceived by the buyer, because 
the latter’s interests are harmed. For instance, in case 2, even though the initial transgression 
was triggered by RoHS imposed by the downstream customers and the government, it was not 
perceived to be completely an external locus, because unavoidable losses occurred. Thus, 
despite the transgression being of a situational trigger, as long as the buyer’s interest is 
affected, it will at least attribute the cause to the supplier to some extent. In case 2, the buyer 
held the supplier’s competence accountable, because it still expected the latter to contain the 
losses with its OQC and also to absorb the loss incurred.  
Whilst for transgressions with an external locus, the findings suggest that the buyer does 
not hold the supplier’s intentions accountable, because the cause is generated externally to the 
supplier. As a result, transgressions with such a locus do not engender the violation of goodwill 
trust. The extant literature has never investigated the locus of transgressions empirically at the 
inter-organisational level. Nevertheless, the data are consistent with interpersonal trust 
violation literature that an external locus dispels the negative impact on trust and emotions, in 
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general, without specifically targeting the two trust dimensions (Elangovan et al., 2007). It 
should be noted that adjacent literature on psychological contract violation suggests that 
transgressions with an external locus tend to trigger disruption attribution, which refers to the 
situation where a partner is willing, but unable, to fulfill obligations (similar to competence-
based transgressions) (Mir et al., 2016). In contrast, transgressions with an internal locus tend 
to drive the reneging attribution, which pertains to where a partner is able, but unwilling, to 
fulfil its obligations (similar to integrity-based transgressions) (ibid). This means that, 
transgressions with an external locus dispel the buyer’s suspicion of the supplier’s intentions, 
which contains the violation to goodwill trust. 
 To summarise (Table 6-1), the dynamics of competence and goodwill trust in the trust 
violation stage can be explained by the interplay between multiple transgressions and 
ineffective reparative attempts, which over time widens the asymmetric perceptions (i.e. 
perceived gap) possessed by the buyer and the supplier. This perceived gap informs the level 
of resistance from the dyadic interaction and in turn, violates goodwill trust. If multiple 
transgressions occur across different operational domains, the buyer’s competence trust is 
significantly violated, which accelerates the trust violation. Moreover, integrity-based initial 
transgressions have been shown to violate goodwill trust and also mitigate the buyer’s 
attribution on subsequent competence-based transgressions.  
 
Key concept Extant study Theoretical contribution 
Multiple 
transgressions  
Bell et al. (2002); Dirks 
et al. (2009); Li et al. 
(2013); Wang and Huff 
(2007); Janowicz-
Panjaitan and Krishnan 
(2009) 
Trust violation entails multiple transgressions 
rather than a single transgression 
Multiple 
interventions  
Trust violation is recouped with multiple 




Kim et al. (2009)  The supplier is not always willing to initiate 





Tomlinson and Mayer 
(2009); Wang and Huff 
(2007); Weber (2017) 
Cross-domain failures accelerate the trust 
violation 
The type of 
initial 
transgression 
The initial integrity-based transgression 
overshadows the following competence-based 
transgressions 
The locus of the 
initial 
transgression  
The initial transgression with an external locus 
mitigates the violation of goodwill trust 
Table 6 - 1. An overview of theoretical contributions to the extant literature on trust violation 
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6.2 TRUST REPAIR  
To begin with, research question two is:  
What are the dynamics of competence and goodwill trust in the trust repair stage? 
 In response to RQ2, the findings show that the dynamics of the two trust dimensions go 
through three phases: the positive turning point, the repair of goodwill trust, and the repair of 
competence trust. That is, these three stages involve critical responses and factors that are 
critical for understanding changes in competence and goodwill trust during the trust repair 
stage.  
 
6.2.1 Positive turning point   
The extant literature has largely overlooked the transition from trust violation to the repair 
stages, because none has adopted a longitudinal research design to investigate both phases in 
one study. The positive turning point pertains to the willingness of the buyer and/or the 
supplier to initiate reparative responses in the subsequent trust repair stage (Dirks et al., 2009). 
It follows the deadlock characterised by the intensified conflict of interests that negatively 
affects the dyadic exchanges (e.g. products and information) and even halts the relationship 
(Hibbard et al., 2001).  
In some literature, it has been argued that a trust violation is characterised by an intense 
negative affect (i.e. anger and frustration), which could lead to revenge and repentance 
behaviour (Wang and Huff, 2007). However, the findings show that a transient vacuum 
between the buyer and the supplier resulting from the deadlock provides some room for both 
parties to re-evaluate the relationship and engage in rational cost-benefit analysis. Consistent 
with Eckerd et al. (2013), the buyer and the supplier still remain rational and unbiased so as to 
be able to make an accurate assessment of the value of the relationship continuation despite 
experiencing high emotional distress. This assessment is conducted by senior management, 
which is responsible for the overall performance of the firm (as the violation has already 
brought about cumulative losses).  
According to the data from the current work, the buyer and supplier conduct a cost-
benefit analysis considering a range of different factors: relational investments (all cases); 
future business opportunities with the other party (all cases); potential disruptions that may 
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occur during the switching of suppliers (cases 1 and 2); new market opportunities (cases 1 and 
3); the quality of alternatives available (all cases); and potential delays to downstream 
customers (cases 1, 2, and 4). The assessment the dyad undertakes is consistent with Tahtinen 
and Vaaland’s (2006) framework that explores a comprehensive set of attenuating factors with 
respect to relationship termination assessment (Table 6-2). These factors provide reasons for 
the buyer and the supplier to maintain the relationship before proceeding to the complete 
disengagement stage that leads to relationship dissolution (Halinen and Tahtinen, 2002). In 
particular, during the phase of positive turning point, the shadow of the future, manifested in 
the expected future gains, is more pronounced than the shadow of the past, manifested in the 
incrementally accumulated relational capitals (e.g. trust). This may explain the trajectory of 
inter-organisational relationships towards active repair as opposed to relationship dissolution, 








- Adaptations made in actor bonds  
- Define existing relational investments, and possible 
unrealized gains  
- Lost future business opportunities with the partner  
Case 1 (buyer) 
Case 1 (supplier) 
Case 2 (buyer)  
Case 2 (supplier) 
Case 3 (supplier) 
Case 4 (buyer) 
Costs of the 
dissolution 
process 
- Resources required to prepare and to carry out less 
arbitration, court trial etc.  
- Disturbances in ongoing production during the 
dissolution  
Case 1 (buyer) 
Case 2 (buyer) 
Case 3 (buyer) 





- Power play from the other side (e.g. exclusion from the 
bidder’s list)  
- Mass media exposure  
- Competitor’s take-over of our future position to the 
partner  
- Sanctions from other actors 
- Possible effect on new market opportunities  
Case 1 (supplier) 
Case 1 (buyer) 
Case 2 (supplier) 
Case 2 (buyer) 
Case 3 (supplier) 
Case 4 (buyer) 
Case 4 (supplier) 
Network 
limitations  
- Number of and quality of alternative market actors 
compared to an existing partner  
- Reduced competition in the supplier market when 
cutting out partner  
Case 2 (buyer) 
Case 3 (buyer) 
Case 4 (buyer) 
Set-up costs  - Necessary changes in activity structure with new 
partner/or in-house 
- Effect on own resource utilisation and new resource 
demands  
- Cost and risk of disturbances and delays (e.g. project 
progress) 
Case 1 (buyer) 
Case 2 (buyer) 
Case 3 (buyer) 
Case 4 (buyer) 
Table 6 - 2. Attenuating factors for relationship dissolution assessment adapted from Tahtinen 




 In addition to this, the cost-benefit analysis can also be effectively facilitated by third-
parties, such as a distributor (i.e. case 4). This is consistent with Yu et al. (2017), who pointed 
out that third parties can actively persuade the buyer and the supplier with respect to the 
positive and negative consequences of repairing and not repairing. As an outcome of this cost-
benefit reassessment, the focus of both parties changes from specific transgressions that 
occurred in the trust violation stage to the overall relationship they would like to maintain. 
Thus, it ultimately drives the buyer and/or the supplier to initiate contact and directly determine 
the resources and intensity of reparative efforts. The case findings suggest that the party ending 
up with a higher net output of the cost-benefit analysis tends to initiate reparative responses. 
The violated buyer and the violating supplier can initiate reparative responses by approaching 
its counterpart. Following the positive turning point, at least the buyer or the supplier must be 
willing to repair and initiate reparative responses with the other party (Ren and Gray, 2009). 
The trust repair process hereby begins.  
 
6.2.2 The repair of goodwill trust 
The findings show that the trust repair process starts with goodwill trust and this primacy is 
for two reasons. First, as previously mentioned, the trust violation stage ends with a violation 
of goodwill trust, because i) the buyer begins to doubt the supplier’s willingness to fulfil the 
buyer’s expectations, rather than their capabilities to do so and ii) the widened conflict of 
interests resulting from the trust violation stage has yet to be resolved. In order to reconcile 
the conflict of interests, the buyer relies on the supplier’s corporate staff, who have the 
authority to make strategic decisions (i.e. reallocation of benefits shared by the dyad and 
increased investment). Second, the buyer gradually realises that those transgressions and 
ineffective reparative attempts have been caused by a lack of senior management intervention 
by the supplier. This means that without the full support of the senior management of the 
supplier, the buyer believes that the repair of competence trust cannot be sustained and 
effectively implemented. That is, senior management involvement conveys a strong signal that 
the corporate staff are willing to motivate and facilitate the following coordination and 
collaboration at the operational level. This is consistent with Salo et al.’s (2009) perspective 
that the supplier’s competence can only be sustained once the buyer believes it is willing to 
show strong commitment and intentions to repair (i.e. the repair of goodwill trust).  
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No prior research seems to have explicated the sequence of the repair of goodwill and 
competence trust, for it has only shown that goodwill trust is more difficult to repair than that 
of competence (Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan, 2009). The case findings add to the 
literature by delineating why goodwill trust is repaired prior to competence trust. The findings 
have also led to the identification of four critical factors that drive the repair of goodwill trust, 
senior management involvement, expression of commitment, relationship-specific investment, 
and economic performance. These factors are explained in the following subsections.  
 
Senior management involvement  
Senior management involvement is key to repairing goodwill trust. That is, the findings have 
revealed that this type of trust is repaired more effectively in cases where the upper hierarchy 
of senior management is involved (e.g. general managers and CEOs), because they have more 
authority and resources to make strategic decisions (Kroeger, 2012). Specifically, senior 
management involvement not only helps to signal proportionate commitment and agreement, 
for it also convinces the buyer that those commitments and relationship-specific investment 
can be effectively enforced through a top-down approach (Lewis et al., 2013). Hence, with 
senior management involvement full compliance with the subsequent operational and 
functional coordination is perceived as being more likely. Without this involvement, the buyer 
does not believe that competence can be repaired, because the promises and agreements put 
forward by the supplier will not be effectively implemented, for this resembles the notion of 
reparative attempts enacted during the trust violation stage in the eyes of the buyer.  
 
Expression of commitment  
Consistent with Bell et al. (2002), the supplier’s senior management demonstrates a strong 
commitment to the buyer by giving assurances and promises that it is willing to fulfil the 
buyer’s expectations. For instance, in case 1, the supplier clarified that the request to quit was 
not a corporate decision, but rather, was sent by their operating staff. Moreover, the supplier 
reiterated that it saw the buyer as an important partner and intended to continue that way. This 
is in line with Smith (2002), who stated that the supplier aims to clarify its benign intentions 
and long-term orientation with the buyer.  
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The data have revealed that the supplier can also clearly delineate specific and detailed 
approaches that it will adopt to minimise the buyer’s uncertainty. For example, in case 4, the 
supplier coordinated with the buyer and eventually proposed that the updated model would be 
developed in Japan under tougher manufacturing and testing conditions, which would involve 
it being tested in the buyer’s lab for one week before the agreed deadline. This is consistent 
with Ren and Gray (2009), who held that mutual communication overcomes indifferences in 
terms of values and expected future collaborations. 
Whilst in case 3, the supplier’s general manager leveraged his friendship and 
interpersonal connection with the buyer’s general manager to demonstrate the supplier’s 
intention of relationship continuation and willingness to do whatever it took to repair the 
trusting relationship. In accordance with Wang et al. (2014), it was found that the expression 
of commitment represents an interactional justice approach that focuses on the social element 
of business exchanges. The supplier may demonstrate “how much attitudinal and emotional 
attachment they have towards the buyer” (ibid, p. 376). As a result, the buyer and the supplier’s 
expectations can be realigned (Weick et al., 2005).  
 
Relationship-specific investment  
The extant literature has overlooked the significance of relationship-specific investment in 
repairing goodwill trust. This can be captured by distributive and procedural justice 
approaches, as proposed by Wang et al. (2014), but the authors do not empirically verify it. 
The findings have shown that relationship-specific investment may take the forms of financial 
sacrifice and/or external investment. These responses are aimed at reconciling the conflict of 
interests perceived by the dyad in the trust violation.  
 In terms of financial sacrifice, the data have uncovered a range of reparative responses 
that could be adopted. For instance, in case 2, the supplier agreed to absorb additional 
manufacturing costs with the buyer’s preferred material. In case 3, the supplier directly and 
voluntarily offered a set of financially favourable terms and conditions to be imposed by the 
buyer. The financial sacrifices made by one party would directly transfer into another’s 
interests. This will repair goodwill trust, because the notion essentially indicates whether the 
supplier shows a genuine care about the buyer’s interests. This is consistent with Jap’s (2001, 
p. 86) notion of ‘pie of benefits’, which describes inter-organisational collaboration as 
incremental efforts from a dyad to “give each other a greater benefit that could not have 
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existed without the idiosyncratic contributions of the exchange partners” (Cheung et al. 2011, 
p: 1061). Thus, if the supplier is willing to make financial sacrifices (e.g. additional 
manufacturing costs, self-imposed control, and direct profit), the buyer will perceive itself as 
having the larger share of the benefits from the supplier.  
With respect to external investment, the findings reveal a series of reparative responses. 
For instance, in cases 1 and 2, the supplier invested more resources in improving quality 
control by recruiting more engineers and redesigning the existing tooling. In case 3, the 
supplier decided to invest in a manufacturing centre in China dedicated to the buyer’s 
production and regional service centres in Europe and South America. This is consistent with 
Wang et al.’s (2014, p. 376) distributive justice approach, “if a supplier invests equitable 
amounts of efforts, resources, and time into the disruption resolution as its buyer does”, which 
signals a demonstration of genuine concern and benign intentions by the supplier.  
 As a result, relationship-specific investment repairs goodwill trust, not only because the 
supplier directly reallocates a proportion of benefits to the buyer (i.e. financial sacrifices), 
which signals the former’s intentions to make up the latter’s losses caused by the violation, 
but also, because the supplier engages in substantive responses that demonstrate a long-term 
commitment (i.e. external investment), one that puts it in a more vulnerable position. Those 
responses aim to show the supplier’s perceived repentance (Dirks et al., 2011) and convince 
the buyer to stay in the relationship by giving up its profits to the buyer so that the relationship 
is more financially attractive to that party. 
 
Economic performance  
The data reveal that an increase in economic performance during the trust repair stage may 
help the repair of goodwill trust. The case findings reveal that during the trust repair stage the 
buyer tends to take extra risk by leaving behind the distrust rooted in the violation stage, 
providing opportunities and collaborating with the supplier. If the outcomes turn out to be 
beneficial and rewarding to the buyer and the supplier (e.g. expanded market share and 
increasing projects), the former’s goodwill trust will be further repaired. In line with Jap 
(1999), the profit expansion indicates that the combined interests from the dyad have been 
enlarged, thereby signalling a further increase of goodwill trust. In addition, this is consistent 




 So far, the reason why goodwill trust is repaired prior to competence trust and the critical 
factors associated with the repair of goodwill trust have been discussed. It should be noted that 
senior management from the dyad determines corporate arrangements (e.g. relationship-
specific investment and commitment), which pave the way for operating staff to start the 
reparative responses targeted at competence trust.  
 
6.2.3 The repair of competence trust   
The repair of competence trust begins after goodwill trust is repaired to the point that the buyer 
and the supplier have resolved any conflict of interests and realigned expectations towards 
future collaboration. In this phase, the deals and promises agreed by corporate staff should be 
complied with and implemented by operating staff from each firm, this ultimately reflecting 
the match between words and deeds (Moorman et al., 1993). For example, in case 1, the 
supplier’s corporate staff agreed to redesign the existing tooling and increase the quality 
control. However, operating staff were initially incapable of achieving the level required by 
corporate arrangements. So, the supplier’s senior management transferred a VP from their 
more technically advanced plant in China back to Taiwan to conduct three-month intensive 
training on quality control and tooling redesign. In case 4, the supplier’s corporate staff 
promised to deliver the improved model within a pre-specified deadline and under tougher 
conditions. However, those constraints over time and conditions were surmounted by 
operating staff who executed the plan in line with the corporate arrangements. In the repair of 
competence trust stage, boundary spanners (e.g. R&D engineers, QA/QC engineers, and 
project managers) at operational and functional levels between the buyer and the supplier 
worked together to coordinate and implement reparative responses and solutions in accordance 
with corporate arrangements aimed at repairing the supplier’s competence.  
 Consistent with Bottom et al. (2002), if reparative responses are not efficiently and 
effectively conducted by operating staff, those corporate arrangements made by senior 
management would be deemed as ‘cheap talk’. As a result, the repair of competence trust could 
terminate prematurely, which would directly affect relationship continuity (Wang et al., 2014). 
Interestingly, the data show that the repair of competence trust tends to be gradual and less 
sensitive to reparative responses offered compared to its violation. This is because the buyer 
only recalibrates the supplier’s competence with various performance indicators conducted 
periodically. As previously mentioned, the buyer tends to assume that early competence 
improvement from the supplier in the trust repair stage is elusive and short-term, because of 
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multiple transgressions and ineffective reparative attempts. It tends to observe the supplier’s 
competence for an extended period of time to ensure the quality and production has stabilised 
and the causes of transgressions have been eliminated. The findings have led to the 
identification of three factors that affect the repair of competence trust, namely replacement 
of boundary spanners, the buyer’s assistance, and overall perceptions of the supplier’s 
reparative efforts. 
 
Replacement of boundary spanners  
The findings show that boundary spanners who are associated with the initial transgression 
and trust violation stage should be replaced to repair competence trust effectively. This is 
because they tend to form fixed expectations regarding their counterparts over the extended 
period of time of the violation. For example, in case 3, the boundary spanners from the buyer 
and the supplier had a tense relationship in which the former’s boundary spanners thought the 
latter’s were incompetent and unresponsive, while the supplier’s boundary spanners perceived 
the buyer’s to be nit-picking and unreasonable. This means that boundary spanners were 
carrying the weight of the past, which would have led to continuous opposition between the 
buyer and the suppliers, when this stage was requiring extensive operational coordination. That 
is, this negative affect and cognition would most likely have undermined the effectiveness of 
the follow-up operational and functional collaboration in the repair of competence trust. So, it 
would appear that organisations replace boundary spanners that have experienced the trust 
violation stage to provide the firm with an opportunity to ‘reset’ the relationship. The extant 
literature has not explained the effect of boundary spanners in the trust violation and repair 
process. Hence, this study provides a novel understanding of the effect of boundary spanners 
on the repair of competence trust.  
 
Buyer’s assistance  
Whilst Kim et al.’s (2009) bilateral dynamic model emphasises buyer’s resistance, the findings 
reveal that it can also take an active role in assisting the supplier, especially in the early phase 
of competence trust repair. At the outset of this phase, the supplier may not possess the know-
how to solve the issue alone. Hence, the buyer’s assistance is critical to the process in that its 
involvement can provide certain leverage, if a problem cannot be dealt with by the supplier 
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alone and requires cooperation among external parties (e.g. upstream suppliers and/or other 
third-party quality certifiers). For instance, in cases 1 and 2, the buyer assisted the supplier in 
re-certifying the competence of the supplier’s suppliers, which eliminated any competence 
loopholes stemming from the second tier and third tier suppliers.  
The findings suggest that it is critical to engage in extensive collaboration across 
organisational boundaries. From the supplier’s perspective, without constant and timely 
feedback from the buyer with respect to its technical performance on the production line, the 
supplier cannot adjust its parameters setting accordingly and achieve permanent solutions. In 
addition to information sharing, the buyer can also offer more intensive on-site assistance that 
troubleshoots faults (e.g. workflow quality assurance, design, and production) and eliminates 
them collaboratively in this critical transition. Overall, the buyer and the supplier jointly plan 
operational tasks, decide on performance measurements, and solve technical issues. The joint 
relationship effort facilitates the buyer and the supplier to “co-align their operations and 
processes” (Nyaga et al., 2010, p. 104). 
Another critical effect of the buyer’s assistance is that it serves as a less intrusive way of 
monitoring the supplier’s performance. This is consistent with Yilmaz and Kabadayi (2006) 
view that monitoring can facilitate cooperation by reducing the uncertainty and risk perceived 
by the buyer, which in turn, allows it to assess the supplier’s performance accordingly and 
ensure compliance. Over the initial competence trust repair process, where preventive 
responses are yet to be devised, the buyer has less substantive information to verify the 
supplier’s conduct. This extensive involvement alleviates the buyer’s concern by enabling 
more first-hand information on the supplier’s factory to be directly gathered.  
 
The overall perception of the supplier’s reparative efforts 
Consistent with Dirks et al. (2011), the repair of competence trust has been evaluated based 
upon how effective the supplier is in eliminating the causes of transgressions that occur in the 
trust violation stage. The buyer relies on objective indicators that convince it that the supplier 
has successfully eliminated all causes of the probable transgressions. For example, in cases 1 
and 2, through the effective execution by operating staff in fulfilling the corporate 
arrangements, the supplier had heightened its quality control and overhauled its manufacturing 
processes. After ten continuous deliveries without defects, the supplier was removed from the 
observation list, because the buyer was convinced that its competence had stabilised. Thus, the 
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effectiveness of the competence trust repair phase is ultimately determined by the efficiency 
of devising preventive measures and the consistency of executing these (Gillespie and Dietz, 
2009). Hence, the buyer will assess the supplier’s performance over an extended period of 
time to decide whether or not the responses are truly preventive.  
Apart from perceived prevention, the buyer also evaluates the overall competence of the 
supplier compared to the pre-transgression stage after reparative responses are provided. This 
notion reflects the service failure recovery literature. Consistent with Hess et al.’s (2003) 
contention, the pre-transgression competence seems to serve as an anchor to the buyer’s ex-
post assessment of the supplier’s reparative effort. If the supplier is able to bolster its overall 
competence, which involves the transgression-affected and non-transgression-affected 
domains, this will result in a ‘recovery paradox’, thereby leading to a higher post-repair 
satisfaction and competence trust (Primo et al., 2007).  
 
6.2.4 The differential outcomes between pre-transgression and post-repair trust 
From the findings, it is clearly evident that trust repair leads to three different outcomes (i.e. 
up-, down-ward recalibration, and restoration) with respect to competence and goodwill trust, 
respectively. This research provides a solid empirical foundation regarding the outcomes of 
trust repair (Gillespie, 2017). The majority of the previous studies have hinted that trust is no 
longer reparable once it is violated (e.g. Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan, 2009; MacDuffie, 
2011). In fact, some scholars have argued that trust violation may not warrant reparative efforts 
or may lead to intentional downward recalibration (Stevens et al., 2015; Villena et al., 2011). 
This study has elicited that the three outcomes of trust repair occur in relation to different 
contingencies associated with the trust violation and repair stages. Most importantly, this 
research has empirically verified that upward recalibration is not just an illusion. This is 
consistent with Wang et al. (2014), who argued that whilst, trust repair serves as a relational 
threat, it is also an opportunity for achieving a higher state of trust in the post-repair stage. The 
differential magnitude and timing of the abovementioned reparative responses implemented 
by the buyer and the supplier will determine the outcomes of post-repair trust.  
To summarise (Table 6-3), competence and goodwill trust are repaired sequentially. Each 
repair is initiated at different times and requires different responses. To be specific, goodwill 
trust needs to be repaired before competence trust. It is more sensitive and responsive to 
reparative responses induced by both parties, while competence is less responsive to these and 
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tends to be only gradually repaired, because the supplier’s competence requires an extended 
amount of time to be deemed effective. The effectiveness of competence trust repair depends 
on whether boundary spanners are replaced, the buyer offers assistance to the supplier, and/or 
the reparative responses bolster the domains of competence that have not been affected by the 
trust violation. The findings also empirically verify Lewicki and Bunk’s (1996) hypothetical 
differential outcomes of trust repair, namely upward and downward recalibration as well as 
restoration, with respect to the two trust dimensions. The factors and reparative responses that 
contribute to differential outcomes have been clearly identified. It should be noted that trust 
repair is a process that requires significantly greater resources and strategic shift when 
compared to the trust violation process. In sum, the whole process reflects the notion that trust 
leaves on horseback, but arrives on foot.  
Key concept Extant study Theoretical contribution 
Goodwill trust  Malhotra and 
Lumineau (2011); 
Connelly et al. (2018) 
Goodwill trust is repaired initially  
Goodwill trust is more responsive/sensitive to 
reparative responses  
Senior management 
involvement 
Crossley (2015); Li et 
al. (2013); Wang et al. 
(2014) 
 
Higher organisational hierarchy the more 
effective it is to repair goodwill trust 
Expression of 
commitment 
Confirmed with literature 
Relationship-specific 
investment  
Significant profit reallocation (i.e. financial 
sacrifice) repairs goodwill trust 




Joint profit expansion repairs goodwill trust 
Competence trust  Malhotra and 
Lumineau (2011); 
Connelly et al. (2018) 
Competence trust cannot be effectively 
repaired unless goodwill trust is repaired first.  
Competence trust is less responsive/sensitive 
to reparative responses 
Buyer’s assistance Crossley (2015); Li et 
al. (2013); Wang et al. 
(2014) 
 
Buyer’s involvement facilitates competence 
trust repair  
Replacement of 
boundary spanners 
Replacement of boundary spanners facilitates 
competence trust repair  
The overall 
perception of the 
supplier’s reparative 
efforts 
Competence trust repair is evaluated based on 
i) perceived prevention of the cause of 
transgressions and ii) improvement across 
affected capability domains  
Table 6 - 3. An overview of theoretical contributions to the extant literature on trust repair 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has discussed the case findings in light of the background literature and the 
research questions. Specifically, it has provided responses to the two main research questions 
through four dyadic longitudinal case studies involving both the trust violation and repair 
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stages. Chapter Seven concludes the thesis with a discussion on the contributions of this 





CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
 
INTRODUCTION  
The final chapter outlines the contributions, implications, and limitations of the research. 
Section 7.1 considers the theoretical and empirical contributions, whilst section 7.2 presents 
implications for managers and organisations. Section 7.3 discusses the limitations of the work 
and recommendations for future research.  
 
7.1 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS  
This study advances research on inter-organisational trust violation and repair in several 
respects. In accordance with the literature, five main gaps have been identified, including: i) 
single focus of time, ii) single dimension of trust, iii) single party focus, and iv) single outcome 
of trust repair.  
First, regarding single focus of time, past studies have largely relied on cross-sectional 
data, assuming that trust violation is triggered by a single transgression and trust repair is 
evaluated by a series of reparative responses, simultaneously (e.g. Wang and Huff, 2007; 
Wang et al., 2014; Yu et al., 2017). This single focus of time prevents a more nuanced 
understanding of how trust violation is progressed over time. This study has uncovered that 
multiple loops of trust violation comprise the discovery phase (where a transgression is 
detected), the resistance phase (where a transgression is verified), and the intervention phase 
(where reparative attempts are provided). These three phases repeat over time with the 
accumulation of multiple transgressions until the trust threshold is reached. This accelerates 
the speed of trust violation into the escalation phase and eventually results in a deadlock. On 
the other hand, in the trust repair stage, the findings delineate that various reparative responses 
are implemented across different time periods. In general, corporate arrangements should be 
made between the buyer and the supplier’s senior management that involve the expression of 
commitment and relationship-specific investment. Those corporate arrangements require 
extensive operational collaboration to be effectively implemented and realised. Moreover, the 
trust violation and repair stages are essentially bridged by the positive turning point. In this 
research, the positive turning point has been characterised as a transient period that begins with 
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deadlock (i.e. the end of the trust violation), when both parties emphasise losses caused by the 
previous transgressions. Over time, as the buyer and/or supplier engage in rational cost-benefit 
analysis, such focus on the past transgressions gradually changes to consideration of the 
broader relationship (i.e. the continuation of the relationship). The party with a higher cost-
benefit ratio tends to initiate reparative responses. In addition, by examining trust violation 
and repair together, this advances understanding of the rationale behind the different reparative 
responses enacted and explains why some cases are more difficult to repair than others.  
Second, the extant literature on trust violation and repair has relied on an aggregated 
inter-organisational trust. For this study, the overall trust was divided into two constituting 
dimensions: competence and goodwill trust. This is in response to the call from Connelly et 
al. (2018) to understand the dynamics of competence and goodwill trust with respect to their 
consequences across different contexts (i.e. trust violation and repair) and over time. This 
study has uncovered that competence and goodwill trust are violated in a differential, but 
interdependent manner. It has empirically confirmed that competence trust is easier to violate 
(i.e. more sensitive to transgressions) than goodwill trust, because information pertaining to 
the former is easier to discover and substantiate. Following this, it has been revealed that early 
goodwill trust violation overshadows competence trust violation, while an extended period of 
the latter engenders goodwill trust violation. This means that the violation of goodwill trust 
reflects the character of the supplier (i.e. being opportunistic) and tends to persist over time. 
Moreover, multiple competence-based transgressions not only signal that the supplier is 
unwilling to allocate sufficient resources to solving the transgressions, for they also, over time, 
impair the buyer’s interests. This is perceived to undermine the buyer’s goodwill trust in the 
supplier. In the trust repair stage, the study has illustrated how goodwill trust is repaired earlier 
and more responsively than the competence form. This has been explained by i) the deadlock 
being triggered by the violation of goodwill trust; and ii) competence trust repair is elusive 
and unsustainable without goodwill trust repair in place. In addition, reparative responses 
targeted at goodwill trust take more immediate effect (e.g. expression of commitment between 
senior level management and relationship-specific investment) than competence trust, which 
requires an extended period of time to be verified and stabilised. In the later phase of the trust 
repair stage, the repair of competence and goodwill trust tends to reinforce each aspect, thereby 
creating a positive spiral, which accelerates the speed of trust repair. 
Third, prior studies have greatly focused on behaviour and responses signalled by the 
supplier for causing transgressions and initiating reparative responses, whilst assuming that 
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the buyer plays the role of a passive observer (Kim et al., 2009). In fact, this study has shown 
that the buyer plays an active role in the trust violation stage and invariably determines its 
outcome via the implementation of punitive clauses and imposition of further operational 
constraints on the supplier (i.e. buyer’s resistance). In addition, this research has revealed that 
the buyer’s actions significantly shape the trust repair process. The buyer can initiate reparative 
responses to renegotiate and clarify expectations and commitment with the supplier; offer 
continuous assistance (e.g. technical support and power leverage to drive the supplier’s 
suppliers); and/or reward the supplier with more projects to keep that party motivated. Thus, 
with more engaging buyers, trust repair can be effectively implemented at a greater speed than 
were it otherwise.  
Fourth, there has been no prior research measuring pre-transgression and post-repair trust 
and hence, the overall outcome of trust repair was previously unknown (Gillespie, 2017; 
Kramer and Lewicki, 2010). For the current study, the different levels of trust between the pre-
transgression and the post-repair trust stages were measured. The adopted longitudinal 
approach allowed for the opportunity to compare each case with differential outcomes with 
the corresponding attributes of transgressions, reparative responses, and relationship-specific 
factors. This work has involved empirically exploring the ‘double-edged’ nature of trust repair, 
as proposed by Wang et al. (2014), and has verified that trust repair poses relationship threats 
and opportunities to buyer-supplier relationships. The findings reveal that trust repair can 
result in upward-, down-ward recalibration or restoration in relation to competence and 
goodwill trust. Moreover, based on the comparative case studies, the study offers prescriptive 
insights into how each potential post-repair outcome is derived based on relationship 
characteristics from the pre-transgression stage, to the dynamics of trust violation and through 
to the trust repair stages. 
Apart from theoretical contributions, this study also has provided some methodological 
ones, which will help future endeavours in this research area.   
 
7.2 METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION  
The extant literature has relied heavily on quantitative methodologies to measure the severity 
of trust violation or the effectiveness of reparative responses in mitigating violated trust (e.g. 
Wang and Huff, 2007; Wang et al., 2014). However, these methodologies have some 
shortcomings, such as: (i) trust invariably involves constant adjustments to expectations; and 
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(ii) trust thresholds exist that buffer the negative effect of transgressions prior to the threshold 
being reached and accelerate the trust violation after this. This means that quantitative 
methodologies may not sufficiently explain the process of trust violation and repair. However, 
the vast majority of prior trust violation and repair studies at the inter-organisational level have 
involved quantitative methodologies (e.g. surveys and scenario-based experiment) (e.g. Wang 
and Huff, 2007; Wang et al., 2014; Yu et al., 2017). This study alternatively contributes to the 
field through the adoption of a multiple case study method. This qualitative and longitudinal 
inquiry allowed for exploring the interaction between the buyer and the supplier along with 
the resulting changes of trust over time during its violation and repair stages. Moreover, it has 
facilitated understanding of the rationale of why particular actions and reactions are signalled 
and specific reparative responses are implemented. Further, this longitudinal perspective has 
allowed the researcher to streamline the temporal dynamics of transgressions, ineffective 
reparative attempts, the deadlock, and reparative responses, with respect to the level of 
competence and goodwill trust. 
 The second methodological contribution is with regards to the dyadic perspective in the 
data collection. Kim et al. (2009) suggested that the buyer and the supplier both interact 
dynamically in the event of trust repair. In addition, trust held by the individual or both parties 
would predict the cooperative behaviour (Zaheer and Zaheer, 2006). One-sided data prevent 
insights into the interaction between the dyad and the underlying reasons and motives behind 
the two parties’ reactions. Whilst this study has captured the views from the dyad, the buyer’s 
perspective has been given more emphasis, because the focus has been on supplier-induced 
transgressions, which occur more often than buyer-induced ones (cf. Reimann et al., 2017). 
Nevertheless, the ability to collect the dyadic view provides a holistic understanding of how 
and why trust violation is caused, perceived, and dealt with and why a particular reparative 
response is offered by one or both parties. Additionally, given the highly sensitive nature of 
the data, collecting these from the party (the supplier) that causes a transgression is extremely 
difficult. A series of recommendations to collect such data is put forward, including: (i) 
capturing the buyer’s perspective first; (ii) collaborating through third-party distributors; (iii) 
the researcher involving and familiarising him/herself with the boundary spanners for an 
extended period so that the conflict has time to ‘cool off’; and (iv) collecting data from multiple 
respondents across hierarchical level domains from a target company.  
The final methodological contribution is the use of graphical illustration in the data 
collection and analysis phases of this research study. In the data collection phase, the 
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respondents were asked to follow this illustration to inform about the trust violation and repair 
stages. During the data collection phase, the respondents were also asked to map out the 
dynamics of trust while describing it. Then, the graphical illustration was constantly compared 
with and contrasted to the narratives, which resulted in some discrepancies over the magnitude 
of the trust changes with respect to specific transgression and reparative attempts/responses. 
The researcher then asked key respondents to verify the accuracy of the explanations and 
graphical representation. The use of graphical illustration is not only a practical way to collect 
data, for it is also a powerful means to present rich relationship data over time.  
 
7.3 MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS  
This section discusses the key implications for managers and organisations both to reduce the 
negative effects of trust violation effectively and speedily repair violated trust. These can be 
divided into three aspects: buyer-related, supplier-related, and both. With respect to buyer-
related implications, two approaches are recommended targeted at the trust violation stage, as 
follows.  
 
Intervene in the trust violation early: The findings show that trust violation is caused by a 
gradual exacerbation due to cumulative transgressions and ineffective reparative attempts. The 
buyer tends to treat the initial or early transgressions as regular supply chain disruptions and 
allocates fewer resources than the actual required level. Thus, if the buyer pays closer attention 
to changes in trust, especially when recalibration approaches are not effective in moving on 
from transgressions, thus resulting in mismatched reparative attempts, then middle and senior 
level staff can intervene to reassess the situation and optimise the level of resources needed to 
mitigate the trust violation (i.e. the use of reorientation approaches).  
 
Carefully use punitive clauses: The study has demonstrated that the buyer generally adopts 
standard responses specified in the contract in response supplier induced transgressions. The 
buyer automatically heightens its inspection criteria and charges the supplier compensation. 
As more transgressions occur, the buyer tends to impose more stringent terms and conditions 
on the supplier to protect its own interests and also, to get the lost ground back regardless of 
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the supplier’s operational challenges. Such action not only leads to the supplier’s operational 
difficulties, for it also harms the supplier’s interests, because more resources and time are 
required for it to fulfil the buyer’s expectations under tougher circumstances. This often results 
in a tit for tat situation, where the supplier decides to get revenge or gain back control from 
the buyer, thereby exacerbating the situation. If the buyer can take a more assisting stance and 
demonstrate compassion to help the supplier on technical and social aspects, the latter may not 
show a high level of reluctance to participate.  
 
 With respect to the trust repair stage, the buyer’s managers are recommended to do as 
follows. 
 
Assist the supplier in the early trust repair stage: This study illustrates that senior management 
involvement in the dyad realigns expectations and leads to agreement on corporate 
arrangements, which pave the way for operating staff to execute the subsequent reparative 
responses accordingly. That is, operating staff between the dyad, in turn, collaborate 
extensively to achieve effectively and practically those arrangements. However, sometimes 
the supplier will encounter difficulties in the execution of the agreed tasks (e.g. incompetence, 
lacking the information needed, and lack of influence on their suppliers). If the buyer is willing 
to provide assistance, such as technical support and on-site co-supervision to the supplier 
during difficult periods, this would speed up the repair of the latter’s performance. Moreover, 
such action also provides an opportunity for a less intrusive way of monitoring that can also 
lower the perceived uncertainty of the buyer in the early repair stage.  
 
Increase the order placed or projects when appropriate: If the supplier makes efforts in 
relationship-specific investment (e.g. investment in new plant, machinery, and/or quality 
assurance systems; recruiting more R&D and QA engineers) and achieving preventive 
solutions (e.g. stricter quality control and changes of manufacturing processes), the buyer’s 
perceived competence trust in the supplier will gradually be repaired. If the buyer can reward 
the supplier with more projects or increased volume, this action not only demonstrates the 
buyer’s reciprocity of goodwill trust, for it also motivates the supplier to keep up the reparative 
efforts, thereby creating a positive spiral.   
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This study’s outcomes also stimulate several practical implications for the supplier in the 
trust violation and repair stages.  
 
Mitigate integrity-based transgressions quickly and effectively: This study empirically 
confirms that integrity-based transgressions cause higher severity to the buyer’s goodwill trust. 
It has been shown that sometimes the supplier does not intend to engage opportunistically (e.g. 
strategic and operational decisions based on a rational assessment), but its actions are 
perceived to be integrity-based transgressions. This means that, if the supplier maintains clear 
communication channels and information sharing across the dyad, the buyer will not be 
surprised and can implement complementary measures beforehand, thereby lowering the 
damage.   
 
Avoid failing across multiple domains: If the supplier fails to meet performance targets across 
multiple domains, the buyer’s competence trust will be significantly violated. Also, cases with 
cross-domain failures generally take a longer time to repair. Thus, if the supplier can pay early 
attention to cross-domain failures, they can allocate more resources to quality control and 
troubleshooting to contain them. This means that, the supplier has to identify potential 
‘complications’ stemming from the initial transgression and effectively contain those. In 
particular, the supplier needs to be cognizant of what domains the buyer values the most so 
that it can at least know what to safeguard with more resources.  
 
Supplier’s reactions matter: The study outcomes suggest that disproportionate reactions 
enacted by the supplier in the trust violation stage are, over time, perceived as integrity-based 
transgressions by the buyer. Hence, if the supplier can adhere to proportionate reactions (e.g. 
demonstrations of support, concern, and the willingness to resolve transgression; attempts to 
allocate proportionate resources in devising effective reparative attempts), the violation to the 
buyer’s goodwill trust can be mitigated. In addition, with proportionate reactions, the buyer 
and the supplier are more likely to focus on the problems operationally and constructively, 
thereby being less likely to exacerbate the conflict of interests.   
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Apart from those practical implications from the buyer and the supplier, respectively, the 
following considers the practical implications recommended for both parties in the trust repair 
stage.  
 
Senior management involvement: When both the supplier and the buyer engage in 
renegotiation after deadlock, parties with a higher level of senior management involvement 
not only are perceived to be sincerer in expressing commitment to resolving matters, for they 
also possess more authority and power to make proportionate corporate arrangements on 
relationship-specific investment (i.e. financial sacrifice and external investment). In addition, 
with more senior management involvement, firms are believed to implement the agreements 
and promises made in the corporate negotiation more effectively, because they have more 
power to motivate and drive their operating staff.  
 
Replacement of boundary spanners: Over an extended period of trust violation, boundary 
spanners, especially those at the operating level, tend to form expectations and stereotypes 
about their counterparts’ ability and intentions, which can eventually turn into grudges. Thus, 
it is recommended that boundary spanners at the operating level should be replaced during the 
period where extensive operational coordination takes place, so new ones can solely focus on 
the operational tasks at hand without being biased by the weight of the past.  
 
Trust violation can be benign if repaired properly: This study has revealed that the outcome 
of trust repair can be positive leading to upward recalibration of post-repair trust under certain 
contingencies. Transgressions inevitably occur from time to time, but not all disruptions will 
engender a trust violation (might be contained before reaching the threshold). If both the buyer 
and the supplier manage individual transgressions properly and engage in reparative responses 
as advised, this can also be an opportunity for the inter-organisational relationship to reach a 
higher level of trust. Notably, the outcomes of this study confirm the service failure recovery 
literature (mainly concerning organisation-consumer relationships), which reports that the 
notion of ‘recovery paradox’ also exists at the inter-organisational level in which the post-
repair trust can be more positive than the pre-transgression stage.  
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7.4 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
This study has not been without limitations, some of which will serve to identify future 
research avenues that need addressing. First, the emphasis of competence and goodwill trust 
differs between buyer and supplier (Korsgaard et al., 2014; Villena and Craighead, 2016). That 
is, whilst the dyadic view has been captured, this study has been focused mainly on the buyer’s 
perspective as the trustor, because it is the party, the interests of which are commonly impaired 
due to transgressions induced by the supplier (Wang et al., 2014). However, asymmetric 
perceptions of trust may exist between the buyer and the supplier, because trust violation can 
be interpreted differently based on the standpoint the researcher takes. Thus, further studies 
should investigate trust violation and repair in the event of buyer-induced transgressions. 
Second, this study involved asking the respondents to identify the first major trust 
violation in the business relationship. Thus, trust violation and repair investigated by the 
research refer to ‘pristine’ trusting relationships (Kramer and Lewicki, 2010). Although this 
study confirms the presence of a recovery paradox stemming from service failure recovery 
literature, the extant literature has never examined what would happen when the second major 
trust violation, if it happens, occurs in which service failure recovery literature shows the effect 
of a double deviation. This would mean that the relationship could not be recovered to the pre-
transgression level anymore. In a similar vein, future research should explore the effect of a 
second trust violation on repaired trust (ibid).   
Third, this has study captured two widely acknowledged trust dimensions (i.e. 
competence and goodwill trust) in the trust violation and repair process (Lui and Ngo, 2004). 
However, there are other trust dimensions identified in the literature. For example, 
institutional-based trust has received increasing attention in the extant literature (Bachmann 
and Inkpen, 2011). This refers to impersonal arrangements that comprise legal regulations, 
corporate reputation, and contracts (ibid). Future research may incorporate this additional 
dimension into the trust violation and repair process. For instance, institutional-based trust 
may be violated initially when the supplier-induced transgression signals a breach of the 
contract. In response to this, the buyer may be tempted to increase institutional-based trust by 
adding more contracts. Then, the repair of institutional-based trust may dispel or discount the 
need to repair competence and/or goodwill trust.  
Fourth, the case study research strategy was adopted to understand how trust violation 
and repair unfold in a specific environment, which was the Taiwanese electronics industry for 
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this thesis. Thus, the findings collected and analysed are then restricted to a specific context. 
Despite some studies having emphasised the importance of situated knowledge from case 
study research (Flyvbjerg, 2001), it inherently limits the findings drawn from this thesis being 
extended to additional settings (Lee and Baskerville, 2003). The findings may not be 
empirically generalisable across all countries or industries. Hence, the findings would have to 
be restricted to cases that share similarities to those investigated in this research. For instance, 
the findings can be applicable to critical (interdependence), leverage (supplier dependence), 
and bottlenecks (buyer dependence) quadrants from Kraljic’s model, because the thesis has 
involved sampling the four cases with respect to different mixes of dependence structures 
(Kraljic, 1983). Furthermore, the findings can also apply to other industries in which inter-
organisational relationships are highly integrated and of large exchange volume. For example, 
the automotive industry, high-tech manufacturing industry (e.g. robotics and advanced 
equipment for space, defence, and medical purposes), and pharmaceutical industry (e.g. R&D 
in new drug discoveries and manufacturing) are characterised by high instrumental and 
structural commitment (Gray et al., 2015; Thomke and Kuemmerle, 2002). As a result, the 
industry characteristics (i.e. high exit barrier) motivate the collaborative partners to repair the 
relationship instead of choosing to quit arbitrarily. In addition to that, future research should 
empirically investigate the dynamics of competence and goodwill trust in trust violation and 
repair across different industries and countries. In particular, it would be a fruitful avenue to 
capture the effect of cultural distance between the buyer and the supplier, because this will 
most likely add extra uncertainty to the dyad in trust violation and repair.  
Last, prior studies have only investigated either the trust violation (e.g. Janowicz-
Panjaitan and Krishnan, 2009; Wang and Huff, 2007; Weber, 2017) or trust repair stages (e.g. 
Wang et al., 2014; Yu et al., 2017), which lead to a gap with respect to single phase focus. 
Despite the fact that this thesis attempts to bridge trust violation and repair stages by 
incorporating the notion of deadlock and positive turning point, this thesis does not examine 
the effect of factors and responses presented in the trust violation stage on the following 
competence and goodwill trust repair due to data complexity. Future research should reveal 
the interrelationships of buyer-supplier actions, reactions, and situational factors between trust 
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Appendix I. Reflexive notes from the pilot study 
From the pilot interviews, the industry experts tended to treat ‘inter-organisational trust’ and 
‘business relationship’ interchangeably. Specifically, both words largely represented goodwill 
trust as they seemed to equate ‘inter-organisational trust’ with ‘interpersonal relationships’ 
possessed by corporate and executive staff between collaborating firms. The majority of 
industry experts expressed that goodwill trust between corporate level staff is what really 
matters in shaping organisational decisions while goodwill trust between operating staff tends 
to wear out easily and could not translate into collective actions. On the other hand, the 
industry experts tended to use ‘reliability’ to denote competence trust and stated that 
competence trust is relatively easy to identify because electronics companies have their own 
metrics to assess their partners’ competence periodically involving quality, price, delivery, and 
service in general. Notably, they can deliberately distinguish competence trust and goodwill 
trust if specific wordings are used. Thus, the wordings from the interview guide were modified 
to accurately reflect the industrial knowledge.  
In terms of trust violation, the industry experts revealed that the notion of inter-
organisational trust is a relatively stable construct, which tends not to fluctuate frequently, 
especially for goodwill trust. Though trust violation is generally associated with a conflict or 
disruption (e.g. Lumineau et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2014), the respondents elaborated that: 
dealing with conflicts and disruptions over quality and pricing is regarded as their regular tasks 
and industrial norms to them due to high uncertainty associated with ever-changing supply and 
demand as well as technical sophistication. Most of those disruptions do not directly affect 
their trust perceptions. That is to say, according to the industry experts, transgressions that 
cause trust violation are normally associated with increased severity and rarity across the 
lifetime of overall inter-organisational relationships. That is, a transgression is not only 
accompanied by a breach of contract, but it is also likely to negatively affect the future 
purchasing decisions. Furthermore, the industry experts were able to distinguish regular supply 
chain disruptions and trust violations. Sometimes, a trust violation is a product of the 
accumulation of a series of supply chain disruptions.  
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It should be noted that those industry experts were reluctant to use the words conflict, 
violation, and disruption because these words intrinsically signal negative meanings, which 
tend to shift from problem-solving focus to responsibility shirking. Therefore, they 
intentionally called a transgression as a ‘major issue’, which denotes a more objective 
connotation. 
In terms of trust repair, the industry experts commented that the positive turning point 
relatively easy to identify compared to the point where the repair process is complete. With 
respect to the stage trust repair is deemed complete, the pilot interview showed that there are 
different ways to characterise the post-repair stage, which refer to behavioural manifestation 
and/or written auditing reports. The former describes that the completion of trust repair process 
is normally accompanied by exchange adjustments such as the restoration or increase of 
purchasing volume. It signals that the reliability of the trusted firm has been recovered and the 
intentions have been clarified. On the other hand, the revised trust perceptions in the post-
repair stage, competence trust in particular, is very likely to be documented on periodic reports, 
which are evident and self-explanatory. Thus, the pilot interviews further refined the interview 
guide in terms of measurement criteria of trust dimensions across stages. 
The pilot interviews also indicated that the topic of this research is extremely sensitive, 
especially in this industry. Since transgressions are closely associated with serious quality-
related problems and likely to be reported on the news, firms generally do not want to disclose 
trust violations experienced or caused in the past in order to protect themselves and their 
business partners. Many industry experts were concerned that such negative information 
would harm their reputation and damage their technical credibility. A few respondents even 
noted that the leakage of certain information could affect the stock price of related parties, 
both domestic and international. In particular, the pilot interview showed that suppliers are 
more reluctant to share their roles and responsibilities in the process of trust violation and 
repair. On the contrary, buying firms are more willing to share the related information as they 
are symbolised as ‘victims’ of violating acts. Furthermore, these experts conformed the 
literature that some of severe disruptions (essentially transgressions) involve mediating firms 
such as external technical analytics or authorised distributors to facilitate the problem 





Appendix II. A request for an interview 
Research summary 
I am a doctoral researcher with the University of Bath1 (UK) Information, Decision, and 
Operations division. My research topic centres on relationship (especially inter-organisational 
trust) recovery between supply chain partners within the Taiwanese electronics industry. This 
research adopts in-depth interviews that aim to explore the causal flows of actions and effects 
as well as the overall perceptual journey in the event of relationship violation and recovery. 
The key points of the interview include:  
Please describe a critical issue/disruption occurred on a key component between your 
company and your buyer/supplier that caused inter-firm trust between a dyad to deteriorate 
significantly. 
 What were the attributes of the issue? 
 What were the impact of the issue? 
Please describe how this issue/disruption was resolved and how this damaged relationship was 
recovered  
 What did you and your partner do to recover the relationship? 
 How did these recovery responses affect the relationship? 
Key informants:  
CEO, VPs, AVPs, purchasing/sales managers, key account managers, personnel from 
engineer and R&D departments involved in the recovery process.  
 
                                                     
 
1 University of Bath is ranked top 10 overall in the UK. Its business school is ranked top 3 after 
Cambridge University and Oxford University (Times UK, 2015) 
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The interview is expected to take around an hour. The content of the interview will only be 
used for academic purposes. The names of your company, respondents, and involved 
companies will be anonymised to ensure full confidentiality. The interview aims to explore 
the temporal events, perceptions, interaction, and responses over the violation and recovery 
your company has experienced. Your valuable opinions would enrich my understanding of the 
field. I sincerely hope that you could approve my interview with the members of your 
company. Interview time would be of your convenience.  
 
Hung-Jui (Henry) Wu 
Doctoral researcher 
Information, Decision, and Operations (IDO) 
School of Management, University of Bath, 
Email: hjw40@bath.ac.uk; Tel.  
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Appendix III. Interview agreement 
After reading the following clauses, the respondent ___________ agrees to provide the full 
content of the interview with the researcher, Hung-Jui Wu, for his research. 
1. The interviewee is willing to provide sincere and honest experience voluntarily, but 
has the right to decide the depth.  
2. The interviewee has the right to raise questions and doubts about the research and can 
withdraw the participation of the research at any time. 
3. The interview data will be stored in the researcher’s personal offline hard-drive with 
care. It will not be shared with any cloud storage privately or publicly.  
4. In the process of data analysis, information regarding the names of key people and 
organisations involved will be kept anonymous by replacing them with random 
aliases.  
5. The interview data will only be viewed by the researcher’s supervisors, Professor 
Brian Squire and Professor Jens Roehrich for academic discussion purposes. 
6. The interviewee approves that the processed interview data will serve as a part of the 
interviewer’s thesis as well as publication. 
 
Signature of the interviewee: _________________________ 
Date: ________________________ 
 






Appendix IV. Interview protocol 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in my doctoral research at the University of Bath, School 
of Management, regarding trust repair between supply chain partners. The following interview 
questions represent an interview guide to steer the data collection period of the research and 
to ensure consistency and validity across the investigated cases. The position and name of the 
interviewee will be recorded, but confidentiality should be respected at all times.  
Organisation:  
Position: 
Contact details (tel. /email): 
Date/time: 
Graphical illustration 
You will be asked to follow the graphical illustration below to complete a full story of trust 
repair process across different stages and at the three turning points. In addition, you are 
required to draw specific patterns with respect to the dynamics of trust (capability-wise and 
relationship-wise) that best address the experience of this particular trust repair cycle. You will 




Appendix V. Interview guide 
Opening (Briefly describe my research area) 
Section 1. Respondent and industry background 
General introduction  
1. What is your post and job description?  
 How long have you worked in the company? 
 What is your role in a typical buyer-supplier disruption?  
2. Brief background of the company and industry  
 Location 
 Size 
 General business 
3. As a manager who focuses on developing and managing buyer-supplier relationships, 
what is the most important quality of a business relationship with your firm? 
 What do you think the impact of trust on buyer-supplier relationships? 
 Why is trust important? 
 What does a trusting relationship mean to you? 
 
Section 2. Pre-transgression stage  
Description of the trusting relationship before a violation  
1. How long had you collaborated with the company? 
 Describe the overall relationship prior to the violation (probe: previous violations 
and disruptions, the general dynamics of the relationship in the past; prior ties) 
2. What was the relationship dependence structure?  
 Relationship investment (probe: monetary investment and instrumental investment)  
 Quality and quantity of alternatives available back then (probe: key upstream and 
downstream market players)  
 Structural commitment (probe: the switching cost; other barriers to exit this 
relationship)  
3. What was the trust like back then?  
 Competence trust 
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 Goodwill trust 
 Probe other trust dimensions that might be relevant  
4. What was the exchange like back then (probe: products, volume, frequency of delivery) 
5. What was the contract like that governed the relationship?  
 Contract nature (probe: transactional and procedural elements; enforcement; 
duration; specificity; contingency; and monitoring) 
 How a typical project began (probe: RFQs; durations; assessment) 
6. How was the external environment that affected the relationship? 
 
Section 3. Trust violation stage  
Description of the characteristics of the violation  
1. Please describe the first severe trust violation your firm experienced that has been 
repaired? 
 What was the violation? (probe: violation type) 
 What was the origin of the violation? (probe: hierarchical structure) 
2. How and when was the violation discovered 
 I knew my partner violated the contract because… 
 While the violation was occurring, what decisions were made; how were they 
made? 
 How did you assess the violation? 
3. How was the violation attributed?  
 Locus (external or internal) 
 Stability (whether or not the violation would repeat) 
 Controllability (whether or not the violation can be prevented) 
4. What were losses incurred by the violation? 
 The magnitude  
5. What were immediate reactions of your firm/you? 
 Cognitively (changing in expectation) 
 Affective (anger/ betrayal/ frustration) 
 Exchange and behaviour (planned to lower the next order) 




7. What was the external environment that affected the relationship? 
 
Section 4. Trust repair stage  
Description of the characteristics of the repair 
1. How and when was the repair initiated? (Probe: the timing and the rationale that signalled 
a positive turning point) 
2. What reparative responses were enacted by the buyer and the supplier? 
 Distributive justice approaches  
 Procedural justice approaches 
 Interpersonal justice approaches 
 Informational justice approaches  
3. How were those reparative responses derived? (Probe: what factors might buffer or 
hinder particular responses)  
4. What was the effect of those reparative responses individually and together on elevating 
the violated trust? (Probe: the effect on competence trust and goodwill trust) 
5. Did this process involve any third-parties?  
6. What was the external environment that affected the relationship? 
7. How long did it take to repair? 
 
Section 5. Post- repair stage  
Descriptions of the trusting relationship after the repair  
1. What was the relationship dependence structure?  
 Relationship investment (probe: monetary investment and instrumental investment)  
 Quality and quantity of alternatives available back then (probe: key upstream and 
downstream market players)  
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 Structural commitment (probe: the switching cost; other barriers to exit this 
relationship)  
2. What was the trust like after the repair compared to the pre-transgression stage?  
 Competence trust 
 Goodwill trust 
 Probe other trust dimensions that might be relevant  
3. What was the exchange like after the repair?  
4. What was the external environment that affected the relationship? 
 
Final remarks  
Is there anything else you would like to add or clarify?  
Could you please point out any additional information that would support my research? 
(Prompt: e.g. company documents; industry report). 
Please advise if other organisations and/or individuals involved in the process of trust repair 











Appendix VI. Supporting interviews (unilateral perspective) 
Intervi
ewee 
Post; year of experience Interviewee’s company and its profile Counterpart Minute The product involved in 
the violation 
1 Product manager; 5  EPISTAR corporation (buyer) 
The company is the largest LED manufacturer globally that manufactures LED lighting, 
LED backlighting, and LED display products for a mobile phone screen, laptop, 
television, automotive, and other applications. 
Capital: $ 380 million 
Employee: 4000  
A.L.M.T. Corporation (manufacturer) via an exclusive distributor, Kingtech Corporation. ALMT 
Corp belongs to Sumitomo industries, the largest semiconductor machines and supplies provider.  
Capital: $24 million 
Employee: 1360 
2) King Tech Corporation (distributor) 
The distributor provides supplies for LED back end of the line including wafer grinding tools, IC 
reclaim, laser cutting machine and UV glue.  
Employee: 50 
60 Grinding Wheel, 
diamond cutters, and 
chemical solutions  
2 Associated vice president (head of 
the marketing department); 20  
Gigabyte Technology (Buyer) 
The company is an international manufacturer and distributor of computer hardware 
products. Their products include motherboards, display cards, laptops, tablet PCs and 
devices, smartphones, and peripherals. 
Capital: $291 million 
Employee: 8000  
Synnex Technology International Corporation (buyer)  
The largest electronic distributor in Asia (top 3 globally) that supplies information, communication, 
consumer electronics, electronic components. Services focus on supply chain integration (marketing, 
distribution, maintenance, and CTO) 
Capital: $320 million 
Employee: 5000 
80 Motherboard 
3 Strategic procurement manager; 12 ASUSTek Computer (buyer) 
The company is a Taiwanese multinational computer hardware and electronics provider. 
Its products include desktops, laptops, mobile phones, networking equipment, 
motherboards, workstations, and tablet PCs. It is ranked the world’s top 5 PC 
manufacturer. 
Capital: $250 million 
Employee: 17000 
Pegatron Corporation (supplier) 
The company is a Taiwanese electronics manufacturer that develops mainly computing, 
communications and consumer electronics to branded vendors, but also engages development, 
design, and manufacturing of computer peripherals and components.  
Capital: $1 billion 
Employee: 177000 
30 Thermal module 
4  Senior procurement manager; 19  HEC Corporation (buyer) 
The company principally focuses on the research, development and manufacturing of 
smart handheld devices. The Company provides touch phones, personal digital assistant 
(PDA) phones, smartphones, Android smartphones, and panel computers. 
Capital: $280 million 
Employee: 16000 
Qualcomm (supplier) 
The company focuses on providing third-generation (3G), fourth-generation (4G) and next-
generation wireless technologies. 
Annual profit: $24 billion  
Employee: 26000 
90 IC (for CPU) 
 5 Project manager; 7  40 
6 
 
General manager; 23 EST Technology Integration Corp (distributor)  
EST specialises in distributing power application and keyboard/mouse IC.  
Capital: $30 million 
Employee: 120 
 
Foxlink Group (buyer) 
Manufactures and sells connectors, cable assemblies, power management devices, battery packs on 
an OEM/ODM basis to some of the world's leading makers of communications devices, computers 
and consumer electronics. 
2017 Revenue: $3.2 billion 
Employee: 56000 
70 IC (for keyboard and 
mouse) 
 7 Project manager; 5  50 
8 Field application engineer; 6  55 
9 Senior sales manager; 21  60  
10 Associated vice president; 15  Chang Wah Electromaterials Inc. (CWE) (supplier) 
This is a distributor of packaging materials and equipment from many prominent 
international firms such as Taiwan Sumitomo Bakelite, Sumitomo Metal Mining, Asia 
Pacific. 
Capital: $25 million 
Employee: 2000 
Siliconware Precision Industries Co., Ltd (SPIL) (buyer) 
The company provides semiconductor packaging and testing services including advanced packages, 
substrate packages and lead-frame packages, as well as testing for logic and mixed signal devices.  
Capital: $1.1 billion 
Employee: 23000 
60 Lead frame 
 
11 Head of R&D department; 20 Siliconware Precision Industries Co., Ltd (SPIL) (buyer) 
The company provides semiconductor packaging and testing services including advanced 
packages, substrate packages and lead-frame packages, as well as testing for logic and 
mixed signal devices.  
Capital: $1.1 billion 
Employee: 23000 
Chang Wah Electromaterials Inc. (CWE) (supplier) 
This is a distributor of packaging materials and equipment from many prominent international firms 
such as Taiwan Sumitomo Bakelite, Sumitomo Metal Mining, Asia Pacific. 





Senior procurement manager; 12  Advanced Semiconductor Engineering Inc. (ASE Group) (buyer) 
ASE is the world’s largest provider of semiconductor assembly and testing. It develops 
and offers complete turnkey solutions covering IC packaging, design and production of 
interconnect materials, front-end engineering test, wafer probing and final test. 
Capital: $3.7 billion 
Employee: 25000 
Yaga electronic (supplier) 
The company is an ISO 9001 and IECQ QC080000 certified, which specialises in IC assembly 
material provision and PCB/TVB manufacturing.  
Capital: $1 million 
Employee: 200 
50  Recycled IC container 
13 Associated vice president; 25  ASEC (supplier) 
The company is a Taiwan-based distributor that provides semiconductor components for 
information, telecommunications and consumer electronics industries.  
Capital: $5 million 
Employee: 120 
Gigabyte Technology (Buyer) 
The company is an international manufacturer and distributor of computer hardware products. Their 
products include motherboards, display cards, laptops, tablet PCs and devices, smartphones, and 
peripherals. 
Capital: $291 million 
Employee: 8000  
Acer, Inc. (Buyer) 
80 IC (for motherboard) 
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is a Taiwanese multinational hardware and electronics provider. Their products include desktop PCs, 
laptops, tablets, smartphones, and peripherals. 




Sales engineer; 7  ITE Tech (supplier) 
The company principally engages the research, development, manufacture and 
distribution of integrated circuits (ICs).  
Capital: $50 million 
Employee: 450  
ATEN (buyer) 
The company is a Taiwan-based company principally engaged in the research, development, 
manufacture and distribution of keyboard-video-mouse (KVM) switches and related products.  
Capital: $400 million 
Employee: 1700 
30 IC 
15 PM; 9  Foxconn Technology Group (buyer) 
The company principally engages in the manufacture, research, development and 
distribution of computer, communication and consumer electronics (3C) products. The 
Company provides metal casings and structures, the heat sink of desktops, servers, 
notebook computers, tablet computers and other 3C products. 
Capital: $5.3 billion 
Employee: 800000 
Winbond Electronics Corporation (supplier) 
is principally engaged in the research, development, design, manufacture and sale of integrated 
circuits (ICs) and memory products. The Company primarily provides logic ICs, dynamic random-
access memory (DRAM) products 
Capital: $1.1 billion 
Employee: 2500 
70 Flash RAM 
16 
 
Director of the production 
department; 17  
ChipMOS Technologies Inc. (buyer) 
The company is a leading independent provider of total semiconductor testing and 
packaging solutions to fabless companies, integrated device manufacturers (IDM) and 
foundries. 
Capital: $300 million 
Employee: 6000 
Wah Lee Industrial Group (distributor)  
The company is a Taiwan-based company primarily engaged in the development and provision of 
industrial materials. 
Capital: $100 million 
Employee: 520 
20 Lead frame 
17 Senior sales manager; 15 Wah Lee Industrial Group (distributor)  
The company is a Taiwan-based company primarily engaged in the development and 
provision of industrial materials. 
Capital: $100 million 
Employee: 520 
An electronic device manufacturer (buyer) (preferred not to reveal) 50  Chemical solution 
18  Purchasing manager; 7  Lanner Electronics Inc. (buyer)  
is a Taiwan-based manufacturer and distributor of network computing products and 
advanced computers (ACs). 
Capital: $135 million 
Employee: 680 
Super Circle (supplier) 
The company is a Taiwan-based manufacturer specialised in different metal sheet components and 
grinding supplies. The firm also provides computer peripherals and networking server.  
Employee: 40 
60 Metal sheet for server  
19 Project manager, 8  Alpha Network Inc. (buyer) 
The company is a Taiwan-based company principally engaged in the manufacture and 
sales of telecommunication-controlled radio frequency equipment, as well as wireless 
communication machinery and equipment. 
2017 Revenue: $560 million 
Employee: 6300 
A US supplier through a Taiwanese distributor (supplier) (preferred not to reveal) 30  IC 
20 Product manager; 6  ASUSTek Computer (buyer) 
The company is a Taiwanese multinational computer hardware and electronics provider. 
Its products include desktops, laptops, mobile phones, networking equipment, 
motherboards, workstations, and tablet PCs. It is ranked the world’s top 5 PC 
manufacturer. 
Capital: $250 million 
Employee: 17000 
Intel Corporation (supplier)  
The company is an American multinational corporation and technology company. Intel supplies 
processors for computer system manufacturers such as Dell, Asus, and Apple. 
2017 Revenue: $62 billion 
Employee: 100000 
50  IC (CPU) 
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Appendix VII. An overview of the pre-determined coding scheme 
Category  Code  Sub-code Description  
Inter-organisational trust  Competence trust  Capability  “The expectation of technically competent role performance” (Das and Teng, 2001: p. 256). It denotes a partner organisation’s “ability 
to perform according to agreements” (Nooteboom, 1996: p. 990) Quality  
Service 
Goodwill trust  Concern for interests  “The expectation that some others in our social relationships have moral obligations and responsibility to demonstrate a special concern 
for other’s interests above their own” (Das and Teng, 2001: p. 256). It denotes a partner organisation's intentions to perform according 
to agreements (Nooteboom, 1996). 
Interpersonal trust between 
corporate staff 
Relationship characteristics  Exchange characteristics  It involves product categories, delivery standards, volume, and other exchange-related details. 
Contract characteristics  It involves the nature of the contract (e.g. format, length, contingencies) 
Relationship duration   The length of the relationship established prior to the violation. 
Relationship stage Exploration  Stages (awareness, exploration, expansion, commitment, dissolution) with respect to different natures of a relational exchange over the 
development of buyer-supplier relationships (Dwyer et al., 1987) Expansion 
Commitment  
Relationship dependence  Relationship investment Instrumental investment The trustor’s investment in the relationship involves 1) instrumental and/or 2) emotional (cf. McAllister, 1997). “Instrumental 
investments such as time and money are expected to produce economic benefits. Emotional investments such as fostering close affective 
bonds are expected to produce benefits such as feelings of security, approval, and affirmation” (Tomlinson, 2011: p. 145). Emotional investment 
Quality/ quantity of 
alternatives  
 A trustor who needs the benefits of trust (i.e. confident positive expectations that will indeed be fulfilled) might be able to achieve these 
benefits from a broad base of able and willing trustees. Thus, a trustor forms a perceived comparison level for alternatives, which refers 
to “the quality of the best of the member’s available alternatives… (or) the reward-cost positions experienced or believed to exist in the 
most satisfactory of the other available relationships” (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959: p. 22). 
Structural commitment  Switching cost Sometimes a trustor “may feel compelled to continue the relationship due to certain external constraints” (cf. Tomlinson, 2011: p. 145). 
Exiting a relationship may involve certain barriers including switching costs and/or institutional mechanisms that inhibit relationship 
termination (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). Institutional arrangements 
Shadow of the past  Since trust is built incrementally over time through prior interaction and experiences (Gulati 1995), prior history creates a shadow of the 
past to trust. It is argued that the shadow of the past provides little economic motivation to trust. On the contrary, the major motivation 
is to promote shared identities in interfirm relationships and thus fulfil basic human needs such as social belongingness (cf. Poppo et al., 
2008). 
Shadow of the future  Shadow of the future indicates the expectations of future interaction, thereby lead to cooperative assurances. Such assurances are 
developed through reciprocal acts and are dependent on a significantly long time horizon of future exchange (Poppo et al., 2008) 
The characteristics of trust 
violation  
Locus    Whether the cause of the violation is attributed internally or externally (Heider, 1958) 
Controllability   Whether the cause of the violation can be prevented by the inflicted party (Weiner, 1985) 
Stability   Whether the cause of the violation is likely to repeat (Weiner, 1985) 
Hierarchy  Operating level staff Whether the violation is caused by the corporate or operating staff (Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan, 2009) 
Corporate level staff 
Severity   The consequence of the violation (e.g. financial and reputational damage) (Tomlinson and Mayer, 2009) 
Type   Whether the violation is caused by the partner’s inability to do so (competence violation) or the partner’s unwillingness to do so (integrity 
violation) (Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan, 2009) 
Duration  Time taken as the violation unfolds 
Function  The pattern of how the violation unfolds. “Departures depict the break or deviation from the prior flow of activities, but they do not 
account for the impact or consequence of these actions” (Putnam and Fuller 2014: p. 190) 
External environment  “as a source of opportunity and threat which is evaluated in terms of gross movements or tends” (e.g. economic, social, and political 
influence) (cf. Bourgeois, 1980: p. 32) 




Compensation provision Distributive justice refers to benefits received are proportional to investment. Organisations “will always receive economic rewards 
commensurate with their input into the relationship” (cf. Liu et al., 2012: p. 358). It manifests in 1) compensation provision and 2) 
resource investment (Wang et al., 2014)  
Resource investment  
Procedural justice approaches  Modifications of SOPs and 
contracts 
Procedural justice indicates that decision-making of an organisation is “unbiased, representative, transparent, correctable, and ethical 
as well as consistent with contractual codifications” (Luo, 2008: p. 28). It manifests in 1) modifications of standard operational 
Joint decision making 
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Real-time and appropriate 
recovery procedures 
procedures and governance structures; 2) joint decision making (e.g. involvement of affected partners, the concern of mutual interest 
and welfare); 3) a near real-time and appropriate execution of recovery procedures (Wang et al., 2014) 
Interpersonal justice 
approaches  
 Interpersonal justice refers to interpersonal treatment received in communicating the allocation of resources. It is assessed based on 
violators’ sensitivity, dignity, politeness and respect in enacting reparative responses (Liu et al., 2013). It manifests in the demonstration 
of respect, concern, and willingness to help (e.g. providing frequent help and regular visit) (Liu et al., 2012)  
Informational justice 
approaches  
Tailored communication Buyers and suppliers “communicate candidly, explain procedures thoroughly and reasonably, communicate details in a timely manner, 
and tailor communications to each other’s specific needs” (cf. Liu et al., 2013: p. 359). It manifests in 1) tailored communication, 2) 
thorough and reasonable explanations of procedures, 3) timely, detailed, and accurate communication (Liu et al., 2012) 
Thorough and reasonable 
explanations of procedures  
Timely and accurate 
communication 
Function  The pattern of how the recovery unfolds. “Departures depict the break or deviation from the prior flow of activities, but they do not 
account for the impact or consequence of these actions” (Putnam and Fuller 2014: p. 190) 
Duration  Time taken as the recovery unfolds 
External environment  “as a source of opportunity and threat which is evaluated in terms of gross movements or tends” (e.g. economic, social, and political 
influence) (cf. Bourgeois, 1980: p. 32) 
Trust repair stage Pre-transgression stage  Trust reaches an equilibrium over repeated exchanges without any severe violations (Dirks et al., 2009) 
Trust violation stage  Trust declines after the occurrence of the violation (Dirks et al., 2009) 
Trust repair stage  Trust bounces back after reparative efforts signalled by one or both parties (Dirks et al., 2009) 
Post-repair stage  Trust reaches a new equilibrium (Dirks et al., 2009) 
The involvement of the third 
party  
 Whether a third-party mediation is involved (Woolthuis et al., 2014). 
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Appendix VIII. Nvivo snapshots
276 
 
 
